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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‘James: “Our vocabulary is inadequate.” Then why don’t we  
introduce a new one?’1 
 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is regarded as one of the most influential 
and eminent philosophers of the twentieth century. In both his early and later 
work, he is a key figure in the development of analytical philosophy: he wants 
us to see that natural language use is pivotal to understanding the nature of the 
mind.
2
 However, his later work, specifically with regard to the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) [henceforth referred to as the Investigations], where 
concepts are a participating part of the context, makes him a key figure in 
contemporary cognitive psychology. While Wittgenstein’s interest in 
psychology began between 1934-1936 when he lectured on private experience 
and sense data,
3
 his contributions to the field of psychology continued up until 
his death in 1951. Unknown to Wittgenstein at the time, his remarks on 
philosophical psychology would have an enormous influence on both the 
psychology and philosophy disciplines. 
 
                                                 
1
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [1953], trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, 3
rd
 
edn, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), #610. 
‘James’ here refers to William James (1842–1910). Psychology’s inception can be seen in the 
early stages of American psychology, commencing with James.  As part of his seminal work, 
he proposed that there should be less emphasis on the structure of consciousness and more 
emphasis instead on the character of consciousness and its relation to the environment. Here 
we can see a Wittgensteinian theme in terms of the prominent role that the ‘context’ or the 
‘environment’ play. In 1890 James published Principles of Psychology in the United States. 
(Also, interestingly, the first two words in Zettel are: ‘William James’.) 
2
 Meredith Williams, Preface, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning — Towards a Social 
Conception of Mind (London: Routledge, 1999). 
3
 Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 23. 
 2 
 Wittgenstein is a towering figure in history and yet his contribution to 
the domain of cognitive psychology specifically has, to date, been undervalued 
and underestimated.  This study examines Wittgenstein’s move from viewing 
language as a calculus to his more natural language view as exemplified in his 
language-game. While Wittgenstein’s early work in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921) [henceforth referred to as the Tractatus] is primarily 
concerned with language and logic, and was influential on the logical positivist 
movement, his later philosophy shows his view on language, human nature and 
how behaviour is intrinsically linked to the practice of language and its use.  
 
Wittgenstein’s remarks and descriptions in his later work, the 
Investigations, show concepts in varying ways, such as ‘concept’ qua concept, 
concepts ‘about’ things in the world, and the more specific concepts that he 
refers to in the preface of the Investigations. In contrast to Wittgenstein’s 
description of concepts and the practice of language, the cognitive approach 
adopted by psychology explains concepts and, therefore their use, in a more 
developmental and theoretical framework. 
 
The term ‘family resemblance’ is used by Wittgenstein to show that 
there is no defining feature, no one essence, of a concept but rather there is a 
criss-crossing and over-lapping of features. This term ‘family resemblance’ 
was later used by cognitive psychology to support an approach in concept 
development, namely the prototype view. Interestingly, while the cognitive 
theorist Eleanor Rosch used Wittgenstein’s term family resemblance to 
 3 
develop the prototype view in cognitive psychology, I am using Rosch’s term 
‘participatory’ to support my argument that Wittgenstein considered that 
concepts are participatory in any language-game. 
 
While the Investigations also shows Wittgenstein’s rejection of 
mentalism and cognitive analysis, he does not deny that mental processes and 
states exist; he considers, rather, that they should play a more prominent role in 
how we use language. For Wittgenstein, this is not in any developmental way, 
but in our behaviour. Furthermore, Wittgenstein is aware of the limitations of 
behaviourism. 
 
Wittgenstein’s descriptions and remarks show concepts are not isolated 
and abstract objects, but ‘participate’ within a context or environment, i.e., a 
language-game. Through a language-game, the individual, with mind and body 
(in a non-dualistic sense)
4
 engages with concepts. Wittgenstein’s description of 
this process is a contemporary cognitive approach to concepts, namely the 
embodied cognition thesis.  
 
This study will show how Wittgenstein’s Investigations and his remarks 
on concepts have had a direct influence on cognitive psychology, thus I 
consider that he should be viewed as one of the key figures in the history of 
                                                 
4
 Proponents of the embodied cognition thesis argue against the radical separation of ‘mind’ 
and ‘body’. These authors, however, still need to talk about ‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ to 
explain their embodied cognition thesis, and so, sometimes this may give the impression that 
these are separate entities. Thus there is a linguistic paradox that terms have to be used about 
‘the mind’ and ‘the body’, but in a non-dualistic sense. Throughout this study, therefore, I have 
attempted to use the terms ‘body’ and ‘mind’ in the embodied cognition viewpoint in a non-
dualistic sense, while the context determines whether the terms are being used in a traditional 
Cartesian dualistic sense or non-dualistic sense. 
 4 
psychology, alongside other prominent theorists such as B. F. Skinner and 
Sigmund Freud. 
 
This dissertation comprises seven chapters. Chapter one begins with an 
outline of  difficulties in interpreting the influence of Wittgenstein’s thought on 
cognitive psychology, but demonstrates that his thinking on the nature of 
‘concepts’, ‘language-games’, ‘meaning’, ‘human behaviour’, ‘family 
resemblance’ are of central importance to cognitive psychology. 
 
Chapter two looks at the historical background to the philosophy of 
language and introduces two of its main contributors, Gottlob Frege and 
Bertrand Russell. Arguably logic might have played an important role without 
Wittgenstein, due mainly to the significant contributions by Frege and Russell, 
but it was ‘Wittgenstein who provided a powerful methodological rationale for 
its role, and who brought language into the equation.’5 The logical positivists’ 
approach to language is discussed in light of the Tractatus and we examine 
how Wittgenstein’s move from a quasi-realist position to an anti-realist 
position is exemplified in the Investigations. We look at the role of behaviour 
that Wittgenstein is so interested in, and how he rejects any theoretical account 
to explain language and its use. 
 
Chapter three examines Wittgenstein’s continuity of thought in relation 
to language as he moves from presenting a calculus view of language to a 
language-game view of life. His two central concepts are introduced and 
                                                 
5
 Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, p. 28. 
 5 
examined: ‘language-games’ and ‘family resemblance’. His views on language 
as behaviour, or a human activity, and the role that language plays for 
Wittgenstein are all explored. 
 
Chapter four examines the potential problem for philosophy and 
psychology if Wittgenstein is viewed as a behaviourist rather than as a 
philosopher who had an interest in behaviour. This misinterpretation of 
Wittgenstein leads to a major misconception and misunderstanding of his 
work, and subsequently distorts the significance of his rejection of mentalism 
and his foresight in seeing the limitations of behaviourism. We look at 
Wittgenstein’s interest in behaviour as a way of explaining language and its 
use, and ultimately how this behaviour is part of engaging with the context, or 
the environment, where concepts become participatory. There is also a brief 
overview of his private language argument to support his rejection of 
mentalism, a description on the differences between analytical behaviourism 
and methodological behaviourism, and some commentary on Skinner to 
support the argument that viewing Wittgenstein as a behaviourist is a 
misinterpretation of his work and of his philosophy. 
 
Chapter five examines the philosophical roots and origins of 
psychology, and paradigms such as structuralism, functionalism and Gestalt. 
There is a discussion on the nature of concepts, which outlines their function, 
such, as communication, inference, prediction, understanding and reasoning, 
followed by an examination into the different approaches that cognitive 
 6 
psychology takes to concepts, thus the definitional view and prototype, 
exemplar and knowledge approach are all discussed. There is also a review of 
the cognitive revolution, which ultimately gave rise to how the mind was being 
re-considered as new terms, such as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognitive processing’, 
were introduced. However, while the revolution moved psychology in a new 
and promising direction, it still remained ‘abstract’ and failed to take account 
of the environment and the role that a context could play. 
 
Chapter six looks at the historical anchors of embodied cognition, such 
as: metaphor and cognition, enactive cognition, rethinking robotics, and 
phenomenology,
6
 before Margaret Wilson’s six claims for embodied cognition 
are examined. We look at remarks from the Investigations to show the 
Wittgensteinian theme of situating concepts and showing concepts as 
participatory and part of the context, before finally assessing the empirical 
domains for embodied cognition. 
 
Chapter seven presents a series of arguments which show that concepts, 
as they occur in a language-game, are participatory. Furthermore, I show how 
the interaction between the context of a language-game, concepts that are 
participatory and the individual, is also known as the embodied cognition 
thesis. This is Wittgenstein’s legacy to cognitive psychology. 
 
                                                 
6
 Robert A. Wilson and Lucia Foglia, ‘Embodied Cognition’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition> 
[accessed 08 August    2012] (p. 8). 
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CHAPTER I 
 
SITUATING WITTGENSTEIN’S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
‘Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our  
style of painting arbitrary?’1 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations is a book which proposes to deal with a number 
of concepts. In the preface dated 1945, Wittgenstein states that the 
Investigations are philosophical ‘remarks’ that concern many subjects: ‘the 
concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the 
foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things.’2 
However, while this dissertation is concerned with these sorts of concepts, it is 
also interested in Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘concept’ qua concept. These are 
the type of concepts that are essential for us to make sense of the world and our 
experiences. Thus this research is concerned with Wittgenstein’s concepts as 
described in his remarks and with the concepts that occur in language-games 
where they can be seen as ‘participatory’ and where, as Rosch puts it: 
 
The world does contain ‘intrinsically separate things.’ The world is 
structured because real-world attributes do not occur independently of 
each other.
3
  
 
 
This dissertation also examines the cognitive view of concepts, thus an inter-
disciplinary approach is taken. We look at cognitive psychology’s theoretical 
                                                 
 
1
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 195. 
2
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Preface. 
3
 Eleanor Rosch and others, ‘Basic Objects in Natural Categories’, Cognitive Psychology, 
(1976), 382-439 (p. 383). 
 8 
account of concepts and their use which is in contrast to Wittgenstein’s ‘form 
of life’ or concepts as part of the context.  
 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with how the 
role of language is involved in human behaviour.  Unlike his earlier work in 
the Tractatus where he is concerned with the picture theory of meaning, and 
for us to understand language as a picture that structures reality, the 
Investigations is Wittgenstein’s own investigation into the workings of 
language and grammar.  For him, the language-game is a communal process: it 
is language in action, language as behaviour, a form of life.   
 
In the language-game, Wittgenstein considers that there is no one 
essence of a ‘game’; similar to his exposition of the term ‘family resemblance’, 
features over-lap and, thus, many and various associations are considered: 
 
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning 
of this word (“good” for instance)? From what sort of examples? In 
what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the 
word must have a family of meanings.
4
 
 
This term (‘family resemblance’) has also greatly influenced the seminal work 
of Eleanor Rosch (1978) and the prototype view on concepts which is 
discussed in Chapter 4. Wittgenstein argues that there is no one single or 
defining feature that all games have in common.  In fact, many of the features 
and characteristics of ‘games’ are similar to, and some are identical to, 
                                                 
4
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #77. 
 9 
characteristics of human activity, hence his argument that language is a 
function of life or a ‘form of life’. 
 
Wittgenstein makes use of metaphors and analogies throughout the 
Investigations: 
 
In what sense can one call wishes, expectations, beliefs, etc. 
“unsatisfied”? What is our prototype of nonsatisfaction? Is it a hollow 
space? And would one call that unsatisfied? Wouldn’t this be a 
metaphor too?—Isn’t what we call nonsatisfaction a feeling—say 
hunger? 
In a particular system of expressions we can describe an object 
by means of the words “satisfied” and “unsatisfied”. For example, if we 
lay it down that we call a hollow cylinder an “unsatisfied cylinder” and 
the solid cylinder that fills it “its satisfaction”.5 
 
He now sees language as a tool, rather than his previous description in the 
Tractatus, where he describes language as a picture. He wants us to think of 
words as tools and sentences as instruments. Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a 
language-game is used so that we understand using language as an analogy for 
playing games: using words and playing games are a human activity, a form of 
‘behaviour’.  He is asking us to look at the uses of words and to observe the 
over-lapping and criss-crossing of family resemblances.  He further contends 
that even abstract concepts
6
 (as opposed to concrete concepts)
7
 we use, such as 
‘truth’ and ‘government’, are all understood in their use only: there is no one 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., #439. 
6
 Abstract concepts are more difficult to understand and, therefore, acquire, and use 
competently. Children usually move from being able to use concrete concepts competently to 
the more abstract concepts between the ages of 10 and 12. An example of an abstract concept 
would be the term ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’. 
7
  An example of a concrete concept would be ‘apple’, ‘chair’, and ‘bed’. Concrete concepts 
are easier to acquire than abstract concepts; once learned they are easily identifiable and can be 
categorised without too much difficulty. Furthermore, when concrete concepts are acquired, 
extensions can then be made, such as including items like ‘bedside lamp’, ‘curtains’, and 
‘dressing table’ as all belonging to the same category as ‘bedroom furniture’. 
 10 
single essence that defines these terms. For Wittgenstein, there is no place 
outside of language that we can stand and observe its workings or its meaning, 
and nor can language ever be transcended. Finally, he contends that 
philosophical problems only arise from the misuse and, therefore, the 
misunderstanding of language: he states that if a word is abstracted from a 
language-game, confusion and ambiguity arise: 
 
Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation 
with the method of science […]. Philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does.  This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce 
anything to anything, or to explain anything.  Philosophy really is 
‘purely descriptive’. (Think of such questions as “Are there sense 
data?” and ask: What method is there of determining this? 
Introspection?)
8
 
 
Wittgenstein is considered by some ‘to have exerted an influence more 
powerful than that of any other individual upon the contemporary practice of 
philosophy.’9 Since Warnock made this statement in 1958, many still regard 
Wittgenstein in this light. Without exception, he is remarkable in many 
respects outside of the Tractatus and the Investigations, and indeed it could be 
considered that often his other works, such as: Zettel, Remarks on Colour, On 
Certainty, Culture and Value and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 
which were all published posthumously, are forgotten in the shadows of the 
substantive and influential texts of the Tractatus and the Investigations. 
                                                 
8
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical 
Investigations [hereafter either The Blue Book or The Brown Book][1958], 2
nd
 edn, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1969), p. 18. 
9
 G.J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 
62. 
 11 
 
Wittgenstein’s central idea of language as behaviour, a human activity, 
and the role that language plays in using concepts, is key to understanding his 
contribution to psychology. This dissertation will show that cognitive 
psychology has been shaped by Wittgenstein’s remarks on concepts and 
language-use, specifically in the areas of how concepts are situated within a 
context or environment, and the embodied cognition thesis. 
 
1.1 STATUS QUAESTIONIS 
 
While there is much written about Wittgenstein, there are limited documented 
details of his direct contribution to cognitive psychology.
10
  While we know 
that there are many philosophical influences throughout psychology as a 
whole, there are some that are specific to cognitive psychology. The focus of 
                                                 
 
10
  I use the word ‘limited’ when I am referring specifically to cognitive psychology and the 
direct contribution that Wittgenstein made. Clearly, there is extensive literature on how 
Wittgenstein, both in general terms and also in more specific areas, contributed significantly 
and these contributions have been documented by eminent philosophers, critics and scholars. 
While it would be impossible to name all of the major contributors on Wittgenstein, and 
difficult to choose even a few of the most prominent (depending on the area of interest in 
question), the commentary that I consider to have portrayed Wittgenstein from the most 
accurate and factual  perspective are: G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Essays on the 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein – Meaning and Understanding (London: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1980); Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1996); Maria McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London: 
Routledge, 1997) and Elucidating the Tractatus – Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy of Logic 
and Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009); Norman  Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein A 
Memoir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); Ray Monk, The Duty of Genius (London: Vintage, 
1991); Charles Travis, Thought’s Footing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and The 
Uses of Sense – Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001); Ludwig  Wittgenstein – Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, ed. by James Klagge and 
Alfred Nordmann (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993); and Meredith Williams, 
Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning – Towards a Social Conception of Mind (London: Routledge, 
1999). 
 
 12 
this dissertation is to show how Wittgenstein’s remarks, specifically from the 
Investigations, has shaped the current cognitive approach as to how concepts 
should be reconsidered and viewed. In contrast to preceding theoretical 
accounts of concepts, commencing with the definitional view, the embodied 
cognition thesis and situated cognition see concepts as part of the environment. 
Having examined Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Investigations, we will see 
how he has always considered concepts as participatory and as part of the 
context, rather than anything abstract or isolated.  
  
There has been a significant amount of research conducted on how 
concepts can be better explained and understood. Recent approaches are in the 
form of ‘embodied cognition’ (also known as the ‘embodied cognition thesis’), 
‘situated cognition’, and ‘the extended mind’. However, one difficulty I have 
found in this research is that the material sometimes becomes nebulous in the 
sense that it can be difficult to define exactly what any of these terms mean. 
The ‘Extended Mind Thesis’ claims, for example, that: 
 
cognitive processes are situated, embodied and goal-oriented actions 
that unfold in real world interactions with the immediate environment, 
cultural tools and other persons.
11
  
 
 
Theorists, such as Anderson,
12
 Clark,
13
 Gallagher,
14
 Clancey,
15
 and Glenberg
16
 
have written extensively on these subjects – embodied cognition, situated 
                                                 
11
 Lucas Bietti, ‘Can the Mind be Extended? And How? Review of “Supersizing the Mind: 
Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension” by Andy Clark’, Constructivist Foundations, 5 
(2008), pp. 97-99. 
12
 For readings by Michael L. Anderson see: ‘Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide’, Artificial 
Intelligence, 149 (2007) pp. 91-130; ‘How to Study the Mind: an Introduction to Embodied 
Cognition’, in Learning Environments Embodied and Perceptual Advancements, ed. by F. 
 13 
cognition and the extended mind - and their findings are reflected as part of this 
study. 
 
One of the main contributors to considering concepts from a new 
perspective, or to reclaiming concepts and how we view them, is Rosch; thus I 
use her term ‘participatory’ for this study. Similarly, it is her definition of the 
term concept that I have used to support my central argument: that 
Wittgenstein’s language-game shows concepts as participatory and as part of 
the environment, and engaging with mind and body, which is the embodied 
cognition thesis. Rosch’s definition of concept and her term ‘participatory’ are 
discussed later in this Introduction.  
 
While Rosch considers that concepts are the ‘central building block of 
cognitivist theory,’17 she also states that: 
                                                                                                                                 
Santoianni and C. Sabatano (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 2007); ‘On the 
Grounds of (X) – Grounded Cognition’, Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied 
Approach, ed. by Paco Calvo and Toni Gomila (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), pp. 423-435. 
13
 For readings by Andy Clark see: Being There: Putting Mind, Body, and World Together 
Again (Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1997);‘Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition’, in 
A Companion to Cognitive Science, ed. by William Bechtel and George Graham (Malden MA: 
Blackwell, 1998); ‘Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Action’, Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 6 (1999), 1-18; ‘Language, Embodiment, and the Cognitive Niche’, Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 10 (2006), 370-374; R. A. Wilson and A. Clark, ‘How to Situate 
Cognition. Letting Nature Take its Course’, in The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 55-77. 
14
 For research on situated cognition and the embodied cognition thesis by Shaun Gallagher 
see: ‘Philosophical Antecedents to Situated Cognition’, The Cambridge Handbook of Situated 
Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 1-21. 
15
 William J. Clancey, ‘Situated Cognition: How Representations are Created and Given 
Meaning’, in Lessons from Learning, ed. by R. Lewis and P. Mendelsohn (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1994), pp. 231-242. 
16
 Arthurs M. Glenberg, ‘Embodiment as a Unifying Perspective for Psychology’, WIREs 
Cognitive Science, 1 (2011), 586-596; ‘What Memory is For’, Behavioural & Brain Sciences, 
20 (1997), 1-55. 
17
 Eleanor Rosch, ‘Reclaiming Concepts’, in Reclaiming Cognition – The Primacy of Action, 
Intention and Emotion, ed. by Rafael Nunez and Walter J. Freeman (Thorverton: Imprint 
 14 
 
[it is going to take something far more radical […] to reclaim concepts, 
and indeed cognitive science as a whole, from cognitivism. It requires a 
genuine rethinking of mind, world, concepts and their relationship.
18
 
 
For Rosch, ‘concept research is currently a hotbed of activity in both 
philosophy and psychology.’19 Concepts are not only considered the 
cornerstone of philosophy and psychology and of central interest to the 
empiricist and rationalist debate, but are also of contemporary interest in 
cognitive psychology, particularly in terms of their origin and function, while 
Douglas Medin considers that ‘concept representation remains as a cornerstone 
issue in all aspects of cognitive science.’20  
 
Rosch states that: 
concepts and categories do not represent the world in the mind; they are 
a participating part of the mind-world whole of which the sense of 
mind (of having a mind that is seeing or thinking) is one pole, and the 
objects of mind (such as visible objects, sounds, thoughts, emotions, 
and so on) are the other pole.
21
  
 
 
She further contends that: 
 
 
concepts — red, chair, afraid, yummy, armadillo, and all the rest — 
inextricably bind, in many different functioning ways, that sense of 
being or having a mind to the sense of the objects of mind.
22
  
                                                                                                                                 
Academic, 1999), pp. 61-77 (p. 61). [Also known as Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6 
(1999), 11-12] 
18
 Ibid., p. 69. 
19
 Kathleen L. Slaney, Timothy P. Racine, ’On the Ambiguity of Concept Use in Psychology: 
Is the Concept “Concept” a Useful Concept?’, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical 
Psychology,31(2011),73-89.  
<http://web.ebscohost.com.jproxy.nuim.ie/ehost/detail?sid=b693f68.pdf> 
[accessed 21 July 2012] (p. 73). 
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 Douglas L. Medin, (1989) ‘Concepts and Conceptual Structure’, American Psychologist, 44 
(1989), 1469-1481 (p. 1469). 
21
 Rosch, ‘Reclaiming Concepts’, p. 72. 
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Rosch, without exception, is a key figure in cognitive psychology. As we shall 
see, her contribution on concepts and categories commenced with her views on 
the prototype approach to concepts, thus her use of Wittgenstein’s term ‘family 
resemblance’. Her seminal paper Reclaiming Concepts illustrates that, in her 
view, by the late 1990s, the issue of concepts needed to be re-examined, hence 
the title of her paper. However, while I refer largely to that specific article, the 
richness of her work can be seen in many of her publications.
23
  
 
Other significant contributors to developing research on concepts and 
their function are Gregory Murphy
24
 and Douglas Medin.
25
 While Murphy has 
                                                 
23
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Objects in Natural Categories’, Cognitive Psychology, 8 (1976), 382-439; ‘Human 
Categorization’, in Studies in Cross-Cultural Psychology (Vol 1), ed. by N. Warren (London: 
Academic Press, 1977); ‘Principles of Categorization’, in Cognition and Categorization, ed. by 
E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd (Hillside, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978); ‘Wittgenstein and 
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Wittgenstein’s Significance for Developmental Psychology, ed. by M. Chapman and R.A. 
Dixon (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987); ‘Categorization’, in The Encyclopedia of Human 
Behavior (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1994); ‘What are Concepts?’, Review of Fodor 
(1998), Contemporary Psychology, 44 (1999), 416-7. 
24
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Murphy, and D. Medin, ‘The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence’, Psychological 
Review, 92 (1985), 289-316; E. Lin and G. Murphy, ‘Thematic Relations in Adults’ Concepts’, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130 (2001), 3-28; The Big Book of Concepts 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004); L. Bott, A. Hoffman and G. Murphy ‘Blocking in Category 
Learning’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136 (2007), 685-699; S. Kim and G. 
Murphy, ‘Ideals and Category Typicality’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 37 (2011), 1092-1112; G. Murphy and B.H. Ross, ‘Uncertainty in 
Category-Based Induction: When do People Integrate Across Categories?’, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36 (2011), 263-276. 
25
 Some readings from Douglas L. Medin on the area of concepts and categories include: D. 
Medin and M. Schaffer, ‘Context Theory of Classification Learning’, Psychological Review, 
85 (1978), 207-238; D. Medin and E. Smith, ‘Strategies and Classification Learning’, Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7 (1981), 241-253; D. Medin, G. 
Dewey and T. Murphy, ‘Relationships Between Item and Category Learning: Evidence that 
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written extensively on this subject he differs in his views from Rosch in terms 
of how he views concepts. For example, in his book, The Big Book of 
Concepts,
26
 he gives an excellent explanation of each approach taken by 
cognitive psychology, but fails to recognise what Rosch argues for; that 
concepts are not isolated objects but participating as part of the context. 
Murphy also considers that word meanings are psychologically represented by 
mapping words onto conceptual structures: a word gets its significance by 
being connected to a concept or a coherent structure in our conceptual 
representation of the world.
27
 Again, we see the emphasis on the 
‘representation’ rather than on ‘action’ and ‘participation’. Murphy also 
frequently uses the term ‘ad hoc’ categories which is similar to how Lawrence 
Barsalou describes some categories. For both theorists, this is where they refer 
to a concept that does not belong or fit a specific category. Ad hoc categories, 
and their significance in how we use concepts, are examined in Chapter 4, 
while Barsalou’s significant contribution to psychology28 can be seen in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
                                                                                                                                 
Abstraction is not Automatic’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 9 (1982), 607-625; J. Busemeyer, G. Dewey and D. Medin, ‘Evaluation of 
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Another major contributor to concept research is Susan Carey and her 
seminal book The Origin of Concepts (2009).
29
 She describes the term concept 
as ‘units of thoughts, the constituents of beliefs and theories […]’.30 She 
continues to state that: 
 
representations of word meanings are paradigm examples of concepts. I 
take concepts to be mental representations — indeed, just a subset of 
the entire stock of a person’s mental representations.31  
 
However, while Carey’s book is of immense interest regarding concepts as a 
whole, it nonetheless focuses on their origin rather than their use. For this 
reason I have chosen not to use Carey as a reference for my study on concepts 
and the role that they play in Wittgenstein’s language-game. 
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reports, and language and simulation. I have cited here only a few of his relevant articles to my 
study. However, a full listing of all of Barsalou’s papers can be found at: 
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Action in Memory, Language, and Thought, ed. by D. Pecher and R. Zwaan (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005),  pp. 129-163; W. Yeh and L. Barsalou, ‘The Situated 
Nature of Concepts’, American Journal of Psychology, 119 (2006), 349-384; ‘Grounded 
Cognition’, Annual Review of Psychology, 59 (2008), 617-645; ‘Situating Concepts’, in The 
Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge University Press; (2009), pp. 247-
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While the focus of this dissertation is specifically on concepts, it does, 
nonetheless, overlap with the area of language. Therefore, it is necessary to 
acknowledge commentary from some eminent theorists in the field, if only to 
give a broader perspective on where the domain of concepts falls in relation to 
language itself.  
 
According to the evolutionary psychologist and cognitive 
neuroscientist, Steven Pinker, ‘to understand mental categories is to understand 
much of human reasoning.’32 Pinker has written extensively on language, 
specifically on how language is part of our genetic make-up rather than a 
cultural development, but refers to concepts and their function as part of his 
study.
33
 He argues that some conceptual categories do not refer specifically to 
things in the world, but are socially constructed – a Wittgensteinian theme – 
and, therefore, can be reconstructed. Similarly I suggest that some conceptual 
categories could be ‘deconstructed’. Pinker states that: 
 
People can learn categories with clean definitions, crisp edges, and no 
family resemblance, such as “odd number.” They can learn that a 
dolphin is not a fish, though it has a strong family resemblance to the 
fishes, and that a seahorse is a fish, though it looks more like a little 
horse. They can understand that Tina Turner is a grandmother, though 
she lacks all the usual traits, and that my childless great-aunt Bella was 
not a grandmother, though she had gray hair and made a mean chicken 
soup.
34
 
 
                                                 
32
 Steven Pinker, Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1999), p. 270. 
33
 Some of Pinker’s works where he refers to concepts include: The Language Instinct – The 
New Science of Language and Mind  (London: Penguin Books, 1994); How the Mind Works 
(London: Penguin, 1998); Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999); and The Stuff of Thought (London: Penguin, Allen Lane, 
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Calling language an ‘instinct’ that humans are born with, Pinker argues 
for an evolutionary mental module for language. He claims that language must 
do two things: first, it must convey a message to an audience and secondly, it 
must serve to negotiate the relationship between language giver and receiver.
35
 
This social relationship or social ‘coordination’36 he refers to is similar to 
Wittgenstein’s social and communal process of a language-game where 
meaning is use and contextual, the objective of which is to communicate, and 
to negotiate social interaction and where the meaning of a word is its use. 
Again, we can see the Wittgensteinian theme. 
 
Pinker paints human nature as having distinct and universal properties, 
some of which are innate rather than been shaped by culture or the 
environment.
37
  He argues that: 
 
Language is a modular system that evolved independently from other 
human cognitive abilities — that it is its own unique tool in the toolbox 
that is the human brain.
38
  
 
(I consider this to be a similar analogy to Wittgenstein’s: ’Language is an 
instrument.  Its concepts are instruments’.39) According to Wargo, for Pinker, 
the instinct for language evolved as an adaptation for social coordination in our 
hunter-gatherer ancestors, and its deep structure still bears evidence of the 
                                                 
35
 Eric Wargo, ‘Talk to the Hand – New Insights into the Evolution of Language and Gesture’ 
Association for Psychological Science, 21 (2008), 16-22 (p. 17) 
36
 Steven Pinker, in ‘Talk to the Hand – New Insights into the Evolution of Language and 
Gesture’ by Eric Wargo, Association for Psychological Science, 21 (2008), 16-22 (p. 17) 
37
 Ibid. 
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 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #569. 
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fundamental human priorities of manipulating the social and physical 
environment.
40
  He states that: 
 
We have seen that much of the richness of language comes from the 
tension between words and rules. In the same way, much of the richness 
of the public sphere of life comes from tensions between family 
resemblance categories built from experience and the classical 
categories defined by science, law or custom. Family resemblance 
categories resonate with common sense, but leave us groping when 
faced with something that is neither fish nor fowl.
41
 
 
Other prominent theorists who have contributed to the area of embodied 
cognition, particularly in the area of embodied cognition’s empirical domains 
which are discussed in Chapter 5, are George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.
42
 
They state in Metaphors We Live By that ‘our ordinary conceptual system, in 
terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in 
nature.’43 Lakoff and Johnson claim that: 
 
Concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. 
They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane 
details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in 
the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system 
thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are 
right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, 
then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day 
is very much a matter of metaphor.
44
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Again, we can see a Wittgensteinian theme emerging when Lakoff and 
Johnson describe concepts as ‘governing everyday functioning’ and ‘how we 
get around the world’ and ‘relate to other people’. This resonates with 
Wittgenstein’s idea that concepts enable us to make sense of our world and, 
therefore, our experiences. 
 
According to Jerome Bruner: 
 
We are still drawing rich sustenance from our more distant, pre-
positivist past: Chomsky acknowledges his debt to Descartes, Piaget is 
inconceivable without Kant, Vygotsky without Hegel and Marx, and 
the once towering bastion of ‘learning theory’ was constructed on 
foundations laid by John Locke.
45
 
 
 
Bruner’s quote clearly acknowledges not just the influence that philosophy has 
had on psychology but also resonates with the suggestion that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the two domains that still warrants further 
exploration. There have been many major influences in the history of 
psychology,
46
 and I propose that while Wittgenstein did not either intentionally 
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 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1990), x. 
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or specifically contribute to the science of psychology, he should, nonetheless, 
be considered as one of the major contributors, particularly in light of the way 
he has helped shape current cognitive approaches to concepts, that is, the 
embodied cognition thesis. 
 
1.2  DEFINITION OF TERMS: CONCEPT, CATEGORY, CONTEXT, ENVIRONMENT,  
        MENTALISM AND COGNITIVISM 
 
 
Since this is a dissertation involving two distinct disciplines it is of importance 
that the definitions of terms are clear.   
 
1.2.1 Concept and Category 
 
In cognitive psychology, the term concept refers to: 
 
how things are related or categorised.  It is a mental representation of a 
category. It enables us to group things together, so that instances of a 
category all have something in common. Thus concepts somehow 
specify category membership.
47
  
 
 
Furthermore, ‘categorizations which humans make of the concrete world are 
not arbitrary but highly determined.’48 When the term category is used we 
                                                                                                                                 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4); in 1938 B.F. Skinner (also discussed in Chapter 3) published 
The Behaviour of Organisms (which Noam Chomsky subsequently critiqued); in 1942 Carl 
Rogers (1902–1987) published Counselling and Psychotherapy which explored his person-
centred approach to counselling and therapy; in 1954 the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget 
(1896–1980) published The Construction of Reality in the Child, where the main focus was on 
a child’s cognitive development; in 1957 Noam Chomsky’s (b. 1928) Syntactic Structures was 
published which propounded a cognitive approach to language behaviour; and in 1981 Roger 
Sperry (who is also discussed in Chapter 4) won the Nobel prize for psychology for his 
research and contribution in the area of split-brain patients which demonstrated the 
interconnections of the brain: in Atkinson at al., Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology, 12th 
edn, (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), pp. 669-670. 
47
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Psychology Press, 2001), p. 276. 
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 Rosch, ‘Basic Objects in Natural Categories’, p. 382. 
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mean ‘a number of objects which are considered equivalent’49 and the term 
taxonomy refers to the system by which ‘categories are related to another by 
means of class inclusion.’50  
 
Categorising is a basic cognitive function, the process of which allows 
us to group together two or more items of the same category. This is 
considered a top-down process,
51
 (as opposed to a bottom-up process
52
) which 
is driven by an individual’s prior knowledge and expectancies.  Without an 
ability to categorise we would be unable to make sense of the world from either 
our present experiences or our past knowledge.  Categorising enables cognitive 
economy and allows us to use our knowledge to make logical inferences, 
predictions and to understand, reason, explain, communicate and classify.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the terms concept and category. 
Medin explains that ‘a concept is an idea that includes all that is 
characteristically associated with it. A category is a partitioning or class to 
which some assertion or set of assertions might apply.’53 However, Medin 
continues to state that ‘it is tempting to think of categories as existing in the 
world and of concepts as corresponding to the mental representations of 
                                                 
49
 Ibid., p. 383. 
50
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ed. by Arthur S. Reber and Emily Reber, 3
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them.’54 This type of partitioning, or compartmentalising, can have problems: 
for example, a concept does not need to have a real-world counterpart. 
Furthermore, it is possible for us to impose or force, rather than discover, any 
form of structure in the world.
55
 
 
By contrast, the term concept in the philosophical sense can be 
understood as a principle of classification, something that can guide us in 
determining whether an entity belongs in a given class or does not:   
 
The conceptualistic substantive views of concepts are that concepts are 
(1) mental representations, often called ideas, serving their 
classificatory function presumably by resembling the entities to be 
classified; or (2) brain states that serve the same function but 
presumably not by resemblance; or (3) general words (adjectives, 
common nouns, verbs) or uses of such words, an entity’s belonging to a 
certain class being determined by the applicability to the entity of the 
appropriate word.
56
   
 
The term concept can be defined as the ‘internal, psychological, 
representation’ of shared attributes.57 Equally, it can defined as a ‘mental 
representation that exists in the minds (or brains) of individuals whose actions 
and/or reasoning processes are being described’ and ‘generally taken to be 
reliably associated with the words in a language that are used to express 
them,’58 while Margolis and Laurence, on the other hand, consider concepts to 
be abstract objects.
59
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Concepts have been described as ‘mental contents’60 or the 
‘constituents,’ ‘elements,’ ‘building blocks,’ or ‘organizers’ of thoughts.61 
Concepts are also considered to be ‘psychological structures’ of one sort or 
another,
62
 ‘mentally possessed idea[s] or notion[s]’63 and ‘the very glue that 
holds our mental world together.’64  However, while I am not rejecting that 
concepts can be described by any of these terms, for the purposes of this 
dissertation I am using Rosch’s definition of a concept. She considers that 
‘concepts are not representational,’65 that is, they do not represent an object 
that is isolated and static, rather, 
 
Concepts occur only in actual situations in which they function as 
participating parts of the situation rather than as either representations 
or as mechanisms for identifying objects.
66
  
 
She explains that to understand a concept it must be participatory: ‘Concepts 
only occur as part of a web of meaning provided both by other concepts and by 
interrelated life activities.’67 Concepts are never ‘abstractly informative’ but 
always ‘participatory’.68 
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 D.A. Weiskopf, ‘The Plurality of Concepts’, Synthese, 169 (2009), pp. 145-173. 
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Concepts are a ‘participating part of the mind-world whole,’69 and 
furthermore, ‘are endowed with content and thus have a semantic role.’70 As 
Wittgenstein states:  
 
‘I don’t see anything violet here, but I can shew it you if you give me a 
paint box.’ How can one know that one can shew it if ….,in other 
words, that one can recognize it if one sees it? 
 How do I know from my image, what the colour really looks like? 
How do I know that I shall be able to do something? that is, that the 
state I am in now is that of being able to do that thing?
71
 
 
In a language-game, to possess a concept is to know what the actual concept is, 
or to know what its form of expression means, that is, its use; this means being 
able to use it correctly within the appropriate ‘context’ or ‘environment’ in 
order that ‘we may make sense of our world.’72 
 
It is important to understand that for the purposes of this dissertation I 
am not using the term ‘concept’ as it is currently understood and cited by some 
of the theorists referred to in this chapter as a ‘mental representation;’ that is, 
that it is ultimately responsible for behaviour with regard to the outside world. 
There are assuredly things in the world which are chairs, but the concept of 
chair is ‘in the head’, not the outside world.73 Interestingly, Paivio (1986) has 
suggested that the problem of mental representation may be the most difficult 
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problem to solve of all the sciences,
74
 arguably because it is active and 
conscious. 
 
 
1.2.2 Context and Environment 
 
 
 
The terms ‘context’ and ‘environment’ are being used inter-changeably 
throughout this dissertation. The term ‘context’ is the Wittgensteinian term: 
Though—one would like to say—every word has a different character 
in different contexts, at the same time there is one character it always 
has: a single physiognomy.
75
 
 
 
 The term ‘environment’ is one that is used in the embodied cognition 
thesis: 
Cognition evolved in specific environments, and its solutions to 
survival challenges can be expected to take advantage of the concrete 
structure or enduring features of those environments.
76
 
 
I use these terms inter-changeably to refer to the same thing, that is, the 
situation in which the concept is participatory, and where these [concept and 
environment] and the mind and body all interact together. 
 
 
 
 
1.2.3 Mentalism 
 
This term mentalism refers to: 
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The doctrine that maintains that an adequate characterization of human 
behaviour is not possible without invoking mental phenomena as 
explanatory devices. Or, phrased another way, that any reductionistic 
exercise which seeks to explain cognitive processes (mind) by limiting 
itself to the physical and the physiological will not succeed in 
accounting for all phenomena observed.
77
  
 
While I refer mainly to ‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’ as Wittgenstein does, the 
term mentalism
78
 is used when we look at how mental states and processes 
were over-looked by behaviourism, rejected by Wittgenstein, and how the 
cognitive revolution replaced the term ‘mentalism’ with the terms ‘cognition’ 
and ‘cognitive processing’. 
  
 From a philosophical perspective, Rene Marres defines mentalism as: 
the mental cannot be reduced to anything else, in particular not to 
behaviour or brain processes. The brain physiologist Sperry uses the 
term in this way. He adopts mentalism while rejecting dualism, and 
distinguishes this mentalism from the kind of materialism that reduces 
the mental to a brain process.
79
 
 
In philosophical terms, mentalism has also been defined as: 
 
Any theory that posits explicitly mental events and processes, where 
‘mental’ means exhibiting intentionality, not necessarily being 
immaterial or non-physical. A mentalistic theory is couched in terms of 
belief, desire, thinking, feeling, hoping, etc. A scrupulously non-
mentalistic theory would be couched entirely in extensional terms: it 
would refer only to behaviour or to neurophysiological states and 
events.
80
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1.2.4 Cognitivism 
 
 ‘Cognitivism is the ascendant movement in psychology these days. It reaches 
from cognitive psychology into social psychology, personality, psychotherapy, 
development, and beyond.’81 The term ‘cognitivism’ grew from the term 
‘cognitive psychology’ which, as Reber describes, is the study of: 
 
A general approach to psychology emphasising the internal, mental 
processes. To the cognitive psychologists behaviour is not specifiable 
simply in terms of its overt properties but requires explanations at the 
level of mental events, mental representations, beliefs, intentions etc. 
Although the cognitive approach is often contrasted sharply with the 
behaviourist approach it is not necessarily the case that cognitivists are 
antibehavouristic. Rather, behaviourism is viewed as seriously 
incomplete as a general theory, one which fails to provide any coherent 
characterisation of cognitive processes such as thinking, language and 
decision-making.
82
  
 
However, Christopher D. Green argues that often the term cognitivism is used 
‘as though it were completely synonymous with “psychological” or “mental”’83 
and that contrary to what many think the development of cognitivism has not 
been, and nor was it ever intended to be, a return to mentalism.
84
  
 
In this dissertation I use the term cognitivism where I refer to the 
cognitive revolution and how the introduction of these new terms, ‘cognition’ 
and ‘cognitivism’85, replaced terms such as ‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’ to 
describe certain phenomena. However, Rosch defines cognitivism as treating 
the mind as a machine. This requires that the mind should be seen as a 
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computer programme, and more specifically as the type of programme which 
functions as a series of computations: 
 
 (that is, rule governed changes) on symbolic representations. The mind 
is considered a collection of mental representations precisely analogous 
to the computer’s symbolic representations. The only question which 
we may ask of such a model or machine, the only appropriate test of it, 
is just the classical Turing test — that its output be indistinguishable 
from that of a human.
86
  
 
 
Fodor (1998) calls this model The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) 
and indicates its importance for cognitivism: ‘No cognition without 
representation.’87 
 
 In philosophy the term cognitivism is not used, or at best it is seldom 
used. Terms like ‘mentalism’ and ‘the mind’ would be used more frequently, 
while the term ‘cognitivism’ is a psychological term and is used in cognitive 
psychology and cognitive science regularly. However, without doubt, the term 
cognitive ‘is a cognate of Descartes’ “cogito”’88 and some, such as B.F. 
Skinner, who opposed the cognitive revolution (which is discussed in Chapter 
4 of this study) argue that ‘it is little more than an anachronistic resurgence of 
Cartesian dualism.’89 Christopher Green’s paper ‘Where Did the Word 
“Cognitive” Come From Anyway?’ gives an excellent historical background to 
the term ‘cognitive’ and ‘cognitivism’. 
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1.3  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Due to the inter-disciplinary nature of this dissertation, it is necessary to make 
a distinction between the different approaches and methodologies used within 
the two disciplines. 
 
Cognitive psychology is the study of how information is processed and 
how the cognitive system operates, including how stimulus is acquired, stored, 
retrieved and used. Several cognitive processes are operating as concepts are 
being formed and used, such as memory, mental representation and reasoning. 
In particular, memory is central to how concepts function, whether construed 
within a semantic network framework, connectionist setting or as a schema.  
Similarly, mental representation (which some theorists consider as the concept 
itself) along with reasoning and its associated functions, such as heuristics, 
abstraction, metaphor and analogy, must also be considered. 
 
Psychological research is empirical in approach and is concerned with 
collecting data, conducting analysis of results, and using different 
methodologies to test subjects and theories. This research is limited in its 
psychological perspective to studies from theories, views and approaches to 
concepts in order to explain their function and use. As discussed in the status 
quaestionis, the work of many theorists have been examined, thus the research 
material used here is taken from text-based sources only. However, while this 
dissertation examines the psychological material without the author having 
conducted any empirical research, there remains, nonetheless, a number of 
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arguments and suppositions to be explicated, such as how Wittgenstein’s 
language-game shows concepts as participatory and as part of a context. 
 
By contrast, however, philosophical research is text-based and is 
primarily concerned with resolving a problematic, defending an argument or 
proposing a hypothesis. The purpose of philosophy is conceptual clarification, 
and an explanation of issues such as meaning, truth and reality. However, the 
focus of philosophy is not just ‘meaning’ but also one of ‘understanding’. 
There is always what we would call a ‘rational enquiry’, otherwise known as a 
‘method’, and where there is an emphasis placed on its subject-matter or its 
purpose.
90
 ‘It is an attempt to understand the most basic facts about the world 
we inhabit and so far as possible to explain these facts.’91 
 
It is often held that philosophy has as a distinctive subject-matter the 
most fundamental or general concepts and principles involved in 
thought, action and reality. It is also a common view that philosophical 
inquiry is a second-order inquiry which has for its subject-matter the 
concepts, theories and presuppositions present in various disciplines 
and in everyday life.
92
  
 
 
1.4  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
This dissertation commences with a discussion on the history of the philosophy 
of language with Frege and Russell, which is the late nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century, and concludes with a discussion on how 
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Wittgenstein’s language-game shows how concepts are part of the environment 
— the embodied cognition thesis — which is a current paradigm in cognitive 
psychology.  Clearly, the history that this dissertation covers is significant and, 
therefore, it is necessary to set out the scope and limitations of this study. 
 
First, it is important to highlight that this dissertation focuses only on 
the Investigations as part of my study into Wittgenstein’s remarks on concepts. 
While there is rich material in his other texts, such as The Blue and Brown 
Books and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volumes 1 and 2, these 
were, nonetheless, preliminary studies to the Investigations. Furthermore, while 
I acknowledge that there may be significant remarks and descriptions to be 
examined in these two other texts which are relevant to my study, the scope of 
this dissertation is limited. Therefore, while my analysis of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks is restricted, it is nonetheless concentrated and in-depth. 
 
It is not the intention of this dissertation to examine and develop a 
discussion of the contemporary theme of realism and anti-realism and the 
different positions for which both Wittgenstein and cognitive theorists argue. 
While occasional reference is made to these terms, they are used only in a 
descriptive form that scholars and critics use to describe both Wittgenstein’s 
early and later works. It is not my intention to develop any philosophical 
examination into the quasi-realist position held by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus and the anti-realist position he held in the Investigations; while his 
calculus view of language and his language-game are discussed and examined 
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in some detail, Wittgenstein’s reasons for moving from one position to another 
are not explored. 
  
Similarly, the origin of concepts and the developmental stages of 
concepts, or ‘the human capacity for conceptual representation’93, are not 
discussed. As cited previously, Susan Carey’s The Origins of Concepts deals 
explicitly with this issue along with other major concerns such as: core 
cognition, representations of cause, language and core cognition, and the 
process of conceptual change.
94
 The purpose of this study is only to show how 
concepts are represented as participatory by Wittgenstein’s language-game, 
and how this representation has been a significant influence on contemporary 
cognitive psychology. 
  
Wittgenstein’s private language argument is not discussed in detail, that 
is, it is not examined in terms of its relevance (or non-relevance) to how 
concepts in a language-game are participatory, or in relation to ‘mentalism’ or 
‘cognitivism’. However, the private language argument is referred to and 
explained briefly in Chapter 3 against the background of behaviourism. 
 
The Investigations is a series of remarks, often related to either 
proceeding or preceding passages, and should be considered as descriptions. 
However, they should never be interpreted as explanations or definitions. 
Without doubt, this makes the task of reading Wittgenstein, and an 
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examination into his remarks, sometimes difficult. Similarly, Bryan Magee 
claims that to understand Wittgenstein is to understand his matter and, 
therefore, it is no surprise to see how often he has been misunderstood and 
misinterpreted, by both scholars and critics. Magee states that readers have: 
 
difficulty sometimes in seeing what the connection is between a 
paragraph and the one before it; the sentences are clear, but the reader 
often cannot understand, at first, why they are there. The prose, though 
distinctive and compelling, has nothing like the blazing intensity of the 
Tractatus.
95
  
 
However, Wittgenstein was also aware of how his work was often 
misinterpreted by his colleagues and students at the time. In the preface to the 
Investigations he writes: 
 
Up to a short time ago I had really given up the idea of publishing my 
work in my lifetime. It used, indeed, to be revived from time to time: 
mainly because I was obliged to learn that my results (which I had 
communicated in lectures, typescripts and discussion), variously 
misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in 
circulation.
96
 
  
I consider that this dissertation adequately and clearly illustrates 
Wittgenstein’s contribution to contemporary cognitive psychology and, 
furthermore, shows that ‘Wittgenstein’s critiques identify challenges for, not 
obstacles to, psychological investigation.’97 The three arguments I put forward 
in this dissertation are first, that Wittgenstein’s language-game can also be 
considered a theory of language that explains how language is used and 
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understood, not developmentally, but through culture and context-dependent 
environments; secondly, that the language-game is the context, or the 
environment, where concepts can be seen as participatory rather than being 
considered as objective and defined in isolation. Furthermore, I will show that 
the language-game is the context where the mind, body and the concept all 
interact together. This is the embodied cognition thesis. Thirdly, this 
dissertation will show that Wittgenstein should be considered a key figure in 
cognitive psychology alongside other immensely influential theorists such as 
B.F. Skinner and Sigmund Freud. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 
 
 
For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ 
 the word meaning it can be defined thus: the meaning  
of a word is its use in the language.
1
 
 
 
 
Some of the great exponents of philosophy of language have included Gottlob 
Frege (1848-1925), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Willard van Orman Quine (1908-2000) and Hilary Putnam (b. 1926). 
Philosophers, scholars, critics and supporters of the philosophy of language 
have seen the pendulum swing from a logical approach to language, as posited 
by some logical positivists, such as Frege and Russell, to a more natural 
approach to language, as exemplified by the later Wittgenstein. 
 
This chapter is an introduction to the history of the philosophy of 
language and its main contributor, prior to Wittgenstein, Frege. Frege’s work 
had a significant impact on Wittgenstein’s ideas, particularly in his earlier work 
the Tractatus. A discussion on the nature of language is also necessary in order 
to understand what role language plays, how language can situate concepts and 
its relation to other functions, such as behaviour, for example.  
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Language is defined as a ‘system of symbols and rules that enable us to 
communicate.’2 Harley defines symbols as things that represent other things, 
e.g. something that is either spoken or written is classified as a symbol. The 
rules that he refers to specify how words should be in a particular order so that 
a sentence can be formed correctly. However, Harley also contends that there 
are problems with trying to specifically define what language is; it raises 
problems such as determining whether the communication systems that 
monkeys use should be considered a language? Similarly, should the signing of 
deaf people be considered a language?
3
 For Wittgenstein, however, a definition 
of language is irrelevant. Rather than definitions and explanations, he is 
interested in describing the function of language, its meaning and use, 
exhibited through behaviour and interaction with the environment, which is 
facilitated by a language-game and, therefore, a context: 
 
Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of 
the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand 
in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are 
these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are 
to be applied is missing.)
4
 
 
 
1.1 THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE 
 
The study of language has concentrated on three main fields: the origin 
of language, the relation between language and reality, and the structure 
of language. The first is bound up with questions of religion or 
cosmogony; the second is epistemological, while the third may be 
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called the field of pure linguistics or grammar. The fields are, however, 
interrelated.
5
  
 
 
The later Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with the second one: the relation 
between language and its usage, its representational qualities and the context in 
which it occurs. However, it should be noted that the earlier Wittgenstein was 
more concerned about the structure of language which is examined in the 
Tractatus. 
 
According to George A. Miller, ‘the interest in the nature of speech and 
language is a very general characteristic of twentieth century thought.’6 There 
is no doubt that language is tightly woven into an individual’s experience and it 
is always referential. Language is also central to communication and, therefore, 
facilitates human understanding. It is a ‘social activity and as such is a form of 
joint action.’7 Language also represents reality, as Wittgenstein argues for, and 
hence its representational quality would suggest that language is infinite and 
‘indefinitely extendable’.8 Language’s main purpose is for communicating with 
another.
9
 Language also has infinite expressive power which enables it to be 
used creatively, such as telling an anecdote, and appropriately, such as giving 
directions. However, as Searle states: 
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It is a characteristic feature of twentieth-century intellectual life that we 
no longer feel that we can take language for granted. Language has 
become immensely problematic for us.
10
 
 
Language is also pervasive, ‘permeates all of thinking, and thus, all of 
human experience.’11 We learn to speak before being able to consciously 
reflect on it: language is a developmental process, and as such develops within 
an individual without us being aware of the actual process itself.
12
  
 
After all, one can only say something if one has learned to talk. 
Therefore in order to want to say something one must also have 
mastered a language; and yet it is clear that one can want to speak 
without speaking.
13
 
 
Vocabulary has grown exponentially and this growth has enabled 
exploration and development in many new paradigms in the fields of 
philosophy, psychology, linguistics and cognitive science. Its richness has 
ensured that fewer errors, ambiguities and vagueness are present in natural 
language, generally, and, therefore, areas such as expression, meaning and 
understanding can also extend further with fewer uncertainties, inconsistencies 
and erroneous implications.
14
 However, what cannot be overlooked is that 
many terms in natural language can be considered vague, e.g. ‘cold’; or 
ambiguous, e.g. ‘bank’; and unclear because of the metaphysical use, e.g., I 
can see where you’re coming from.15 Philosophy of language is essentially a 
quest for meaning and understanding. This search for meaning and 
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understanding can occur on two levels: we can focus on specific terms and 
attempt to prove whether or not they are meaningful; or we can focus on 
sentences and attempt to show their meaning.
16
 
 
Human language and communication are reliant upon the functions of 
specific cognitive components such as memory, information processing, 
perception, and of course language and speech production and linguistics 
themselves. However, language and speech production or linguistic production, 
is a higher-order activity and, therefore, can be complex in terms of cognitive 
processing.
17
 On a more superficial level, language can be seen as an activity 
that is acquired naturally yet methodically and systematically and through 
various methods, as exemplified, in for example, the specific developmental 
linguistic stages that commence in early childhood.
18
 
 
Speaking a language suggests that we know how it is used and 
understand its meaning; language sounds are related to language and its 
essential meaning, while the sequencing of rules refer to the grammar of a 
sentence. In this sense, we are positing the idea that an individual knows the 
grammar of a sentence from a combination of its sounds and meaning and, 
therefore, uses the sentence appropriately and within context, which is key for 
Wittgenstein. What we do not mean here is that the terms and concepts could 
be fragmented and isolated in order to explain the grammar of specific terms.  
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Knowledge, too, is integral to understanding language and how it is 
used. It is acquired not just by repetition or ostensive teaching, as Wittgenstein 
remarks,
19
 but by acquiring a set of rules and regularities, as Pinker remarks: 
 
In one’s cognitive make-up there must be a code or protocol or a set of 
rules that specifies how words may be arranged into meaningful 
combinations.
20
  
 
  
The intention of the speaker also plays a key part in language use and 
meaning. Intentions are also of central interest to Wittgenstein: 
 
In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is 
made possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question.
21
 
 
 
 If a speaker’s intentions are vague or unclear in any form, ambiguity 
and misinterpretation can arise. For example, we can ask, demand, question, 
advise, surmise or accuse – to name but a few – but if the intention of the 
speaker is not clear or definite, then misunderstanding of meaning is likely to 
arise. This is a prime example of where the role of context is essential to the 
meaning and, therefore, understanding, of a word or a concept. Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the philosophy of psychology are key to understanding how social 
construction and context enable the understanding of concepts: 
 
Are you sure that there is a single if-feeling, and not perhaps several? 
Have you tried saying the word in a great variety of contexts? For 
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example, when it bears the principal stress of the sentence, and when 
the word next to it does.
22
 
 
 
1.2 GOTTLOB FREGE 
 
 
In order to fully grasp Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus and, thus, his 
later work, the Investigations, an introduction to Frege is necessary and an 
overview of his principle ideas. 
 
Gottlob Frege, the father of the philosophy of language, is regarded as 
one of the great exponents of logic. Indeed Pascal O’Gorman considers him as 
one of the most outstanding logicians ever and, alongside Aristotle, should be 
considered as one of the towering figures in the history of logic.
23
 The analysis 
of language, which Frege undertakes, involves an analysis of the working of 
language. ‘His seminal work consists of the sense and reference distinction’,24 
or as Frege calls it Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (meaning),
25
 where he considers 
how some propositions express an identity but give no information, while 
others do not yet are still considered identities (e.g. the morning star and the 
evening star). Thus, Frege endeavours to distinguish between the sense and the 
reference of these terms.
26
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  Frege, and his English counterpart Bertrand Russell, accomplished what 
we might consider as a logical revolution in terms of developing truth-
functional logic.
27
 The Frege-Russell logic is primarily focused on sentences 
and the propositions that lie therein, although it should be noted that some 
sentences are straight-forward propositions. This logical approach also 
analyses the domain of semantics, syntax and pragmatics within the course of 
language itself.
28
 Semantics is concerned with the literal meaning of a 
sentence, e.g. The tortoise ran across the field as quickly as it could.  In its 
literal sense, this sentence is false, (a tortoise cannot run) although it could 
nonetheless be interpreted in a metaphorical sense.
29
 Syntax is concerned with 
the rules of grammar for a language, and how a sentence is constituted 
according to the terms used. This is essential in order for us to understand a 
sentence; without the correct syntax, sentences or propositions are incoherent 
and unintelligible.
30
 Pragmatics, it appears, is a grey area in relation to the 
Frege Russell revolution.
31
 This domain deals with the practical uses of 
language, such as joking, colloquialism, and arguably, perhaps, even dialect. 
Frege’s basic idea was to analyse propositions into function and argument, as 
opposed to subject and predicate, like Aristotelian logic.
32
   
   
Frege was attempting to propose a general account of the workings of 
language that did not proceed by taking any fundamental concept for granted.  
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According to Frege, an account of the working of language is a theory of 
meaning.
33
 Three fundamental principles govern Frege’s enquiry: the 
delineation or separation of the psychological from the logical, which is the 
subjective from the objective; to seek the meaning of a word in the context of a 
proposition only; and to distinguish between a concept and an object.
34
 
 
Frege first draws the sense and reference distinction in connection with 
definite descriptions and names; he considers a name an abbreviation for a 
definite description.
35
 Accordingly, we can divide all propositions into simple 
categories - also known as atomic propositions, e.g. Lucy is a funny girl - and 
complex categories. For Frege, all proper names and descriptions in 
propositions (atomic) refer to objects.  He states that in atomic propositions, the 
logical role of a name is to refer to an object in virtue of its sense. He contends 
that the sense and reference distinction of a name-definite description is 
indispensable because we use the sense to determine the referent, i.e. the sense 
determines the object but the object or referent does not determine a unique 
sense, therefore referents do not have only one sense associated with them.
36
  
Frege claims that the sense is not subjective: it is not a private psychological 
state of mind, similar to Wittgenstein’s rejection of a private language and 
confers the term idea for such psychological states. Frege concludes that 
without reference we could have a sense but not one that could lead to further 
development or scientific knowledge.   
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Frege further argues that we must determine the difference, or 
separation, between the sense and the idea. He exemplifies this by explaining 
that: 
 
just as a person connects ‘this’ idea, and another person ‘that’ idea with 
the same word, similarly a person can associate ‘this’ sense and another 
‘that’ sense; but nonetheless there still remains a difference in the type 
of mode of connection.
37
  
 
 
Essentially, ‘they are not prevented from grasping the same sense, but they 
cannot have the same idea: Si duo idem faciunt, non est idem.’38  Even if two 
people picture the same thing, each still has their own idea. (In psychology this 
is referred to as mental representation.) Frege also suggests that every 
grammatically, well-formed, comprehensive expression presenting as a proper 
name must always have what he refers to as a sense. However, ‘this is not to 
say that to the sense there also corresponds a thing meant.’39 
 
Frege extends his sense and reference distinction to sentences, although 
unlike Russell he never actually defines the type of sentence he is referring to. 
This could be considered a Wittgensteinian trait: Wittgenstein does not give 
definitions or explanations but only descriptions and remarks; however, it is 
questionable whether Frege intentionally adopted a Wittgensteinian style. 
Russell, however, divided sentences into five types: interrogative, optative, 
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exclamatory, imperative and indicative.
40
 He emphasises his distinction 
between what is said when we utter a sentence as opposed to what we have in 
mind in uttering the sentence, or what we intended to say. He further contends 
that the sense of a sentence is constituted by the sense of each of its logical 
parts, i.e. name and predicate.
41
 Frege extends his theory of logical parts by 
constituting what is regarded as his central thesis, namely the sense of a 
sentence is given by its truth-conditions.
42
 If we cannot grasp truth conditions, 
then we will have difficulty in grasping the sense of the sentence, e.g. ‘Lucy is 
not wise’. In logical terms, this is a ‘negative’ sentence. It is true only if the 
sentence ‘Lucy is wise’ is false, and it is false only if the sentence ‘Lucy is 
wise’ is true.43 Furthermore, for Frege, reference is not an ingredient of 
meaning, thus sense can be explained as part of the meaning of a word (or 
concept or expression) which needs to be grasped, in order for us to decide the 
truth-values of the sentences containing it ‘and this means: that part of its 
meaning which determines its reference.’44 
 
Frege explores first level predicates — that which remains of an 
elementary sentence when the name is taken away.
45
 He contends that 
predicates are logically simple: we cannot give a definition of what is logically 
simple and, furthermore, it cannot be broken down any further. Frege insists 
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that first level predicates are incomplete, and arrives at this conclusion from a 
logical perspective. Frege continues to introduce the notion of a ‘concept’, and 
draws a basic contrast between a concept and an object. What he is explicating 
is that names refer to objects but objects fall under concepts.
46
 Arguably, the 
advantage of Frege’s terminology is that it draws our attention to the different 
logical roles of names and first-level predicates in elementary sentences. Frege 
extends this theory further again by introducing second-level predicates. He 
argues that a first-level concept can fall only within a second-level concept 
while an object can fall only under a first-level concept.
47
 
 
The Fregean legacy states that the term ‘meaning’ should be abandoned 
and replaced with two distinct terms, namely: sense and reference. From here 
we can determine that many terms with different senses have different 
referents, while some terms with different senses have the same referent.
48
 The 
later Wittgenstein legacy is a contribution to the understanding of the sense of 
a term and when we combine these two legacies, we arrive at a paradox. This is 
commonly referred to as the paradox of meaning variance: some terms, with 
totally different senses, do not refer to the same thing, e.g. I genuflected before 
the cross or I will cross the road at the traffic lights. Here we can see the 
Wittgensteinian theme, where understanding a concept is context-dependent. 
This is key to understanding Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. 
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In Frege: Philosophy of Language, Michael Dummett highlights the 
point that Frege distinguishes three things: (1) sense, (2) tone and (3) force – 
‘variations of which, in sentences, affect the meanings of those sentences.’49 
Dummett is arguing that reference is not an ingredient of meaning, rather it is a 
consequence of meaning in that it is determined by sense. Dummett contends 
that a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding: ‘what a person knows 
when he knows what a word or expression means, that is, when he understands 
it.’50 
  
Frege never actually defines the term ‘proper name’ and yet it is a 
philosophy of language that we are assessing, and ultimately a theory of 
meaning. Or is it? In Frege’s defence, Michael Dummett argues that Frege 
never said he was developing a theory of meaning. He referred to and 
explained that he was developing a logic, thus Frege never feels obliged to 
offer a definition of what it is to be a ‘proper name’. Frege is merely setting up 
‘a logical notation and logical laws and this is implicit in his writing.’51  
However, it could be argued here that the laws of logic cannot be independent 
of meaning. According to Weiner,
52
 Frege’s failure to offer a definition of a 
‘proper name’ can either be interpreted as an error or as an indication that he 
was not concerned with the workings of language. However, if we insist that 
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Frege was developing a theory of meaning then Weiner attributes many more 
errors to his thesis.
53
 
  
The contemporary American philosopher, Hilary Putnam argues that 
the Fregean thesis does not work for our usage of natural kind terms. In this 
situation, Putnam argues that the principle of doubt should be instigated. 
Similarly, he argues for the principle of reasonable ignorance: using a natural 
kind term correctly even though what we may reasonably call ‘experts’ have 
developed and established the correct criteria for identifying or naming an 
entity, e.g. water.
54
 In both examples presented here, the principle of doubt and 
the principle of reasonable ignorance, Frege would disagree. In the latter 
example he would argue that the sense determining the referent does not apply 
in this case. Similarly, Frege makes no allowances for the principle of doubt. 
 
Putnam further explores the use of natural kind terms and introduces his 
reasons why he disagrees with logical positivism and their analytic 
propositions.
55
 In several essays, including Is Semantics Possible (1970) and 
The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (1975), Putnam argues that for certain classes of 
expressions, in particular, natural kind terms, the reference of an expression is 
not a function of ideas or descriptions associated with it in the minds of the 
speakers. ‘Meanings, Putnam concludes further, are not “in the head”.’56 The 
traditional sense and characteristics of a term or concept such as a melon, e.g. 
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small, oval and yellow, may be matched by other things that are not melons 
and, therefore, may possibly fail to pick out actual melons, since for whatever 
reason some melons may not possess these generic or defining features. 
(Defining features and prototypical features are discussed in Chapter 4.)  
Instead, Putnam claims that we should recognise that our linguistic practices, 
or as Wittgenstein describes ‘the practice of language’, include our intentions 
to refer to things in the world that share common features, whether or not some 
speakers are able to state it specifically. 
 
However, it is questionable whether we can ever actually ‘name’ 
anything. What exactly is a name? Perhaps Frege’s theory may not be certain, 
‘but there is nothing more certain by which they can be shown to be false.’57 
The sense and reference distinction has had an enormous impact on twentieth-
century analytical philosophy, and has stimulated further exploration into an 
area that would have been neglected until the arrival of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein’s ‘meaning is use’ has without doubt, developed language in 
terms of effect and different uses: 
 
to formulate theories […] make promises, promote actions, make 
requests, tell fictitious stories, tell jokes, utter obscenities, take oaths 
[…] and so much more.58 
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1.3  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 
 
While Frege is regarded as the father of philosophy of language, Wittgenstein 
is regarded as one of the most influential philosophers and towering figures in 
history. The difficulty, however, has never been in deciding whether 
Wittgenstein was a great analytic philosopher, or not, but how we should 
interpret, understand and read his work. This controversy has surrounded 
Wittgenstein not just in relation to his first text, the Tractatus, but also the 
Investigations. Extraordinarily, both texts were equally influential and yet in 
some ways were diametrically opposed, an outstanding achievement that no 
other philosopher had accomplished, with the possible exception of the late 
influential German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). 
 
In both the early and late works, Wittgenstein asks questions about 
language, and about language and its relation to the world. In his earlier work, 
the Tractatus, he examines how language can logically mirror the way things 
are in the world – a picture theory of meaning. It also demonstrates simply how 
logic and language can say something about the world, and the nature of the 
world. In his later work, the Investigations, he explores how language is a 
social and communal process where rules are developed for the use of words 
and concepts, and where a language-game ‘refers to a social action-based 
context in which human beings relate to one another.’59 The Investigations also 
shows that there are no explanations or definitions, only descriptions and 
remarks, which is a synthesis of not only a new view of language but also a 
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new perspective on logic. It is also essential to understand that both of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophies are concerned with language and its limits. 
 
Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an expression of pain and 
saying “abracadabra!”—We ask “What do you mean?” And he answers 
“I meant toothache”.—You at once think to yourself: How can one 
‘mean toothache’ by that word? Or what did it mean to mean pain by 
that word? And yet, in a different context, you would have asserted that 
the mental activity of meaning such-and-such was just what was most 
important in using language. 
But—can’t I say “By ‘abracadabra’ I mean toothache”? Of 
course I can; but this is a definition; not a description of what goes on 
in me when I utter the word.
60
  
  
As Shand states, Wittgenstein is convinced that:   
 
The cardinal problem of philosophy has been the attempt to say what 
can only be shown; that is, the attempt to explain by saying things 
which can only be shown; and that can only produce nonsense.
61
 
 
 
While Wittgenstein’s logical approach to language is concerned with 
propositions and meaning, as outlined in the Tractatus, his natural language 
approach is concerned with meaning as use, and the usage of terms in ordinary 
contexts, as outlined in the Investigations. 
   
  According to Russell there are several problems with regard to 
language
62
 but the one that Wittgenstein is most concerned about is the logical 
element: ‘what relation must one fact (such as a sentence) have to another in 
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order to be capable of being a symbol for that other?’63 The following extracts 
from the Tractatus illustrate what Wittgenstein is endeavouring to show: 
 
2.141          A picture is a fact.
64
 
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.65 
3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the 
thought.  What is thinkable is possible too.
66
 
4                 A thought is a proposition with a sense.67 
4.022          A proposition shows its sense.  A Proposition shows how things    
         stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.
68
 
 
Wittgenstein argues that Augustinian philosophical questions, such as 
‘What is Time?’ as meaningless. Rather than concentrating on such questions, 
Wittgenstein suggests that we should return the subject of the question, in the 
instance ‘time’, back to its original context.   
   
  Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, believed that language represented 
reality, and that sentences are like the picture of the possible fact: 
 
When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my 
mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought.
69
  
 
  Wittgenstein considered words, for example, like ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’ 
not part of the ‘picture relationship’, although in the Tractatus, as Searle 
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remarks, he considered these words as tools or operators.
70
 However, in his 
later work, Wittgenstein abandoned the picture theory of meaning in favour of 
‘us to think of words as tools, think of sentences as instruments.’71 In the 
Investigations he claims that the structure of our language determines the way 
we think of the real world and, therefore, our experiences. Wittgenstein insists 
that language is infinite and extendable and that there is no one defining 
element that binds all uses of language together. This, then, is why Searle 
concludes that, ‘There isn’t any single feature that runs through all of language 
that constitutes the essence of language.’72 
   
  Arguably, tautologies and contradictions, true or false propositions 
according to the early Wittgenstein, are senseless (sinnlos) but not nonsense 
(Unsinn). Tautologies, such as a ‘logical proposition’73 or ‘logical truths’74, 
establish a logical structure of the world and of language and, therefore, our 
experiences, which is key for Wittgenstein, and show the boundaries within 
which all propositions, whether true or false, which can say anything about the 
world must fall. This is how we make sense of our world and of our 
experiences. However, on the contrary, genuine propositions can state facts 
[about the world], and can have sense only by doing so or else are relegated to 
the grouping of tautologies or contradictions. However, arguably, they could 
also be relegated to the group of propositions or ‘degenerate cases of 
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propositions’75 that make no sense; this way tautologies remain a special group. 
However, as we shall see: 
 
Wittgenstein later came to think that logic does not rest on ineffable 
foundations […]. He also abandoned the idea that logic is confined to 
tautologies or truth-functional relations.
76
 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, language and its usage gets its entire meaning from the 
world, ultimately from names, terms, concepts and objects, and so, language is 
meaningful only when it states facts about the world: ‘[…] there has to be 
something in common between the sentence and the state of affairs.’77 
   
  As stated earlier, Wittgenstein’s later work can be considered a critique 
of his earlier work. His new approach to language can be seen clearly not only 
in the Investigations but also in many of his other lectures and notes which 
were published posthumously. Wittgenstein genuinely believed that in the 
Tractatus he had solved the fundamental problems of philosophy. However, 
much later he felt that his work was fundamentally in error, and so he 
developed a wholly new approach to language in the Investigations, hence the 
Investigations is often considered a critique, and for some a criticism, of his 
earlier work. However, as Malcolm states, it will likely remain a matter of 
future debate as to what extent there is continuity between the early and the late 
Wittgenstein: 
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The writings from 1929 to 1932 testify to a continuous development 
and struggle – out of the former work and in the direction of the later.78  
 
 
However, I would agree with Glock when he argues that there is clear 
continuity between Wittgenstein’s early and later writings, particularly in the 
area of semantics and ontology: Wittgenstein has developed a ‘new conception 
of language’ but within a ‘framework which completely changed their 
significance.’79 Wittgenstein had now achieved something quite remarkable: he 
had produced two incompatible philosophies at different stages of his life, and 
as I stated earlier, both philosophies in some ways were diametrically opposed. 
However, Magee argues differently; he claims that Wittgenstein’s earlier and 
later works share certain basic common features: both texts are concerned 
about the role that language plays in human thinking and human life, and both 
the Investigations and the Tractatus are centrally concerned with the 
demarcation between valid and invalid uses of language.
80
 
 
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with how the 
role of language is involved in human behaviour. Unlike his earlier work in the 
Tractatus, where he is concerned with the picture theory of meaning and 
understanding language as a picture that structures reality, the Investigations 
explicates language as a socially constructed communal process, and 
something that is learned, rule-governed and systematic. Language also 
determines how we think and behave in the world. I suggest that this should 
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also be extended to ‘our world’, to fully engage and understand a form of life 
and behaviour as Wittgenstein had intended. He also explores how language 
functions in life, thus his term ‘form of life’ or a ‘life-form’ evolves.81 
Language, words and concepts acquire meaning as part of behaviour or as part 
of a form of life, where language permeates thinking and where it can never be 
transcended. It is in this context that he introduces the idea of a language-game.  
 
For Wittgenstein, then, language is obscured when, ‘instead of looking 
at the whole language-game, we only look at the contexts, the phrases of 
language in which the word is used.’82  Thus, for Wittgenstein, speaking a 
language and using words is an analogy to playing games: both, using words 
and playing games are human activities, social, communal and shared 
processes that are also systematic and are rule-governed. However, although 
the language-game is rule-driven, a language-game does not always follow 
strict rules: 
 
It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any 
rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis 
is a game for all that and has rules too.
83
 
 
 
Wittgenstein wants to draw attention continually to the fact that there 
are certain structural features that are characteristic of a game and certain 
structural features that are characteristic of verbal discourse:
84
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Doesn’t the analogy between language and games throw light here? We 
can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing 
with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many 
without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into 
the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another 
for a joke and so on.  And now someone says: 
The whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite 
rules at every throw. 
And is there not also the case where we play and—make up the rules as 
we go along?  And there is even one where we alter them—as we go 
along.
85
 
 
The Investigations is a reflection of Wittgenstein’s thoughts and his 
examination into language and its link to human behaviour. For Wittgenstein, 
his language-game it is not a doctrine or ‘any kind of theory.’86 This is what 
Wittgenstein most rejects. However, as this study will show, I argue that the 
language-game in more than a tool for explaining his conception of meaning; it 
can also be considered a theory of language. Wittgenstein’s observations and, 
therefore, remarks on ‘behaviour’ are to show how it [behaviour] is 
intrinsically linked to the practice of language. Similarly, throughout the 
Investigations he systematically rejects any ‘cognitive’ analysis, yet, as we will 
see, he often refers to ‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’ thus he does not deny that 
mental states and processes occur. Wittgenstein’s remarks and interest in 
behaviour occur at a time when behaviourism was considered the prominent 
tradition of psychology: ‘the psychologist observes the external reactions (the 
behaviour) of the subject.’87 However, his interest in behaviour should not be 
confused with interpreting Wittgenstein as a behaviourist. This is examined 
further in Chapter 3.  
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Wittgenstein contends that many words have a family resemblance 
only, as opposed to a specific fundamental essence that determines their 
definition: 
 
We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been 
named. It has not even got a name except in the language-game. This 
was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had meaning only 
as part of a sentence.
88
 
 
However, Gregory Murphy argues that Wittgenstein is arguing from the 
negative: Murphy claims that Wittgenstein does not say what specific features 
are present in family resemblance but argues instead that there is no defining 
feature, and thus, as Murphy states, can never be considered as part of the 
defining attribute theory.
89
 Similarly, in games also there is no single essence 
of game; there is a criss-crossing and over-lapping of features: 
 
And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one 
fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many 
fibres.
90
 
 
There is no one characteristic or defining attribute that all games have 
in common: they have various features in common with human activities, such 
as they are rule-governed, socially constructed and systematic. Wittgenstein 
applies his term family resemblance to what he considers as ‘meaningful’ 
concepts and, thus, avoids the possibility of any ambiguity arising in language 
use. This enables us to use language and situate concepts contextually. 
However, Wittgenstein does not deny that identical words have different 
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meanings, but emphasises the key role that the environment plays and, 
therefore, successfully separates this issue of identical words from the notion of 
ambiguity. 
 
As Wittgenstein argues we can only work from the inside of language, 
even when its fundamental constituent parts need to be described. We can 
never get outside of language and nor can it ever be transcended and so, 
therefore, each language-game too can only be understood from a ‘within’ 
perspective. A language-game refers to a social based context where human 
beings relate to, engage with and understand one another. As in games, a 
language-game will have (or will develop) its own rules for understanding and 
interpreting the many and varied aspects of its use of language. However, this 
does not prevent contradictions or some confusion arising when aspects of one 
language-game may have similar aspects to another language-game.
91
   
 
However, Shand considers Wittgenstein’s method ‘to carry through his 
critique to be deceptively simple’ since it emphasizes ‘how every and any 
language acquires its meaning determines the limits of what is meaningful in 
language.’92  Indeed, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, limits are determined 
by discovering the essence of language.  He also considers the limits of 
language as the limits of our thoughts; beyond those limits we not only lack 
any possibility of knowledge but we also reach what is unthinkable.
93
 But are 
there any limits to thought and language? To give a philosophical critique is to 
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describe the logical limits of something, e.g. Kant’s transcendental 
metaphysics. Thus, in the Tractatus the aim of the critique is to show that the 
problems of philosophy do not need to be addressed because they are pseudo-
problems which arise from illegitimately going beyond logical limits. Shand 
claims that ‘philosophical problems are not solved but dissolved’,94 but this 
raises the question of whether philosophical problems are problems at all? 
Perhaps, instead, they are only linguistic puzzles waiting to be solved. 
Wittgenstein believes that because terms, including concepts, cannot be 
defined in a method illustrated by the logicians, it does not follow that ordinary 
language is therefore defective. 
 
The American philosopher and logician, Willard van Orman Quine, 
offers a critique of logical atomism and logical positivism.  Quine’s holism is 
opposed to logical atomism, and implies that we cannot understand a sentence 
on its own: its sense is embedded in a conceptual scheme.
95
 Quine, reinforcing 
Frege’s principle, and subsequently supporting Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 
believes that the meaning of a term should be seen not in isolation but only in 
the context of a sentence. He insists that infants learn one word sentences by 
conditioning: this is referred to as ‘occasion sentences’.96  
 
Occasion sentences, as against standing sentences, are sentences such 
as ‘Gavagai’, ‘Red’, ‘It hurts’, ‘His face is dirty’, which command 
assent or dissent only if queried after an appropriate prompting 
stimulation.
97
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For an ‘occasion sentence’ to occur, appropriate prompting stimulation 
is necessary. Quine believes that the learning infant, whose linguistic ability is 
only confined to the correct usage of an occasion sentence, has not yet 
mastered an adult conceptual sense.
98
 The terms, which refer to objects, that 
the learning infant absorbs form part of the vocabulary of terms which are 
necessary for grasping the full meaning of other specific terms and developing 
concepts. Learning a term is, as Frege contends, learning to use it within 
sentences, and for Wittgenstein, within contexts. Ultimately, the process of 
referring to individual objects is learned in context, and not simply by appeal to 
‘occasion sentences’, or repetition or even ostensive teaching. For Quine, 
learning to refer to specific objects is not a simple matter: it involves learning 
to use terms in a construction of sentences rather than isolated occasion 
sentences. Quine is arguing that we should never take the meaning of a term in 
isolation: terms occur in sentences. This, too, is what the later Wittgenstein 
argues for, a natural approach to language where concepts are learned through 
an individual’s interaction with the environment or context in which the 
concept is present and, most importantly for Wittgenstein, where the concept is 
participatory. 
 
Arguments from contemporary philosophers and psychologists are 
worth mentioning here in order to see how this subject has been discussed and 
examined. For example, Jerry Fodor argues that we cannot learn a language 
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whose terms express semantic properties not expressed by the terms of some 
language we are already able to use.
99
 For example, Putnam claims that when 
we learn terms such as ‘gold’ or ‘cat’, we are learning socially acceptable 
stereotypes, ‘so that it is reasonable to believe of things that conform to the 
stereotypes that satisfy the predicates.’100 However, arguably, what is 
reasonable to believe need not prove to be true. For Fodor, ‘either the semantic 
properties of a word aren’t what you learn when you learn the word, or the 
semantic properties of a word don’t determine its extension.’101 
  
However, there are other views to consider also. Noam Chomsky 
claims that ‘we know the grammar of our language, though the knowledge is 
not conscious or inferentially integrated with conscious knowledge.’102 Fodor 
removes the emphasis from cognition and the mind and ‘postulates 
propositional attitudes without regard to conscious access or cognitive 
integration.’103 However, interestingly, Searle holds that ‘representation 
without the possibility of conscious access is impossible.’104 
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 It would appear to be the case, then, that it may be more appropriate 
and beneficial to ‘reconstruct’ the language of science. For example, terms like 
‘validity’ in philosophy, and terms like ‘empirical’ in psychology, are 
introduced as ‘theoretical constructs rather than as an intervening variable of 
the observation language.’105 This would mean, following Carnap, that a 
sentence containing a term of this type, 
 
can neither be translated into a sentence of the language of observables 
nor deduced from such sentences, but at best inferred with high 
probability.
106
  
 
 
For example: ‘Madge believes that a blue flame radiates more heat than a 
white flame’. This sentence can be interpreted in such a way that we can infer 
from a proposition describing Madge’s behaviour, at best with probability, but 
not with certainty. However, although Carnap’s argument is persuasive, he 
does not introduce any distinction between the terms, or for Wittgenstein 
concepts, such as, ‘belief’ and ‘know’, ‘true’ and ‘false’, or ‘valid’ and 
‘invalid’. This sentence is valid but untrue: white flames radiate more heat than 
blue flames.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
WITTGENSTEIN’S CENTRAL CONCEPTS:  
LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FAMILY RESEMBLANCE 
 
 
 
‘We find that what connects all the cases of comparing is a vast number of 
overlapping similarities, and as soon as we see this, we feel no  
longer compelled to say that there must be some  
one feature common to them all.’1 
 
 
I consider that Wittgenstein’s move from a calculus view of language, as seen 
in the Tractatus, to his language-game view of life, as it appeared in his later 
work the Investigations, as his most audacious move. However, we should not 
be concerned here with why Wittgenstein made this move — I would suggest 
that question in itself is a separate thesis — but rather the substance behind his 
two perspectives on language and specifically in relation to his conception of 
language, ontology and the application of rules.
2
  Bearing this in mind, in this 
chapter we examine Wittgenstein’s two central concepts: language-games and 
family resemblance. These concepts are integral to understanding how 
Wittgenstein has influenced cognitive psychology, specifically in the area of 
situating concepts and embodied cognition, both of which are exemplified in 
the language-game. 
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There is clear continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought with regard to 
language and his on-going investigation into the nature of language and 
meaning.
3
 For example, his analogy of a game of chess is used both in his 
earlier and later works to describe the workings of language and, as Glock 
argues, it should be considered that the ‘Investigations transforms rather than 
abandons the Tractatus’s methodological ideas.’4 Testimony to this is 
Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy and his: 
 
abandonment of not just logical atomism — the idea that the possibility 
of representation rests on the existence of sempiternal objects — but 
also the idea that representation presupposes an agreement in form 
between a proposition and a possible state of affairs.
5
  
 
He continues to discuss the connection between propositions and facts, but now 
specifically, and with intention, he discusses the ‘harmony between thought 
and reality which obtains equally between beliefs, expectations, desires, etc., 
and what verifies or fulfils them’:6  
 
The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I 
say falsely that something is red, even the red is what it isn’t.  And 
when I want to explain the word ‘red’ to someone, in the sentence ‘That 
is not red’, I do it by pointing to something red.7 
 
 
In The Blue Book Wittgenstein discusses issues such as ‘criteria’ and 
‘symptoms’ by means of explanation of rules within language.8  He argues: 
 
                                                 
3
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5
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that in general we don’t use language according to strict rules […]. We, 
in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with 
a calculus proceeding according to exact rules.
9
  
 
 
He develops this further by remarking that:  
 
This is a very one sided way of looking at language.  In practice we 
very rarely use language such as a calculus.  For not only do we not 
think of the rules of usage—of definitions, etc.—while using language, 
but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren’t able 
to do so.
10
  
 
Wittgenstein here is acknowledging that while rules apply to language, as also 
they apply in games, these rules are rarely used in something specific, such as a 
calculus, but rather are used even though we are unable to give specific 
definitions of these rules. He continues to remark that: 
 
When we talk of language as a symbolism used in exact calculus, that 
which is in our mind can be found in the sciences and in mathematics.  
Our ordinary use of language conforms to this standard of exactness 
only in rare cases. Why then do we in philosophising constantly 
compare our use of words with one following exact rules?  The answer 
is that the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this 
attitude towards language.
11
  
 
 
We know that one of the reasons why Wittgenstein moves from the idea 
of language as a calculus to a language-game view is because he saw a 
delineation between language and calculus, even though rules and application 
would always apply.
12
  Wittgenstein’s shift in the application of these rules 
allows him to present language, and language and behaviour and a form of life, 
in a broader and more cohesive structure. 
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2.1  LANGUAGE-GAMES 
 
The language-game appeared first in a Cambridge lecture (1932) which was 
then later, amongst other lectures, dictated to two of Wittgenstein’s pupils — 
Francis Skinner and Alice Ambrose.
13
 It then later appears in The Brown Book, 
when he refers to ways of using signs and systems of communication as 
language-games, noting that,  
 
they are more or less akin to what in ordinary language we call games 
[…]. We are not, however, regarding the language-games which we 
describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete 
in themselves, as complete systems of human communication.
14
   
 
He continues to remark that:  
 
Let us ask the question: Suppose I had explained to someone the word 
‘red’ (or the meaning of the word ‘red’) by having pointed to various 
red objects and given the ostensive explanation.—What does it mean to 
say ‘Now if he has understood the meaning, he will bring me a red 
object if I ask him too’? This seems to say: If he has really got hold of 
what is in common between all the objects I have shown him, he will be 
in a position to follow my order. But what is it that is in common to 
these objects?
15
   
 
Even as a child learns words and concepts, this teaching is not a preparation for 
a language-game but is a game complete in itself: the teaching and the process 
of the language is, for Wittgenstein, the language-game. 
 
Would a child understand what it means to see the table ‘as a table’?  It 
learns: ‘This is a table, that’s a bench’ etc., and it completely masters a 
language-game without any hint of there being an aspect involved in 
the business. 
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‘Yes, it’s just that the child doesn’t analyse what it does.’  Once more: 
what is in question here is not an analysis of what happens.  Only an 
analysis – and this word is very misleading – of our concepts.  And our 
concepts are more complicated than those of the child; in so far, that is, 
as our words have a more complicated employment than its words do.
16
 
 
Similarly when Wittgenstein talks of a primitive language as a 
language-game he is referring to the first words of a child: 
 
We can also think of the whole process of using words as one of those 
games by means of which children learn their native language.  I will 
call these games ‘language-games’ and will sometimes speak of a 
primitive language as a language-game.
17
 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s key concept ‘language-game’ was first introduced into 
philosophical circles via The Blue Book.  During all of Wittgenstein’s later 
work what he most rejects is a theoretical account of language. I suggest that, 
in fact, Wittgenstein overlooked many of the positive attributes of a theory. 
Furthermore, I argue in Chapter 6 that his language-game is in fact what he 
most rejects — a theory, and one that has greatly exerted many philosophical 
and psychological influences. However, for us to view the language-game as a 
‘theoretical notion’18 or as a key constituent part of a theory to explain 
language, for Wittgenstein, is a misconception of his work and a distortion of 
his ideas. For him, one of the best ways that we can understand language-
games is to see them as a network of connections, or at least producing an 
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understanding that allows us to see connections.
19
 Wittgenstein tried to show 
that: 
 
not all meaningful uses of language are meaningful in the same way. 
For example, names acquire their meaning through being correlated 
with a person or object, but (a) not all words are names and (b) the 
thing or person that is the bearer of the name is not itself or herself the 
meaning of the name.
20
 
 
However, when we attempt to provide a description of a language-game 
we are confronted with many obstacles and are reminded of when Wittgenstein 
asks:  
 
What does it mean to know what a game is?  What does it mean, to 
know it and not be able to say it?  Is this knowledge somehow 
equivalent to an unformulated definition?  So that if it were formulated 
I should be able to recognise it as the expression of my knowledge?  
Isn’t my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in 
the explanations that I could give?  That is, in my describing examples 
of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other  games can be 
constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely 
include this or this among games; and so on.
21
   
 
 
For Wittgenstein, once the syntax and meaning of language are thoroughly and 
accurately examined, what remains are language-games, and it is these 
language-games that constitute the semantic link between language and reality, 
and most importantly, context. 
 
The term language-game (Sprachspiel) refers to language use and the 
actions (behaviour or form of life) into which the language is woven therefore 
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enabling us to dispel with language confusions, vagueness and ambiguities. As 
Searle states: 
 
In his later work, as a consequence of emphasising the use of language, 
Wittgenstein is constantly calling our attention to the multiplicity, the 
variety, that we find in uses of language.
22
  
 
However, the term language-game has not just one but several family related 
meanings: first, it refers to primitive models of language, which Wittgenstein 
describes in the opening remarks of the Investigations and which he 
intentionally constructs in order to enable clarification in the working of 
language in general; secondly, language-games also refer to the whole of any 
language, such as Irish for example, and the particular regions of our language 
with its specific grammars; and thirdly, they refer to games that children play 
that enable them to learn language, which Wittgenstein refers to as training in 
language. Language-games refer to a multiplicity of language practices in 
ordinary language as well as the whole of any ordinary language while drawing 
attention to the fact that learning a language is much more than just learning 
words.
23
 Furthermore, they can be learned before we have mastered the 
individual concepts used within the actual game itself. The various meanings or 
references of language-games are not separated from each other but rather are 
connected by a network of relations as suggested by the term family 
resemblance and ‘are “interwoven” with non-linguistic activities, and must be 
understood within this context.’24 For Wittgenstein there is nothing trivial 
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about language; it is only through the various and multiform activities of 
human life that words and concepts have meaning (form of life):  
 
Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a 
future regularization of language—as it were first approximations, 
ignoring friction and air-resistance.  The language-games are rather set 
up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts 
of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of 
dissimilarities.
25
 
 
Ray Monk describes Wittgenstein’s language-game as ‘a (usually 
fictitious) primitive form of language’26 in which some specific aspect of our 
language, such as the role of names, is highlighted because it has been 
separated from the context in which it is embedded.
27
 For Wittgenstein, there is 
no separation between the name and the context; the context is where the 
concept is learned. Monk claims that the idea is that we will be able to ‘see the 
connection between this simplified case and language as it is used in real 
life.’28 Monk gives the following example as it appears in the Investigations in 
the first paragraph: 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping.  
I give him a slip marked ‘five red apples’. He takes the slip to the 
shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked ‘apples’; then he looks up 
the word ‘red’ in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he 
says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by 
heart—up to the word ‘five’ and for each number he takes an apple of 
the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and 
similar ways that one operates with words.
29
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Wittgenstein’s remarks here are not an accurate reflection of how we use 
language. However, Wittgenstein’s purpose is to break language down, 
introduce what he considers a primitive language, and for a recognition and 
awareness of some aspects of our language in this primitive way rather than the 
way language appears in everyday lives and subsequently everyday use. When 
language is viewed from this perspective it allows us to see clearly features of 
language that otherwise may have been overlooked. Wittgenstein is drawing 
attention to the connections between the words and concepts, both as they are 
used in this example that he draws out for us, and how they are then used in 
ordinary life.  He is highlighting the differences in the many and varied uses of 
language which is the fundamental basis of his concept the language-game; the 
meaning of a word or a concept is to be found in the way it is used, the 
meaning of a word or a concept is to be found in the language-game and, 
therefore, the context, to which it belongs. 
 
In the Tractatus, we can see where Wittgenstein considers that there is 
a certain structural similarity between the structure of a sentence and the 
structure of the fact represented by a sentence. In the Investigations he 
abandons the idea altogether (although Glock maintains that he ‘transforms’ 
rather than ‘abandons’30 as referred to earlier) that there is such a thing as the 
‘essence’ of language.31 For Wittgenstein, there is an indefinite variety of uses 
of language, which he calls different ‘language-games’ that people play with 
language. This might suggest that Wittgenstein was perhaps not rejecting the 
                                                 
30
 Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, p. 27. 
31
 Searle, ‘Wittgenstein’, p. 329. 
 75 
answer he had concluded in the Tractatus but rather that he now rejected the 
very question that he had presented himself with in the first instance in relation 
to language.  
 
According to Monk, for Wittgenstein, the technique of language-games 
was to break the tendency and, therefore, the expectation, of being able to 
answer questions such as: ‘What is time?’, ‘What is meaning?’, ‘What is 
thought?’ and ‘What are numbers?’32  
 
Connected with the inclination to look for a substance corresponding to 
a substantive is the idea that, for any given concept, there is an 
‘essence’ — something that is common to all the things subsumed 
under a general term.
33
   
 
In The Blue Book we can see clearly how Wittgenstein urges us to replace this 
notion of essence with the more flexible idea of family resemblances. The 
search for essences is, Wittgenstein states, an example of the ‘craving for 
generality’34 that springs from our preoccupation with the method of science. 
However, for Monk, Wittgenstein’s avoidance ‘to announce any general 
conclusions is perhaps the main feature that makes his work difficult to 
understand.’35  
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2.2  FAMILY RESEMBLANCE 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘family resemblance’ argues that there is no one 
defining feature to the meaning of a word: 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than 
‘family resemblance’; for the various resemblances between members 
of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. 
overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ 
form a family.
36
   
 
Wittgenstein contends that many games have a family resemblance 
only, as opposed to a specific fundamental essence that determines their 
definition. However, as stated in Chapter 1, Murphy claims that in explaining 
family resemblances, Wittgenstein argues from the negative: he does not, or 
perhaps cannot, put forward any defining features or attributes but that does not 
mean or prove that there are none.
37
 For Wittgenstein, games have no one 
defining attribute that all games share as language has no essence but only 
different phenomena related in various ways. I would argue that although 
Wittgenstein did not state any defining features of his concept family 
resemblance this does not detract from what he means: it is the connection 
between and across the words and concepts within a given rule-governed and 
contextual setting that he is most concerned about. It is the use of concepts and 
their subsequent meaning that is important to him. Similarly, however, in 
games there is no single essence of a ‘game’ — there is a criss-crossing and 
over-lapping of features. There is no one characteristic or defining attribute that 
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all games have in common: they have various features in common with human 
activities: 
 
The strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre 
runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
38
 
 
 
Eleanor Rosch has used Wittgenstein’s term family resemblance in 
many of her studies on concepts and categories.
39
 According to Rosch, for 
Wittgenstein ‘the referents of a word need not have common elements in order 
for the word to be understood and used in the normal functioning of 
language’40 but rather there was a family resemblance, an over-lapping of 
features, that linked the referents of a word.
41
 Rosch describes the family 
resemblance relationship as consisting of: 
 
a set of items of the form AB, BC, CD, DE. That is, each item has at 
least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more 
other items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items.
42
  
 
Investigating a network of family resemblances has developed into a 
theory about the shared nature of language, something common to all language 
users and linguistic communities. This, however, raises the question of how 
can we communicate (i.e. talk) if we do not agree on everything about the 
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words and concepts that we use?  I am interested in how Wittgenstein would 
answer this.  I suggest he would argue that: 
 
We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because 
we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real 
‘definition’ to them […]. Our ordinary use of language conforms to this 
standard of exactness only in rare cases.
43
  
 
  
It is important to remember, then, that Wittgenstein applies the term family 
resemblance to all language-games, and as previously stated, in so doing 
avoids the possibility of any duplicity or ambiguities arising in language use.  
However, he does not deny that identical words have different meanings 
(homophones) such as ‘right’, ‘rite’ and ‘write’ or ‘quay’ and ‘key’, and 
separates this issue from the notion of ambiguity and, therefore, vagueness. 
 
In the language-game, Wittgenstein considers that there is no one 
essence of a ‘game’, no one defining feature. Similar to his exposition of the 
term ‘family resemblance’, features over-lap and, therefore, many and various 
associations and relations are considered. Furthermore, many of the 
characteristics of ‘games’ are similar and some identical to characteristics of 
human activity (i.e. behaviour), thus his argument that language is a function of 
life or a form of life. Within a language-game we follow certain rules hence the 
notion of rule-governing; for example, if we want to talk about a whole natural 
language, then this becomes the language-game — ‘Japanese is a language-
game’, and similarly if we want to become more particular about a particular 
usage, for example the use of the concept ‘justice’, then the way we use the 
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concept ‘justice’ within context and in a sentence is a language-game: ‘I shall 
also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven, the ‘language-game.’44 
 
Wittgenstein’s arguments that there are no defining features or 
fundamental essence in order that we may define concepts, can be considered 
an attack on essentialism: all concepts meaningfully and appropriately used 
refer to a common underlying essence that make ‘the thing’ what it is. 
Wittgenstein’s attack, or rather his rejection of essentialism, is also fuelled by 
his anti-dogmatic approach to both language and philosophy as exemplified in 
his later work, which is in contrast to his logical, analytical and quasi-realist 
approach as viewed in the Tractatus. 
 
Wittgenstein remarks that meaning is always found in language-games 
and, therefore, argues that meaning can only be found when it can be shared: 
‘Language is everywhere bound up with the rest of our activities.’45 His ideas 
on language, and in particular the language-game, have never been abandoned, 
particularly in psychology, and the concept of a language-game is still referred 
to as we shall examine in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. However, a recurring underlying 
theme that arises in relation to the exploration of Wittgenstein’s work 
regarding the various concepts that occur within a language-game is the 
possibility that there may be some contemporary theories of language 
development which are incompatible with it. However, to date psychology 
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accepts Wittgenstein’s investigation into language and language use and indeed 
has even used some concepts from his later work, such as his concept family 
resemblance, in an attempt to explain concept development in particular. 
Rather than supporting Wittgenstein’s views on language as behaviour and, 
therefore use, psychologists tend to see it in a more theoretical framework. This 
too is further explored in the following chapters. 
 
2.3  LANGUAGE: MEANING IS USE 
 
Family resemblance is Wittgenstein’s term for the type of similarity that seems 
to hold between members of a category which was later used to derive family 
resemblance scores by Rosch and Mervis.
46
 However, what also needs to be 
considered is the extent to which estimates of family resemblance correlate 
highly with typicality. ‘Some categories do not have gradations of membership, 
while others do.’47 Using Wittgenstein’s term family resemblance, Rosch and 
Mervis have shown that we can derive a family resemblance score for each 
member of a category by noting all the attributes that that member has in 
common with all the other members of the category.  Rosch and Mervis found 
that typical members have high family resemblance scores and share few (if 
any) attributes in common with related, contrast categories:
48
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Rosch is perhaps best known for developing experimental paradigms 
for determining subjects’ ratings of how good an example of a category 
a member is judged to be.
49
  
 
 
This too is further explored in chapter five. 
 
The defining attribute theory has clear, specific and well-defined 
common properties and boundaries. For example, a concept belonging to this 
category would be a triangle whose properties comprise three sides. From this 
type of example Wittgenstein derives his notion of ‘game’ and how ‘game’ 
does not fit the classical view since there are no common properties shared by 
all games, for example: some games depend upon physical skills, dexterity, 
upon position or strategy, while others depend upon luck and others on the 
throw of a dice. There are card games, ball games, board games and there are 
games of prowess and occasional games, and competitive games and games 
demanding skill. Some games involve a group of people (e.g. football), other 
games involve only two individuals (e.g. chess) while other games can be 
enjoyed by oneself (e.g. solitaire).  
 
Wittgenstein also observed that there was no fixed boundary to the 
category game. The category could be extended and new kinds of games 
introduced, provided that they resemble previous games in appropriate ways. 
Lakoff cites that the introduction of video games in the 1970s where the 
boundaries of the game category were extended on a large scale. He states that:  
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One can always impose an artificial boundary for some purpose; what 
is important for his point is that extensions are possible, as well as 
artificial limitations.
50
  
 
 
Thus Wittgenstein cites the example of the category number. Historically, 
numbers were originally taken to be integers and were then extended to 
‘rational numbers, real numbers, complex numbers, transfinite numbers’51 and 
other subsequent numbers developed by mathematicians. Again, as Lakoff 
states, we can see how we can, for a particular purpose or intention, limit the 
category number to, for example, integers only, or rational numbers only, or 
real numbers only. ‘But the category number is not bounded in any natural 
way, and it can be limited or extended depending on one’s purposes.’52 
 
Wittgenstein argues that just because we cannot give a definition of 
words such as ‘game’ or ‘number’ or ‘family’ that we do not know what they 
are: ‘But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none 
have been drawn.’53 A fuzziness or lack of definitiveness around a word or a 
concept does not mean that the expression itself is meaningless. This is where 
he argues for the use of a word or concept and how it is learned in a context 
rather than searching for a precise and definitive meaning. Furthermore a sharp 
boundary can be chosen, to suit a purpose; however, in such cases, it is always 
the way in which the concept is used, and how it is learned, that is pivotal, 
rather than any precise meaning. 
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When we start to examine the constituent elements of the concept 
family resemblance, it raises many interesting possibilities. For example, 
within family resemblance are some members of the category more typical and 
others less typical? Is this because of how we form the concept in the first 
place?  Murphy argues that: 
 
For example, the basic family resemblance analysis of typicality or the 
structure analysis of basic categories simply do not refer to knowledge 
and yet do very well.
54
  
 
 
Furthermore, although the feature list is a very useful simplification of reality 
for purposes of calculating family resemblance, it nonetheless tends to lead us 
away from thinking about how the concept’s properties are both constrained 
and explained by one another and indeed by more general knowledge.
55
 There 
is also the issue of fuzzy boundaries and categories to consider. Wittgenstein 
wants us to allow for ‘fuzzy’ boundaries which he refers to and furthers this by 
describing why the meaning of exactness is indefinable. We know that 
boundaries and exactness are the traits of ‘Form’ and it is this that he is 
fighting against when he refers to the term ‘family resemblance’. However, he 
also applies the term concept to all meaningful concepts although this raises the 
question of what he means by the term ‘meaningful’? An alignment can be 
made here between Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘fuzzy’ boundaries and those 
found within the domain of conceptual structure, such as ‘fuzzy’ boundaries 
within prototype theory. I suggest that this raises a further interesting question: 
are the boundaries of some concepts limited by family resemblance? 
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The Investigations rejects the assumption that the meaning of a word is 
the thing that it stands for.
56
  For Glock, ‘that involves a misuse of the word 
‘meaning’.’57  Similarly, Hacker states that: 
 
There is no such thing as the name relation, and it is confused to 
suppose that words are connected with reality by semantic links.
58
   
 
 
That supposition, for Hacker, rests on a misinterpretation of ostensive 
definition.  Not all words or concepts, are, or need to be, sharply defined, 
‘analysable by specification of necessary and sufficient conditions of 
application.’59 The idea that we should always be looking for ‘determinacy of 
sense’ is not viable. Vagueness should not always be considered a defect, and 
we should never assume that there is ever an absolute standard of exactness. 
Hacker claims that the very ideal of analysis (inherited from the Cartesians and 
Empiricists, and developed afresh by Moore and Russell) was misconceived.
60
  
 
The terms ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ which are relative, were misused. 
Many concepts, in particular philosophically crucial ones such as 
‘proposition’, ‘language’, ‘number’, are united by family resemblance 
rather than by common characteristic marks.
61
  
 
However, some might argue that Wittgenstein is incorrect when he states that 
there is no real ‘definition’ to the concepts that we use. Cognitive theorists 
have shown that there are real definitions and that some are bound by specific 
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rules, such as outlined in the defining attribute theory of concept development, 
which must be noted were open to philosophical influences.  
 
While Wittgenstein continually draws our attention to the connections 
between the words and concepts, both as they are used in specific examples 
that he draws out for us — such as ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’ —62   and 
how we use them in our ordinary life, he is focusing on broader descriptions 
rather than specific definitions. He is also highlighting the differences in our 
uses of language which is the fundamental basis of the language-game: for 
Wittgenstein the meaning of a word and, therefore, the concept, is found in the 
way it is used, it is found in the context of the language-game to which it 
belongs. For psychology, however, there is a further extension to 
Wittgenstein’s language-game thesis: the meaning of a concept, both concrete 
and abstract, can be found in a theory of concept development, such as the 
exemplar view and the knowledge approach which are examined in Chapter 4. 
 
In both abstract and concrete concepts there is no one essence, thus 
Wittgenstein’s argument for a family resemblance, is a rejection of general 
explanations and the philosopher’s ‘craving for generality’.63 Wittgenstein 
again uses the term ‘craving for generality’64 which he states is the resultant of 
a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions.
65
 
He argues that we need to look at the actual variety of uses of these words —  
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‘look and see’ — and we will see many and varied criss-crossing and over-
lapping of family resemblance relationships in their uses: 
 
We have a tendency to look for something in common to all the entities 
which we commonly subsume under a general term.  We are inclined to 
think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and 
that this common property is the justification for applying the general 
term ‘game’ to the various games; whereas games form a family, the 
members of which have family likeness.  Some of them have the same 
nose, others the same eyebrows, and others again the same way of 
walking; and these likenesses overlap.
66
   
 
For Wittgenstein it is essential that we do not search for a systematic 
theory or doctrine to explain this concept, for he repeatedly asks us to: ‘Don’t 
think but look.’67 
  
The following extract from Wittgenstein’s Cambridge notes, which 
were subsequently published as The Blue Book, illustrates what he means when 
he talks of family resemblance and a language-game: 
 
I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall 
call language-games.  These are ways of using signs simpler than those 
in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language.  
Language-games are the forms of language with which a child begins to 
make use of words.  The study of language-games is the study of 
primitive forms of language or primitive languages.
68
   
 
 
From this point of view, therefore, it is fair to conclude that the Investigations 
is a continuation of Wittgenstein’s ideas about language and its constituent 
parts therein which were first described in the Tractatus: propositions, 
meaning, ontology, semantics, pragmatics and syntax. It is questionable 
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whether Wittgenstein ever abandoned the calculus view of language. However, 
by the time The Blue and Brown Books were circulating he had replaced the 
term ‘calculus’ with ‘language-game’ and this would indicate a definite shift in 
his conception of language.
69
 However, both the calculus and language-game 
are rule-governed but it is Wittgenstein’s conception of these rules, and their 
application, that has altered: ‘if anyone utters a sentence and means or 
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.’70 
Wittgenstein claims that the calculus view of language does not reflect the 
essential nature of reality but is autonomous. Glock states that for Wittgenstein 
‘“the meaning” of a mathematical sign, like that of a chess piece, is the sum of 
the rules that determine its possible “moves”.’71 It is the ‘application’ that 
separates applied mathematics and language from chess and pure mathematics: 
‘it is the way in which they engage with other (linguistics and non linguistic) 
activities.’72 Just as the calculus view of language highlights similarities 
between language and formal systems, the term language-game highlights the 
similarities between language and games.
73
 
 
As I stated in the opening that while Wittgenstein’s move from the 
calculus view of language to the more flexible language-game is his most 
audacious move, and the one that has had the most significant influence in 
philosophical and psychological circles, his views on behaviour and its 
connection to language use have equally also caused much debate. In the 
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following chapter I discuss how viewing Wittgenstein as a behaviourist is a 
distortion of his work and, therefore, creates a misunderstanding of his central 
thesis on how language should be considered. For Wittgenstein, the practice of 
language occurs always within a context and where the concept is 
participatory. 
 89 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
A POTENTIAL PROBLEM FOR PHILOSOPHY AND 
PSYCHOLOGY: 
WITTGENSTEIN AND BEHAVIOURISM 
 
 
‘Psychology treats of behaviour, not of the mind.’1 
 
 
 
Wittgenstein showed a genuine interest in psychology, as some of his other 
works clearly exemplify, such as The Blue and Brown Books and Remarks on 
the Philosophy of Psychology which is presented in 2 Volumes. Part II of the 
Investigations is concerned with psychological concepts, both specifically and 
general remarks ‘about’ concepts, and it is here that the reader first encounters 
Wittgenstein’s interest in this ‘other’ discipline. There is, nonetheless, as this 
chapter will show, a potential problem for both philosophy and psychology, 
namely that to consider or refer to Wittgenstein as a behaviourist is a 
misinterpretation of his work. His interest and descriptions of behaviour are 
used only to show his views on the practice of language and language use. 
Furthermore, as I will show in this study, Wittgenstein could see the limitations 
of behaviourism and, thus, for him, there evolves an emphasis on ‘the mind’ 
and ‘the mental’. His language-game shows the context in which a concept is 
participatory, which is a key feature of embodied and situated cognition. 
Wittgenstein illustrates how the mind and the body, along with the 
environment, and a participating concept, all engage together. 
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In the Investigations Wittgenstein adopts a new way of approaching 
philosophy: to see and understand it as an activity rather than a doctrine.  This 
activity he refers to is a way of clearing ambiguities caused by the bewitchment 
of language: ‘Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence 
by means of our language.’2  It is not Wittgenstein’s intention to falsify other 
philosophers’ theories or works; it is simply to attack ‘philosophical problems 
and confusions at their source.’3  Wittgenstein’s resistance to philosophical 
theorizing also extends to psychological theorizing. He does not think that 
problems about the mind that were created by bad philosophical theories can 
now be adequately addressed through empirical scientific means. Wittgenstein 
is essentially objecting to the idea that mental states are considered in isolation 
from the social environment
4
 and, therefore, any social context. Here we can 
see his growing interest in how an individual interacts with the environment 
and the concept in question. Furthermore, while he maintains that empirical 
psychological explanations can be given of behaviour, he nonetheless 
maintains that psychology is not a science. 
 
Both the early and late Wittgenstein ask questions concerning language, 
and language and its relation to the world. Wittgenstein developed language in 
terms of effect and use. Thus Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with how the 
role of language is an intrinsic part of human behaviour.  Unlike his earlier 
work, the Investigations explicates language as a social and systematic process 
where we can see the role that language plays in how we think and behave in 
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the world. For Wittgenstein, along with others such as Dewey and Quine, 
language is ‘intrinsically social’.5 This has important implications regarding 
analysing and understanding both ‘truth’ and ‘meaning’ in human behaviour 
from any exclusively scientific-behaviourist point of view, for, as Davidson 
acutely notes:  
 
This does not entail that truth and meaning can be defined in terms of 
observable behaviour, or that it is ‘nothing but’ observable behaviour; 
but it does imply that meaning is entirely determined by observable 
behaviour, even readily behaviour. That meanings are decipherable is 
not a matter of luck; public availability is a constitutive aspect of 
language.
6
  
 
 
 
4.1  PRIVATE LANGUAGE 
 
 
Wittgenstein also shows a significant interest and understanding of not just 
language, as it is used in any language-game or context, but also of what is 
referred to as a private language, which he claims is impossible. However, 
while Wittgenstein’s argument may be correct, concepts are nonetheless key to 
understanding the argument. The delineation between a shared or public 
language and a private language rests firmly in the area of semantics: when 
referring to public language, the issue of semantics needs to be considered. 
When referring to the notion of a possible private language, a language used 
for the purpose of communicating to oneself only, and in principle unusable for 
communication with another, the issue of semantics is both internalised and 
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subjective as it is embedded in the inner experience, or the private object, being 
named.
7
 For some, Wittgenstein’s attack on the possibility of a private 
language show that meaning, for example, must be a manifestation of 
behaviour.
8
 When Wittgenstein speaks of a private language he is referring to 
language that cannot be understood by anyone other than the speaker:   
 
The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be 
known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.  So 
another person cannot understand the language.
9
 
 
 
I contend that the private language argument, for many, is not fully understood; 
subsequently there are many and varied interpretations from several critics of 
what Wittgenstein actually intended to argue. I shall clarify some aspects that 
have been misinterpreted in Wittgenstein’s private language argument here. 
 
Immediately preceding the rule-governing section in the Investigations, 
and perhaps even as a result of these passages, are sections often referred to as 
the private language argument, which is also considered an anti-Cartesian 
argument.  The private language sections in the Investigations suggest that in 
order for an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible to subject this same 
utterance to public and shared social standards in terms of its correctness.  For 
Wittgenstein, therefore, a private language is not a genuine or meaningful rule-
governed language. There are areas where states of sense experience are 
private and so their nature cannot be known to anyone other than the individual 
                                                 
7
 Byrne, ‘Behaviourism’, p. 7. 
8
 Ibid., p. 5. 
9
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #243. 
 93 
who experiences them.  Issues such as these are covered by philosophy of 
language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.
10
  
 
In the Investigations we see how the structure of language determines 
the way in which we think of the ‘real’ world and, therefore, our experience of 
the ‘real’ world. For example, we are able to determine what counts as one 
object or two objects or even the same object; in fact it enables us to determine 
what counts as an object at all:
11
 
 
We can’t discuss the world and we can’t even think of the world 
independently of some conceptual apparatus that we can use for that 
purpose.  And, of course, the apparatus is provided by language.
12
 
 
Since there are many strands to Wittgenstein’s argument on private language, it 
is immensely controversial; while some disagree with it, others argue it is valid 
such as Roger Scruton and John Searle.  Those who consider his argument to 
be valid come to the conclusion that: 
 
It is not possible to refer to private objects in a public language or refer 
to private objects in a private language; thus simply one cannot refer to 
them.
13
 
 
It is indeed a complex yet rich area within Wittgenstein’s work and has caused 
much debate, widespread disagreement over its significance and validity.  
Wittgenstein is claiming in his argument that for language to mean anything at 
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all, its use has to follow particular rules. I suggest that perhaps this is why it 
immediately follows the rule-governing section in the Investigations.  
However, some of the principles that constitute a rule, or the following of a 
specific rule-governing behaviour, are essentially social and shared constructs, 
and, therefore, he concludes that there can be no such thing as a private 
language. It simply cannot exist. 
 
Wittgenstein continues to argue that we do not give private definitions 
of sensation words or concepts, but rather sensation language: our language for 
describing inner experiences, is a part of a public, social phenomena.
14
  For 
Wittgenstein, our ordinary sensation language is not a private language because 
we learn and use the terms and concepts of this language in conjunction with 
public criteria or public phenomena that is clearly delineated and only learned 
through behaviour and context-dependent situations. 
 
For example, if we feel a sensation directly, such as tickling or tingling, 
and then we give that particular sensation a name, the rules for that name’s 
subsequent use are already determined by the sensation itself.  However, 
Wittgenstein argues that this impression is incorrect and, therefore, false. He 
purports that the sensation of tickling or tingling derives its identity only from 
a communal and shared practice of expression, social phenomena, and our use 
of concepts and language. If, however, the sensation was a metaphysical 
phenomenon, then the possibility of a communal and shared practice, within 
any context, would be irrelevant to the actual concept of the sensation, in this 
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case tickling or tingling: the nature of the object would be revealed as a single 
mental act of naming and all subsequent facts in relation to the use of the name 
would be deemed irrelevant to how the name was intended to be interpreted: its 
meaning, and, therefore, the name, ultimately becomes private.  Wittgenstein’s 
wants us to see that such subsequent facts could not be irrelevant and that no 
names, such as a named object, for example, could be private. The notion of 
having the genuine identity of a sensation revealed in a single act is simply 
unobtainable. For Wittgenstein ‘our sensation language, our language for 
describing inner experiences, is tied to public social phenomena at every 
point;’15 it is never a private act or a private experience. 
 
However, an issue that should be considered is how words can be 
linked or refer to sensations.  In The Wittgenstein Reader edited by Anthony 
Kenny, he draws our attention to Wittgenstein asking us where is the 
connection between the name and the thing being named: where is the 
sensation derived from.
16
 Sensations fall into Wittgenstein’s private language 
because only the individual experiencing, for example, the ‘pain’ can know 
whether they are actually in ‘pain’; another can only surmise the level of pain 
involved. This of course highlights the issue of certainty: how does anyone 
know for certain that they are in ‘pain’?  For Wittgenstein, you are either in 
pain or not in pain, and that descriptive terms such as ‘knowing’ and ‘certainty’ 
should be disregarded; they become irrelevant, meaningless, useless if not 
redundant, in the individual experience of the ‘pain’ itself. The expression 
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should be: ‘I am in pain’ or ‘I am not in pain’.   Therefore, it is true and valid to 
say that others can genuinely claim that they can doubt another’s experience of 
pain, but that the individual itself can say with certainty that ‘I am in pain’ and 
not doubt it.  Although issues concerning truth and validity mistakes can be 
made about the external world, judgements about our immediate and directly 
personal sensations and not sensations stored in memory, can only be true.
17
 
 
Any language that another person cannot understand, for Williams, is 
not a language.
18
 The hypothesis of private language is that ‘the meanings of 
the terms of the private language are the very sensory experiences to which 
they refer.’19 Private language suggests that only the individual who is 
experiencing the ‘sensation’, the inner experience, is the only one who 
understands it.  If words were used to describe concepts such as ‘throbbing’, 
‘uncomfortable’, ‘hurting’, ‘stinging’, ‘dull ache’ then surely they would no 
longer be private sensations.  If the language used to describe the private 
sensations, such as those above, is derived from our vocabulary, the language 
the individual uses competently and consistently while engaging and 
communicating with others, then is it not possible that others are capable of 
understanding the individual’s inner experiences and private sensations, 
negating the notion of a language that is private. 
 
Wittgenstein is arguing for the impossibility of a private language on 
the grounds that it [private language] must be incoherent since the words are 
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used to refer to the concepts of what can only be known to the person speaking; 
his philosophical idea of a private language is central to the notion that an 
individual cannot feel another individual’s private sensation. Perhaps it should 
be considered that the sensation is ‘directly correlated’20 with a particular 
concept or term, rather than interpreting the sensation, or sensory experience, 
as the meaning. However, it is important to understand that Wittgenstein is not 
objecting to any language-game in which we refer to private inner experiences 
or sensations. 
 
The notion of isolation is also important in Wittgenstein’s argument, for 
example: an individual who is in complete isolation and is naming his private 
sensation of ‘throbbing’.  This individual is familiar with and understands his 
private sensation of ‘throbbing’, completely separate from his own private 
experiences of the sensation of ‘throbbing’: from understanding and the 
experience itself, private sensations subsequently acquire their meaning, but in 
complete isolation from others.  It is a private process, although contextual, 
with no reference to others’ inner experiences or private sensations.  This 
private process allows for us to name the sensation, and to become familiar 
with it. What we cannot contend is that a private process takes place.  To this 
end, language still serves its ultimate purpose: to convey thoughts,
21
 which 
may be about pain, thirst, hunger, happiness, heat, sadness, anxiety or any type 
of sensation. Furthermore, Wittgenstein claims that advocates of a private 
language are abusing the word ‘name’; he accuses them of taking the word 
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‘name’ from ordinary usage and misusing it to prove their argument of naming 
a private sensation. 
 
According to the Cartesian, mental states are private, and can only ever 
be considered as such; they are only knowable to the person experiencing 
them.  However, that would suggest that it also makes them a separate entity 
from the external world which we inhabit and which is public, and where 
contents are accessible to more than one person. However, for Wittgenstein, 
the ‘external’ world is where we experience a communal and shared system. It 
is in this place [the world] that we engage with contexts and where concepts 
become participatory. 
 
Wittgenstein also refers to self-reference: he claims that an individual’s 
public language is so constructed that if we were to make a mistake when 
applying the term ‘pain’ or ‘thirst’ or ‘throbbing’, for example, to one’s self, 
then what has transpired is a misunderstanding of the actual terms and concepts 
themselves:  
 
‘But at least I know from my own case what it means “to say things to 
oneself”.  And if I were deprived of the organs of speech, I could still 
talk to myself’.  
If I know it only from my own case, then I know only what I call that, 
not what anyone else does.
22
 
 
 
Similarly, Wittgenstein argues that the depth grammar of a sentence can have 
different implications.  For example, it doesn’t make sense to say ‘I know I am 
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hot’ in the same way we can say that ‘I know that Ireland is playing against 
Italy today’.   Wittgenstein’s central point here is that we cannot doubt, guess, 
surmise or question the notion of their private sensation.  The sentence, 
therefore, ‘I know I am hot’ is invalid while the sentence ‘I am hot’ is valid.  
Similarly, we can guess, doubt, surmise or question whether Ireland are playing 
against Italy today, but cannot doubt the validity of sentences that arise from 
private sensations and inner experiences.  In this example, Wittgenstein is 
arguing that the depth grammar of a sentence is of central value and, therefore, 
we must separate sentences such as ‘I am hot’ from the factual sentences and 
statements such as ‘Ireland is playing against Italy today’: 
 
In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know 
whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one 
way this is wrong, and in another nonsense.
23
 
 
 
Further he remarks: 
 
 
The proposition “sensations are private” is comparable to: “One plays 
patience by oneself”.24 
 
 
Wittgenstein considers language as ‘the symbolic representation of 
sensory experience.’25 For him it is essential that the notion of the use of words 
is itself a social phenomena, that all criteria of meaning are social and not 
personal, and certainly not private.  Wittgenstein considers that concepts and 
words derive their meaning from the contexts in which they are used, and these 
contexts are built upon social constructs through a systematic process, and 
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unquestionably, on forms of life.  The practice of language and language used 
are functions of life and, therefore, neither can be subtracted from our existence 
and then examined in isolation from all other activities, including behaviour. 
For Wittgenstein ‘meaning-giving (and taking, for that matter)’26 should be 
seen as ‘an experiential affair’.27 
 
Wittgenstein refers to the grammar of a concept and for some this can 
be considered as the ‘rich behavioural context’28 in which the behaviour, 
environment and concept are determined. Furthermore, as Shimp argues, 
language presupposes a non-linguistic context. For him it functions against a 
‘background of human needs in the setting of a natural environment.’29 It is this 
that determines its character. ‘And we must see it and understand it in this way, 
as involved in a pattern that goes further, if we are to understand it at all.’30 
 
4.2  BEHAVIOURISM 
 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not a cognitive discipline:  
There are no propositions expressing philosophical knowledge — and 
cannot emulate the methods of science […]. Wittgenstein’s 
methodological views are based on the conviction that, unlike science, 
philosophy is concerned not with truth, or matters of fact, but with 
meaning.
31
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While Wittgenstein’s main interest can be found in language and logic, his 
genuine interest in psychology can be found in many of his works as stated 
previously. His views on the impossibility of a private language, and his 
systematic rejection of cognitive analysis, is arguably in contrast to his views 
on psychology and some of its more dominant themes at the time such as 
psychoanalysis and behaviourism. While Wittgenstein rejects all cognitive 
analysis and asserts that philosophy is not a cognitive discipline, Hathcock 
argues he has failed nonetheless to address the biological aspect of language 
development.
32
  
 
It could be argued that the most significant influence on Wittgenstein’s 
later work is undoubtedly the prominent tradition of psychology in 1945 —  
behaviourism: ‘the psychologist observes the external reactions (the 
behaviour) of the subject.’33  According to Wittgenstein, psychology’s 
problems are first and foremost conceptual. An example from the 
Investigations can serve to illustrate this point: taking the concepts of love or 
hope, Wittgenstein asks: 
 
Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of 
one second—no matter what preceded or followed this second?— What 
is happening now has significance—in these surroundings. The 
surroundings give it its importance.
34
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Wittgenstein’s answer is no: this is not a meaningful use of the concepts ‘love’ 
or ‘hope’.  The ‘surroundings’, as Wittgenstein says, are not so that the 
concepts can be correctly applied and, therefore, understood.  For Wittgenstein 
we do not discover this through experiments, or by handing out questionnaires 
to ‘subjects’, as they are called, but only by examining the ‘grammar’ of 
psychological concepts, i.e., ‘the normativity that determines what linguistic 
moves are allowed to make sense in what “surroundings”, and what are not.’35 
Again we can see the central role that the term context plays for Wittgenstein; 
it is in the situation that the concept is learned, used and adapted where 
necessary. The concept participates and becomes part of the environment. 
 
One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. 
Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to 
numbers, etc.. To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to 
a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But 
what is it a preparation for?
36
 
 
Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of any scientific psychology. He 
concludes the Investigations with the remark that: 
 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusions […]. 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have 
the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem 
and method pass one another by.
37
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For Williams, what Wittgenstein rejects mostly is the idea that any cognitive 
ability (e.g., memory, recognition, problem solving) can be explained by 
reference to any type of inner psychological process: 
His two principal objections that are most central to the cognitivist 
program would be that (1) causal stories are irrelevant to our 
understanding of cognitive abilities; and (2) believing, recognising, 
remembering, etc are not mental processes.
38
   
 
Again, here we can see how Wittgenstein is addressing the issue of how mental 
states should not be considered in isolation from any social context or social 
environment.  Williams continues to show why Wittgenstein argues that the 
most interesting psychological questions are conceptual.  She suggests that 
there are two aspects to this claim: first, the critical aspect in which we are 
concerned with ‘what counts as meaning or intending or believing;’39 and 
secondly, the genetic aspect that explains how we come to be a ‘believer or an 
intender’.40  For Wittgenstein, both aspects can be illustrated in terms of social 
practices, social contexts and forms of life.
41
 
According to Rhees, when Wittgenstein was in Cambridge, before 
1914, he had thought ‘psychology a waste of time.’42 However, some years 
later he discovered the work of Sigmund Freud and for the remainder of his life 
he considered him as one of the few authors that had something to say, even 
though Wittgenstein regularly disagreed with him and considered him in the 
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wrong. Wittgenstein was critical of Freud and considered psychoanalysis, and 
particularly its influence in America and Europe, rather harmful, ‘although it 
will take a long time before we lose our subservience to it.’43 For Wittgenstein, 
to learn from Freud it was necessary to be critical and psychoanalysis generally 
prevented this,
44
 although Wittgenstein remained a ‘disciple of Freud’ and ‘a 
follower of Freud’ for many years.45 
 
Wittgenstein’s interest in behaviour, ‘the mind’, ‘the mental’ and 
psychological concepts, leads us to the conclusion that he had an understanding 
and knowledge of the science of psychology.  Using behaviourism as the 
psychological paradigm of the 1940s we can tentatively see the background to 
which he remarked and developed his ideas on language as behaviour and 
language as use. However, the [psychological] behaviourists primary concern 
is that which is ‘overt’ and ‘objective’. Wittgenstein’s interest is in how 
behaviour and language, intrinsically linked, are used to understand and use 
concepts within a particular context. However, both [psychological] 
behaviourists and Wittgenstein consider that meaning and, therefore, 
understanding, will always be culturally and contextually variable. 
 
Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology as a philosopher has fuelled many 
debates about his behaviourist viewpoints and, therefore, it is without doubt a 
contentious question to ask whether Wittgenstein was a behaviourist or 
whether he was a philosopher who showed an interest in behaviour and its link 
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to the practice of language. His philosophy of mind has often been interpreted, 
and I argue it has also been misinterpreted, as a form of behaviourism. His 
descriptions of behaviour are intrinsically linked to language and the nature of 
meaning which are clearly seen in his remarks on philosophical psychology, 
both in the Investigations and in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 
Volumes 1 and 2. 
 
Wittgenstein understands and, therefore, emphasises the role of the 
‘context’ or the ‘environment’ in linguistic interaction, although it must be 
noted that he uses the term ‘context’ sparingly: the term appears a total of six 
times and always in what Kopytko refers to as the ‘ordinary rather than in the 
technical sense.’46 Furthermore, Wittgenstein systematically reconceptualises 
language and behaviour, and all ‘linguistic interaction in terms of language-
games and forms of life.’47  Koptyko states that according to Wittgenstein: 
 
a hierarchy of embedding consists of words and expressions embedded 
in language-games, which in turn, are embedded in a variety of forms 
of life (for instance, biological, social or cultural).
48
  
 
 
Terms and concepts are key components for Wittgenstein, and 
consequently he argues that in order for us to understand a term or concept, we 
must not only place it back into its context, but must also look at its usage. 
Here Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the sophistication of the usage of 
terms in ordinary contexts, and exploiting it in terms of its flexibility and 
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conversational perspective. For him this is how we learn a concept; in a general 
context-dependent situation. ‘Most questions and propositions of the 
philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our 
language.’49  
 
It is clear that the Investigations is concerned with how the role of 
language is involved in human behaviour, and so the Investigations becomes 
Wittgenstein’s own investigation into the workings of language and grammar, 
rather than an investigation into behaviour.  His remarks and explanation of 
concepts is not meant to be interpreted as a description of behaviourism, rather 
they are used to illustrate his views on concept qua concept, and concepts 
‘about’ things in the world, as well as: 
 
concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the 
foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things.
50
  
 
Furthermore, knowledge of language and language-use are seen not only in 
linguistic terms but are also evident in the behaviour of an individual: to fully 
grasp and understand a concept is to be able to use it competently, and this, as 
we know, is always reflected in behaviour. Although language and behaviour 
are interlinked and interdependent for Wittgenstein, they are nonetheless both 
discussed independently and collectively by him. 
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4.3  PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIOURISM: ANALYTICAL OR LOGICAL 
 
 
Behaviourism, for one commentator, has ‘no major, distinct existence but it is 
everywhere.’51 Undoubtedly, this statement made by Harzem is still relevant 
for present day psychology. 
 
Analytical or logical behaviourism, with its historical roots in logical 
positivism, is a theory within philosophy which concerns the meaning or 
semantics of mental terms or concepts.  It states that the very idea of a mental 
state or condition is the idea of a behavioural disposition or family of 
behavioural tendencies. For example, when a belief is attributed to someone, 
we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or condition.  
Instead we are characterising the person in terms of what he or she might do in 
particular situations or environmental interactions.   
 
Analytical behaviourism can be seen clearly in the work of Gilbert Ryle 
and arguably a version of this type of behaviourism can also be traced in the 
work of Daniel Dennett on the ascription of states of consciousness via a 
method he calls ‘heterophenomenology’.52  Similarly, Quine also took a 
behaviourist approach to the study of language.  He claimed that it should 
never be considered that any type of psychological or mental activity or 
process has a place in the scientific account of either the origins of speech or in 
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the meaning of speech.
53
  For Quine, to talk in a scientific discipline 
concerning the meaning of an utterance is simply to talk about ‘stimuli for the 
utterance, its so-called “stimulus meaning”’.54  There is no evidence to suggest 
that Wittgenstein’s works, particularly his philosophical psychology, can be 
interpreted as analytic behaviourism. Perhaps it is more accurate to suggest that 
Wittgenstein has been misinterpreted as a behaviourist both in the 
psychological sense and the philosophical one. 
 
According to Thornton: 
 
mental state descriptions are really disguised shorthand versions of 
behavioural descriptions. Thus, they cannot be invoked to explain the 
same chunks of behaviour.
55
 
 
 
While Wittgenstein provides a rich description of mental phenomena (‘the 
mind’ and ‘the mental’) throughout the Investigations, he also very carefully 
distinguishes between mental states and behaviour:
56
  
 
Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom 
really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?—If I 
do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.
57
 
 
Furthermore, Glock states that: 
 
Mental terms would not mean what they do if they were not bound up 
with behavioural criteria […]. Mental phenomena are neither reducible 
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to, nor totally separable from, their bodily and behavioural 
expressions.
58
 
 
Similarly, Wittgenstein asks how does the philosophical problem, even 
if it is only conceptual, about mental processes and states, and about 
behaviourism arise? 
 
The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes  
perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just  
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we  
have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better […]. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the 
yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental 
processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.59 
 
Here Wittgenstein acknowledges that there is more to know about the 
nature and ‘essence’ of mental processes and states even if for now we must 
deny the ‘uncomprehended process’ in the ‘unexplored medium’.  We could 
reasonably suggest here that in light of the developments within cognitive 
psychology as a science that the then ‘uncomprehended process’ is now 
considered to be cognitive processes such as attention, perception, memory, 
reasoning, problem solving and language, and that the ‘unexplored medium’ 
refers to ‘the mind’.  
 
However, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of psychology ‘retains some 
points of contact with logical behaviourism.’60 It discards any dualist account 
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of the mental, and mind, as epistemically private. Furthermore, as Glock 
claims: 
 
It accepts, albeit as an empirical fact, that language-learning (and 
thereby the possession of a complex mental life) is founded on brute 
‘training’ (Abrichtung), rather than genuine EXPLANATION, and 
presupposes natural patterns of behaviour and reaction, to be activated 
by certain stimuli. And it claims that the ascription of psychological 
predicates to other people is logically connected with behaviour.
61
  
 
However, Wittgenstein’s remarks and descriptions in his later 
philosophy, where some suggest that he has tentatively retained some points of 
contact with logical behaviourism, is not sufficient to assert his allegiance to a 
form of behaviourism, either psychological and analytical, even though 
‘methodological, psychological, and analytical behaviourism often are found in 
one behaviourism’62 (such as Skinner’s radical form of behaviourism63).  
Furthermore, even though Wittgenstein systematically rejects cognitive 
analysis, he does not deny the existence of a complex mental life, particularly 
when he refers to mentalistic concepts. However, this should not be confused 
with citing him as a behaviourist:  
 
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states 
and about behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them—we 
think […].64   
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4.4  SKINNER AND WITTGENSTEIN 
 
 
While Wittgenstein had been disturbed at how the logical positivists had 
misunderstood his earlier work, the Tractatus, at the same time he was also 
aware of the parallel developments in psychology.  In 1913 John B. Watson 
exerted a hugely influential force on the course of psychology by introducing 
his behaviourist approach.  This was followed in 1938 with B.F. Skinner 
publishing The Behavior of Organisms where he explored research findings on 
operant conditioning. Some academics advocating behaviourism would 
consider Skinner’s work as a preparation and an introduction to Wittgenstein, a 
type of  ‘Skinner is Wittgenstein in practice’.65 For Skinner, however, 
behaviourism is all that there can be: the mind, the mental, the internal 
reactions and responses are all exhibited through the behaviour of the 
individual. For him, ‘behaviourism seems committed to the idea that 
knowledge is social in origin.’66 
 
 Willard Day makes a compelling argument when he systematically 
outlines the similarities between Skinner and Wittgenstein. Some of these 
similarities, which are discussed in detail in his paper,
67
 include: their 
objections to dualism; the significance of private events; their interest in 
                                                 
65
 In conversation with Dr Bryan Roche, Department of Psychology, National University of 
Ireland, Maynooth, (2011). 
66
 B.F. Skinner, ‘Verbal Behavior’ (New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts, 1957), in C.P. 
Shimp, ‘Contemporary Behaviorism Versus the Old Behavioral Straw Man in Gardner’s The 
Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution’, Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior,  51 (1989), 163-171 ( p. 165). 
67
 Willard F. Day, ‘On Certain Similarities Between the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and the Operationism of B.F. Skinner’, Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 12 (1969), 489-506. 
 112 
natural language, the effects of verbal behaviour and the situation or context in 
which it occurs; and the nature of meaning: 
 
Wittgenstein and Skinner are vey much alike in their analysis of the 
nature of meaning itself. For both, there are no such things as meanings, 
where meanings are taken to be mental entities somehow focally 
involved in communication. For both, a search for meaning can lead 
only to the study of word usage, to the analysis of verbal behaviour as it 
is actually seen to take place. For both, the meaning is the usage.
68
 
 
Also both Skinner and Wittgenstein considered their work descriptive 
in nature rather than theoretical.
69
  Pole claims that: 
 
Wittgenstein disclaimed any intention of propounding a philosophy of 
language [i.e., theory of the nature of language]. To me it seems that he has 
done so whether he intended it or not.
70
 
 
According to Day, Wittgenstein wants psychologists and philosophers to 
understand that one of the difficulties for them that arises regarding their 
concern in relation to mental processes is ‘from habitual ways of talking about, 
of conceptualizing, of thinking about mental events as objects of study.’71  
 
However, while Day draws attention to the similarities between Skinner 
and Wittgenstein, these similarities could arguably be drawn between Skinner 
and other philosophers too. For example, Frege and Skinner share the same 
perspectives on logical positivism; Quine too is interested in natural language 
and the context in which it occurs; and the contemporary philosopher Daniel 
Dennett would share Skinner’s interest in the nature of meaning. While Skinner 
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and Wittgenstein share similar, but not exact, views on aspects such as the 
impossibility of a private language,
72
 this in no way constitutes an argument to 
consider Wittgenstein as a behaviourist. Wittgenstein’s ideas and remarks were 
often and repeatedly misunderstood and misinterpreted, often distorted, ‘even 
by those who professed to be his disciples.’73 Wittgenstein also doubted ‘that 
he would be better understood in the future.’74 This we now know to be true. 
Even in contemporary philosophical and psychological circles, Wittgenstein is 
still misunderstood and his passages are often taken out of context, if not 
distorted. While Wittgenstein offers no substantive remarks about his rejection 
of him as a behaviourist he nonetheless rejects the notion. Furthermore, as Pole 
states: 
 
Yet Wittgenstein himself has been thought a behaviourist. For, one 
asks, if Dualism is rejected […] what other alternative remains? But 
Wittgenstein does not mean to offer any alternative, any other or newer 
theory or picture.
75
 
 
In the late 1930s and 1940s behaviourism was revived by Skinner. In 
this revival Skinner developed some of Watson’s main principles of 
behaviourism.
76
 This included the rejection of consciousness and related terms, 
and Skinner’s subsequent arguments for mentalistic terms to be eliminated 
from scientific language.
77
 Skinner is without doubt a leading figure in 
twentieth century psychology and his remarks on behaviourism as documented 
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in his writings such as Verbal Behavior (1957) and About Behaviorism (1976) 
have had an enormous impact on behaviourism as a paradigm. While Skinner 
openly acknowledged that he had been influenced by some of Wittgenstein’s 
ideas, this acknowledgement was never reciprocated. While Day discusses ten 
similarities between Skinner and Wittgenstein, perhaps these similarities are 
only apparent because of Wittgenstein’s influence on Skinner, rather than any 
reciprocal influence. Furthermore, for Skinner, it is mentalistic to look at words 
such as ‘deciding’, ‘remembering’, ‘trying’ or other, similar mentalistic words, 
as identifying psychological processes or states of some description which map 
the underlying structure of our psychological nature.
78
 Day argues that this is 
where he is resisting ontology. Furthermore, Day states that Skinner sees these 
types of words as part of language where we make sense of behaviour and, 
therefore, ‘if we are to account for the behaviour to which they are relevant we 
must first analyze the control of these terms as aspects of verbal behaviour.’79 
 
Wittgenstein continued to revise his earlier ideas on language and 
reality, and his quasi-realist arguments such as how the world imposes 
concepts on us: ‘A concept forces itself on one. (This is what you must not 
forget)’80 and what a concept is, or is not: ‘We are not analysing a phenomenon 
(e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a 
word.’81 Furthermore, for Wittgenstein: 
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We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because 
we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real 
‘definition’ to them. To suppose that there must be would be like 
supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game 
according to strict rules.
82
 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s developing views on concepts, their context and language-use 
are without doubt set against a background where behaviour is integral to 
understanding them, rather than set against a behaviourist paradigm or 
background. Furthermore, an interesting aspect to consider is whether 
Wittgenstein exerted any influence on psychological behaviourism. In Chapter 
4 there is a discussion on how his term ‘family resemblance’ is used by Rosch 
in the prototype theory of concept development, and also as this dissertation 
shows his influences can now also be traced in current psychological 
disciplines such as embodied and situated cognition. 
 
While Wittgenstein was determined not to be labelled a behaviourist 
and was concerned to avoid any form of behaviourism ‘many of his 
commentators remain unconvinced.’83 Furthermore, some of these 
commentators and critics, who in their wish to defend behaviourism, saw him 
as an ‘ally’.84 Other commentators, according to Luckhardt, ‘believing 
behaviourism to be mistaken, regard what they see as Wittgenstein’s 
commitment to it as a flaw in his philosophy.’85 Commencing a discussion on 
the question of whether Wittgenstein is a behaviourist is undoubtedly a 
contentious issue and one that has been asked by not only many eminent 
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psychologists but also by philosophers, scholars and critics.  It is a fractious 
area of discussion with many complex matters to consider before any 
conclusions can be drawn. In psychology, behaviourism is the view that human 
activity is accounted for by descriptions of behaviour.  For example, ‘Tom’ is 
visibly upset.  The description of the subject’s behaviour includes using the 
terms crying, anxious and agitated; it is from observing Tom’s behaviour - 
crying, anxious and agitated – that we can give an account or description of his 
behaviour. However, in philosophy, and in particular with reference to the 
philosophy of mind, logical behaviourism argues that mental concepts can be 
defined in terms of behaviour, in the sense that statements about ‘the mind’ or 
‘the mental’ can also be understood as statements about behaviour. This would 
suggest that there is more than a tentative link between concepts and 
behaviour, and mind and behaviour.
86
   
 
The general term ‘behaviourist’ has been applied to Wittgenstein, 
perhaps only because he places an emphasis on meaning and ‘meaning as use’ 
within a social context: for example, his concept family resemblance and how 
we are using language but yet no specific definition of the type of 
behaviourism he is supposed to have held is available. Thornton argues that 
there is a connection between mental states and behaviour.
87
 For Thornton, 
because the content of a mental state depends on the linguistic content, being 
capable of forming mental states requires underlying practical abilities and 
skills in order to use, understand and explain signs.  It is these practical abilities 
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and skills that play a central and key role in the formation of mental states.  
Therefore, ‘there is an a priori and analytic connection between mental states 
and behaviour.’88  However, we have to ask whether that connection between 
mental states and behaviour is sufficient to warrant the generality of the term 
behaviourist to Wittgenstein. 
 
Behaviourism, as a prominent paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s, placed 
an emphasis on the study of learning rather than focusing on psychological 
functioning; behaviourists were interested in seeing and understanding the 
effects of stimulus response (S-R) reactions
89
 – that which is considered to be 
‘observable’ and ‘objective’ as opposed to that which is ‘inward’ or a form of 
‘introspection’ both of which are neither observable nor objective.  Similarly, 
at the time of Wittgenstein and the Investigations, behaviourism was concerned 
with attempting to put forward a ‘theory of behaviour’. The proposed theory of 
behaviour was based on the principles of conditioning, S-R reactions, and on 
environmental determinants of behaviour. However, what should not be 
ignored are some of the problems that have been associated with behaviourism, 
such as the issue that environmental stimuli are accounted for while some 
internal factors, for example past knowledge and experience, are overlooked. It 
was from this dissatisfaction with behaviourism that the development of the 
cognitive approach emerged.  
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A further anomaly in Wittgenstein’s alleged allegiance to behaviourism 
can be identified when he suggests that language is impossible to transcend, is 
inexplicable to explain from an ‘outside’ perspective and, therefore, is only 
coherent from within the workings of language itself: language is obscured 
when ‘instead of looking at the whole language-game, we only look at the 
contexts, the phrases of language in which the word is used.’90  I would argue 
here that when he denies the explanation of language from an outside 
perspective he is in fact, to use Pole’s term, ‘disclaiming’ a form of 
behaviourism.
91
 Although Wittgenstein does not develop his remarks or 
descriptions on mental states and activities, and never denies their existence 
either, he is aware, perhaps, of the limitations that behaviourism has to offer, 
and considers that ‘the mind’ and ‘cognition’ now have a more dominant role 
to play. The language-game is language as behaviour, an action, a form of life, 
and as I have discussed earlier speaking a language and using words is an 
analogy to playing games, which is also behavioural. However, although 
Wittgenstein did not discard the idea that language is rule-governed, ‘he 
clarified it, comparing language to a calculus no longer but to a game.’92  He 
wanted to show that although language is rule-governed this should not be seen 
as just a heuristic device. For him, understanding a language, using a language 
competently, mastering a language, all involve learning skills and techniques 
concerning the application of rules.
93
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Wittgenstein continues to emphasise the link between language, 
meaning and rules:
94
 ‘following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to 
our language-game.’95  Both language and games are contextual and share 
several features rather than one defining characteristic that suggest how they 
should be categorised.  However, although the language-game is rule-driven, 
the rules are applied loosely as opposed to strict and rigorous rules that we 
might apply to science.  A language-game does not always follow strict rules: 
 
It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any 
rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis 
is a game for all that and has rules too.
96
  
 
 
Without doubt there remains many unresolved ambiguities and unanswered 
questions in relation to Wittgenstein’s real intent with regard to his 
psychological writings, particularly in relation to his descriptions of concepts 
in general and more specifically his ‘concepts of meaning, understanding and 
states of consciousness.’97 His descriptions of behaviour feature prominently in 
the explanation of language-behaviour, ostensive definition and the 
impossibility of a private language. Throughout his work, however, but 
particularly in relation to the Tractatus and Investigations, Wittgenstein is 
considered as an extraordinary and influential philosopher who moves 
successfully from an anti-realist position of logic advocating a calculus view of 
language, to a quasi-realist position as exposited in his later work and the 
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language-game. During this incalculable move he illustrates how language is a 
form of behaviour and how it is a part of a social, contextual and shared 
process. Wittgenstein’s views on language and the language-game involve 
descriptions of behaviour by their very nature only, and these descriptions 
should not distort or invite misinterpretation of Wittgenstein as a philosopher.  
 
4.5 SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
One of the most significant remarks that Wittgenstein makes in the conclusion 
of the Investigations concerning the relationship between his way of thinking 
and that kind of thinking promoted in natural science (and natural history), is:  
 
If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should 
we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which 
is the basis of grammar?—Our interest certainly includes the 
correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. 
(Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But 
our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the 
formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural 
history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our 
purposes.
98
 
 
 
Wittgenstein, in other words, was not a behaviourist, but because his remarks 
are often intricate and dense that this leads us to a range of interpretations, 
including one of behaviourist beliefs. Wittgenstein as a philosopher who 
viewed behaviour as intrinsically linked to the practice of language, concepts 
and their use, rather than Wittgenstein as the behaviourist, introduces language 
in a broader context but with no specific link to cognitive processing.  He asks 
                                                 
98
 Ibid., p. 195. 
 121 
how language functions in life and what role language plays in human thinking 
and in human behaviour, and it is precisely these fundamental questions that 
separate him from a behaviourist stance and anchor him firmly in logic and 
language. Similarly, his interest in establishing broader descriptions as opposed 
to concrete definitions distinguishes his language-game as innovative, 
impossible to describe and fundamentally posits his language system as 
something definitive and sufficiently distinct to a developmental process.  
Furthermore, describing or labelling Wittgenstein as a behaviourist is arguably 
a profound misconception of his work and distorts any potential appreciation 
and understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein continued to reject the 
notion of behaviourism as he undermined logical positivism in his later works. 
 
As Williams states, it is the conceptual psychological questions that 
Wittgenstein finds so interesting
99
 and indeed, for him, most of the questions 
that he asks can be answered through the explication of social practices and the 
human form of life. He rejects the possibility of a scientific psychology, any 
theory that purports to explain behaviour in terms of inner mental causes, but 
this should not lead us to assume that this rejection is reason enough to 
describe Wittgenstein as a behaviourist. Simply ‘psychological behaviourism 
was a theory that concerned Wittgenstein from the 1930s to the end of his 
life’100 and his ‘analysis of psychological sentences does not commit him to 
any form of behaviourism.’101 
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Having explored the paradigm of behaviourism and how 
misinterpreting Wittgenstein’s perspective on language and forms of life could 
be a potential problem for philosophy and psychology, the following chapter 
looks at the different approaches that cognitive psychology takes to concepts 
including Wittgenstein’s influence on the prototype view. This is followed by 
an examination into the subsequent developments in psychology, namely the 
cognitive revolution and the impact that this had on later psychological 
paradigms, specifically embodied cognition. In a further section of this 
dissertation we see how Wittgenstein could see the limitations of 
behaviourism, thus the focus is no longer on ‘mentalism’ and ‘the mind’ but 
has developed now to the interaction between the person, the concept and the 
environment. Testimony to this is Wittgenstein’s clever use of linking language 
to experiential forms of life, such as the ‘‘body-subject’ in Merleau-Ponty’s 
terminology’102 and, thus, there is evidence to suggest that there is a ‘challenge 
with which Wittgenstein’s legacy confronts present-day psychology.’103 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO CONCEPTS 
 
‘A concept forces itself on one. (This is what you must not forget.)’1 
 
 
In order to understand embodied cognition and how concepts are situated 
within an environment or context, it is important to explain how and why 
paradigms in contemporary cognitive psychology arose. The beginning of this 
chapter looks at the origins of psychology and its relationship with philosophy. 
The subsequent division between these two sciences led to developments in the 
respective areas that may not have otherwise occurred. What is most interesting 
is not necessarily the delineation between the two disciplines but rather how 
both philosophy and psychology often overlap and the reciprocal nature that 
can be seen across the two domains. However, while the philosophical roots 
and origins of philosophy and historical paradigms are of immense importance 
in understanding how cognitive psychology has arrived at present day 
paradigms, the scope of this dissertation does not allow for any indepth 
analysis or discussion; rather I give a brief overview of the relevant schools to 
show how psychology has used philosophical elements and how some 
contemporary paradigms are using tools that were once thought to be out-
dated. 
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While Wittgenstein had seen the pendulum swing from psychoanalysis 
to behaviourism in psychology, I would argue that he was also witnessing the 
emerging interest of a new domain that focused on mentalism and the role that 
‘the mind’ was about to play. Psychology was about to witness a revolution, or 
as Miller states ‘the cognitive revolution in psychology was a counter-
revolution’ that took place in the early 1950s.2  Miller explains that the first 
revolution had occurred much earlier when a group of experimental 
psychologists, who had been greatly influenced by Pavlov and his S-R 
experiments, attempted to redefine psychology as the science of behaviour.
3
 
However, by the mid 1950s it had become clear that psychology needed 
something more scientific than behaviourism. Miller quotes Chomsky as 
remarking that ‘defining psychology as the science of behaviour was like 
defining physics as the science of meter reading.’4 Behaviourism was 
interested in observable data only and not data that was unobservable, such as 
mental states. However, psychology could see that mentalistic concepts had a 
place and, when integrated, could explain behavioural data, hence the term 
‘cognition’ was born.5 
 
One of the main aims of this dissertation is to understand how a 
language-game provides the context in which concepts are participatory and 
how, therefore, we see the embodied cognition thesis at work. However, we 
first have to understand the different approaches that cognitive psychology 
                                                 
2
 George A. Miller, ‘The Cognitive Revolution: a Historical Perspective’, Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 7 (2003), 141-144 (p. 141). [Accessed 13 July 2012] 
3
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4
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5
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 125 
takes in terms of explaining concepts, their origin and their function. Having 
examined the historical roots of psychology, this chapter then looks at the 
nature of concepts and their ontology, which is followed by an explanation and 
critique of theories and viewpoints that have been proposed by cognitive 
psychology. While all of the approaches discussed in this chapter have 
limitations, we will see how some views have been influenced by philosophers, 
such as Aristotle (the classical view), and Wittgenstein (prototype approach), 
while other viewpoints, such as the exemplar view and the knowledge 
approach originated from the probabilistic approach to concepts. Work from 
the main contributors in this area shall be examined, namely: Rosch, Medin, 
and Murphy. Other factors will also be considered such as exemplar strategies, 
hypothesis testing strategies and memory, and following this there will a 
discussion on the cognitive revolution which ultimately gave rise to 
contemporary views in cognitive psychology, namely embodied cognition. 
 
5.1  THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
The origins of psychology can be seen in the rich work of many eminent 
philosophers such as Socrates (469–399 BC), Plato (427–348 BC) and 
Aristotle (384–22 BC).  Early Greek philosophers such as these questioned the 
nature of the human person, the mind, the soul, death and forms of perfection.
6
 
Aristotle similarly made numerous profound contributions to philosophy, and 
subsequently psychology, including his ideas on what might be considered 
                                                 
6
 Rita L. Atkinson et al., Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology, 12th edn. (Fort Worth: Harcourt 
Brace College Publishers, 1996), p. 663. 
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‘associationism’.7 Along with Socrates and Plato, Aristotle was one of the first 
philosophers to explore ideas on how the mind works. He considered that the 
mind was composed of elements which are organised by means of association. 
Reber describes Aristotle’s concept of association by means of four laws as 
follows: 
(1)  The law of contiguity: this is where two concepts are associated. They 
occur together through the link of space and time.  
(2)  The law of similarity: this occurs when two concepts are associated 
because they share similar features, thus the thought of one can trigger the 
thought of the other.  
(3)  The law of contrast: this occurs when a link can be created from 
opposites, that is, two concepts are associated because of their different 
attributes.
8
 The roots of associationism can be ‘traced back to the epistemology 
of Aristotle’ and while there has never been a school that has called itself 
‘associationism’, like ‘behaviourism’ or ‘psychoanalysis’, ‘the principle has 
proven to be one of the most enduring theoretical mechanisms.’9  
 
Philosophers such as Socrates and Plato considered that all learning and 
acquisition of knowledge is already known - a priori. In psychology, a priori 
knowledge is described by terms such as a ‘nativism’ or a ‘nativist’ approach.  
                                                 
7
 See, this chapter, Section 4.9.3 Memory. It is of philosophical and historical importance to 
note, however, that Hume’s famous psychological critique of the traditional Aristotelian 
conception of ‘causality’, which stresses ‘no necessary connections’ but ‘only mental 
association of ideas’ in our understanding of relations in empirical concepts that are derived 
from experience, determines the way Aristotle’s theory of abstraction of universals by the mind 
and held in ‘memory’ was received by psychologists conducting their science in the wake of 
Hume’s critique of both Cartesian and Aristotelian Greek psychology. See, below, n. 9 and 
corresponding quotation and comments by Reber. 
8
 Reber, p. 58. 
9
 Ibid., pp.56- 57. 
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The ideas of nativism, that some ideas are innate at birth, such as God and 
Perfection, were developed further by René Descartes (1596–1650) in his 
Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641) and his arguments on the mind-
body problematic (dualism).
10
 The fact that the mind was now considered as a 
separate and immaterial subject was innovative, even though controversial. As 
a traditional dualist, Descartes was furthering Plato’s arguments on the soul 
(although Descartes refers to ‘soul’ as ‘mind’) and the separation of the body, 
or distinct (and unrelated) substance, thus the emergence of the arguments for 
the existence of both the material and the immaterial, or the physical and non-
physical. Today the debate continues in contemporary circles within 
philosophy and psychology. Proponents of dualism include philosophers such 
as Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), Sir John Eccles (1903–1997) and Wilder 
Penfield (1891–1976). However, different uses of language are evident in all of 
the contemporary theorists’ arguments; this is clearly seen in examples of how 
the term ‘mind’ has been replaced with the terms ‘brain’ and ‘consciousness’. 
Furthermore, it would appear that despite its dwindling advocacy these 
contemporary arguments still carry weight and continue to contribute to both 
philosophical enquiry, particularly in the domains of the philosophy of mind, 
and developments within cognitive psychology. 
 
John Locke (1632–1704), the seventeenth-century English philosopher 
proposed a different form of learning and acquisition of knowledge; he argued 
for the mind as a tabula rasa — a blank slate — where all sensory experience 
                                                 
10
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and interactions with the world enabled knowledge and understanding.
11
 
Locke’s arguments for sensory experience are considered an empiricist 
approach or a posteriori learning. Locke’s ideas gave rise to the birth of 
associationist psychology. Associationists
12
 denied ‘inborn ideas’13 or that 
ideas are innate but rather that all knowledge came through the senses and then 
became associated through the principles of similarity, contrast and 
contiguity.
14
 
 
Both these traditions are still apparent in contemporary psychology 
although many psychologists and theorists would consider that acquiring 
knowledge is not a case of ‘either/or’ but rather a combination of both.  
However, the question of whether nativism or empiricism is the most dominant 
remains open, particularly in the field of cognitive psychology. 
 
5.2  THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
As we can see, psychology, like many other disciplines, has its roots in 
philosophy. During the course of its earlier work, philosophy underpinned 
psychology’s foundations, not just as a study of humanity but also later as a 
science. Psychology’s inception can be seen in the early stages of American 
psychology, starting with William James (1842–1910). 
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The science of psychology, or rather ‘psychology as an academic 
discipline’,15 was founded by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879 when Wundt established 
the first formal psychological laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 
Germany.
16
 Fundamental to Wundt’s approach to psychology was the method 
of introspection, an influence that I suggest was inherited from philosophy. 
(Traces of introspection can be seen in the work of Plato and Descartes where 
they are interested in looking ‘inward’, espousing a form of introspection.) 
However, within a short space of time Wundt had developed this method of 
introspection further and introduced the idea of experiments: he wanted to 
initiate self-observations in order to study consciousness. Wundt’s experiments 
included modifying a stimulus that would alter the self-observation of the 
subject and, therefore, their introspection; this in turn would allow Wundt to 
determine how stimulus, or any other changes to physical conditions, could 
alter consciousness.
17
 
 
The foundations of psychology are indebted to Wundt’s contribution 
and many eminent psychologists were later trained in Wundt’s laboratory. A 
student of Wundt’s, G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924), established the first formal 
psychology laboratory in the United States at the John Hopkins University in 
1883. Furthermore, Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, was 
introduced first in the United States by Hall.
18
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5.3  PARADIGMS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Structuralism, as a branch of psychology, was first introduced by E.B. 
Titchener (1867– 927), another student of Wundt’s. Titchener was interested in 
describing mental structures, and showing how mental experience could be 
understood as a combination of events, or its internal contents. However, 
William James found this form of description too analytical and, therefore, 
proposed that there should be less emphasis on the components or structure of 
consciousness and Titchener’s analytical quest; he proposed that there should 
be more emphasis instead on the character of consciousness and its relation to 
the environment.
19
  James’s study of the role of consciousness in the 
environment and its interaction led him to also question its function: it was 
from here that his investigations into the function of consciousness emerged (in 
contrast to Titchener’s structure of consciousness). This in turn led to another 
branch of psychology — functionalism — which focused on the acts and 
function of the mind rather than any internal structures, including introspection 
or any contents.
20
 Advocates of functionalism include William James and John 
Dewey (1859–1952). Both structuralism and functionalism were important 
paradigms in the early development of psychology. However, while 
structuralism and functionalism continued to focus on consciousness, other 
paradigms within psychology started to emerge, namely, behaviourism, gestalt 
psychology and psychoanalysis.
21
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As discussed in chapter four when we examined the potential problem 
for philosophy and psychology in relation to misinterpreting Wittgenstein as a 
behaviourist, psychological or methodological behaviourism is anchored firmly 
in S-R relations. The behaviour of the subject is measured in what is 
considered to be ‘objective’ and ‘observable’ responses to stimulus as indicated 
in the subject’s behaviour.22 However, by contrast, analytical or logical 
behaviourism is a philosophical account of behaviourism and is measured in 
the terms and concepts that are used in describing a subject’s behaviour. 
 
The school of (psychological) behaviourism was founded by John B. 
Watson (1878–1958). Following on from structuralism and functionalism 
where both paradigms placed an emphasis on ‘introspection’, Watson decided 
to challenge the very thing the previous two branches of psychology had 
founded their proposed theories on.  Instead Watson argued for something that 
was overt and objective — behaviour.  He considered that as behaviour was 
public and introspection was private and, therefore, unavailable to any form of 
psychological analysis, behaviour was the most reliable and scientific way of 
studying the mind, its relation to the environment and the person themselves, 
all as a central and empirical study of psychology.
23
  From this position of 
‘behaviour’ or ‘behaviourism’ the stimulus-response (S-R) approach arose. 
This new approach allowed for an analysis of stimulus input and response 
output of subjects. This S-R reaction analysis sat comfortably with 
conditioning, following the work of the Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov 
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(1849–1936).  Watson argued that almost all behaviour is a result of 
conditioning and that the environment helps shape our behaviour through 
reinforcement.
24
  
 
Other approaches in psychology were emerging too. Gestalt 
psychology, literally translated as ‘configuration’, originated in Germany with 
Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) who was interested with the organisation of 
mental processing.
25
 While Gestalt psychologists were reluctant to subscribe 
and subsequently agree to the more introspective and subjective form of 
psychology, they also rejected behaviourism. Gestalt psychologists were 
interested in ‘motion’ and ‘perception’ and an individual’s patterns of 
organisation of ‘experience’; they considered that experiences or perceptions 
were relevant only when in relation to other aspects of the whole rather than 
individual parts.
26
 This type of psychology was considered a form of 
phenomenology: 
 
A philosophical doctrine that advocates that the scientific study of 
immediate experience be the basis of psychology […] the focus is on 
events, occurrences, happenings, etc. as one experiences them, with a 
minimum of regard for the external, physical reality and for the so-
called ‘scientific biases’ of the natural sciences.27  
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Gestalt psychology, with its emphasis on perception-centred experiences, can 
also be considered as one of the strongest foundations to cognitive 
psychology.
28
 
 
5.4  THE NATURE OF CONCEPTS 
 
 
There are many issues that surround the nature of concepts, for example, their 
origin, how and where they come from psychologically, and their relation to 
language and language learning.
29
 Murphy and Medin propose that ‘concepts 
are coherent to the extent that they fit people’s background knowledge or naïve 
theories about the world’.30 Concepts have always been of central interest to 
philosophy and psychology and continue to further debate in certain areas, e.g. 
what concepts represent exactly, such as external representations, mental 
representations or representational theories of mind.
31
 Furthermore, as Murphy 
states ‘the current surge of interest in people’s concepts has provided much 
information about conceptual structure and content.’32 
 
However, according to Rosch (1999), ‘concepts are the natural bridge 
between mind and world to such an extent that they require us to change what 
we think of as mind and what we think of as world.’33 Rosch’s statement 
resonates of how we must see concepts in varying ways but with specific 
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reference to how concepts and the mind and body and world are all related. 
This is the embodied cognition thesis.  
 
Murphy and Medin suggest that ‘people’s theories of the world embody 
conceptual knowledge and that their conceptual organization is partly 
represented in their theories.’34 Concepts have many purposes including 
enabling us to classify experience and further knowledge concerning any entity 
which may fall into them, and should always ‘be studied in the context of a 
system of interrelated functions’.35  For some, they are the mental 
representation of a category.
36
  Concepts enable us to group things together, so 
that ‘instances of a category all have something in common.  Thus concepts 
somehow specify category membership.’37   Some studies, such as Rosch’s38 
and Nunez,
39
 for example, would suggest, as Pinker notes, that ‘to understand 
mental categories is to understand much of human reasoning’40 while other 
research would suggest that categories have an independent existence in the 
world while they ‘serve as building blocks for human thought and behaviour’.41   
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For Pinker, ‘(C)oncepts in the mind pick out categories in the world – 
and concepts must meet certain conditions for membership of a category’42 
thus categories refer to a group of instances that are placed into an equivalence 
or membership class while concepts are the mental representation used to place 
each instance into the category.
43
 I argue in Chapters 5 and 6 that when 
concepts are participatory in Wittgenstein’s language-game they allow us to 
make sense of the world. Let us consider the functions of concepts in order to 
understand their role more clearly, particularly in relation to ‘the mind’ (or, as 
we shall see later in this chapter, psychology’s new term since the cognitive 
revolution ‘cognition’). Solomon describes the function of concepts as: 
 (1) Classification or Categorization: concepts contain information that can 
assist in classifying entities. 
 (2) Understanding and Explanation: concepts allow the world to be 
segmented or divided up into meaningful chunks so that we can understand, 
make sense and explain the world that we experience. 
 (3) Prediction: once knowledge and understanding of a concept is in place 
it becomes easier to make predictions about its future intentions and behaviour. 
 (4) Reasoning: concepts allow us to reason out new, unfamiliar and 
possible situations. 
 (5) Communication: finally, concepts are centrally involved in 
communication and allow us to make sense of the world and share information 
without necessarily having to experience the situation itself.
44
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Concepts also support learning, thus: 
 
Encountering a member of a category with a novel property […] can 
result in that novel property being incorporated into the conceptual 
representation.
45
 
 
How concepts are experienced is what cognitive psychology refer to as 
a top-down process (as opposed to a bottom-up process) which is knowledge 
driven, and where the recognition of the concept is influenced from our beliefs, 
prior experiences and current expectations combined with incoming data. 
Conceptual combination can be seen as the glue of our cognitive system 
facilitating a range of functions which are integral to our mental life as we 
interpret, understand and structure the world.
46
 Similarly, conceptual 
combination helps facilitate problem solving: concepts (and categories) also 
allow us to engage in the social process of communication.  
 
According to Rosch, ‘psychology inherited a particular view of 
categories from the history of philosophy.  To serve as a proper essentialist 
basis for knowledge, categories were required to:  
 
(1) be exact, not vague – i.e. have clearly defined boundaries;  
(2) have attributes in common which were necessary and sufficient 
conditions for membership of the category.   
From these it followed that: 
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(3) all members of a category must be equally good with regard to 
membership; either they have the necessary common features or they don’t.  
Categories and concepts were thus seen as logical sets.’47   
 
This is the foundation on which the defining attribute theory was built, also 
referred to as the classical view or Aristotelian categories.  Gottlob Frege also 
maintained that a concept can be characterised by a set of defining attributes 
(or semantic features).  Frege clarified the distinction between a concept’s 
intension and its extension as discussed in Chapter 1. Eysenck and Keane 
describe it as: 
 
The intension of a concept consists of a set of attributes that define 
what it is to be a member of the concept and the extension is the set of 
entities that are members of the concept.
48
   
 
Wittgenstein had speculated that categories were structured by what he 
called ‘family resemblances’, which is considered as one of Wittgenstein’s 
central concepts as we have seen in Chapter 2. Rosch showed that what 
philosophers considered as a matter for ‘a priori speculation’ could, in fact, be 
demonstrated empirically.
49
  Characterising ‘family resemblances’ as perceived 
similarities between representative and nonrepresentative members of 
categories,
50
 Rosch showed through her experiments that there was a 
correlation between family resemblances and numerical ratings of the best 
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examples.
51
   The prototype theory is attributed as part of Rosch’s seminal 
work, and is also commonly accredited to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Rosch brought 
Wittgenstein’s ideas into psychology by showing concepts and family 
resemblance categories rather than classical categories.
52
 Rosch’s work here is 
a prime example of where a philosophical method (although some might argue 
that it is a philosophical presupposition rather than a method) has been used in 
the contemporary foundations of cognitive psychology.  
 
In Rosch’s article Reclaiming Concepts she also acknowledges that the 
theories and approaches to understanding concepts and concept development 
grew out of the philosophical and psychological traditions. However, she 
continues to state that: 
 
Although none originated in the cognitivist position per se, cognitivism 
has adopted or critiqued these views at length since it is in need of a 
theory of its central building blocks.
53
  
 
 
Rosch also comments on gradients of membership judgements and how they 
apply to various kinds of categories, for example: 
political categories such as democracy, formal categories that have 
classical definitions such as odd number, and ad hoc, goal-derived 
categories such as things to take out of the house in a fire.
54
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(According to Barsalou, ad hoc, goal-derived categories are ‘created 
spontaneously for use in specialized contexts’55 and differ from natural 
categories in the sense that ‘ad hoc categories violate the correlational structure 
of the environment and are not well established in memory.’56) We can also see 
how Rosch’s later work in the late 1990s is a re-focus of how we might 
‘reclaim concepts’ hence the title of her paper. Wittgenstein’s theme of how 
concepts are situated in any language-game, and how we interact with a 
particular context or environment in order to understand the concept, resonates 
through Rosch’s later work.   
 
5.5  THE DEFINING ATTRIBUTE VIEW OR THE DEFINITIONAL VIEW 
 
 
Research and theory on categorization and conceptual structure have 
recently undergone two major shifts. The first shift is from the 
assumption that concepts have defining properties (the classical view) 
to the idea that concept representations may be based on properties that 
are only characteristic or typical of category examples (the probabilistic 
view).
57
  
 
However, the defining attribute approach, is often considered less of a single, 
unified theory and more of a collection of various but related views on concept 
ontology and the defining features that they are required to have, namely 
necessary and sufficient conditions.
58
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The definitional view is also referred to as the classical view of 
Aristotle’s categories which ‘emphasised logic and definitions as the basis of 
knowledge.’59 As stated earlier in this chapter, Gottlob Frege continued this 
view and maintained that a concept can be characterised by a set of defining 
attributes (or semantic features). Although an outstanding contribution of its 
time to the inception and further development of cognitive psychology, too 
many weaknesses have been exposed in this theory and, therefore, it is now 
regarded as inadequate to explain the acquisition of a concept. The definitional 
view’s main limitation was soon exposed as those of features that were 
defining of a concept, and as a consequent non-defining features were ignored. 
As we know this limitation of ‘non-defining’ features is the basis of 
Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance. The limitations of the defining 
attribute theory as proposed by cognitive psychology are more clearly seen 
when we explore Wittgenstein’s language-game as the context in which 
concepts are participatory, or concepts in action, in Chapter 6.  
 
‘The definition is the concept according to the classical view.’60  I 
propose that in general, we agree that similar objects belong to one type of 
category and dissimilar objects belong to another.  This distinction facilitates 
the separation of a class of objects, as defined by their characteristics, attributes 
or shared properties, from one another. According to the classical view, 
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concepts have rigid boundaries: a concept either does or does not meet the 
definition.
61
  Murphy states that first: 
 
the defining attribute theory claims that concepts are mentally 
represented as definitions. A definition provides characteristics that are 
a) necessary and b) jointly sufficient for membership in the category. 
Secondly, that every object either belongs or does not belong to the 
category; and thirdly, that it does not make any distinction between 
category members.
62
 
 
The defining attribute view maintains that an object must have all the 
necessary attributes to determine the concept, and that no other attributes enter 
into determining whether the object concerned is an instance or example of that 
particular concept.
63
 This theory or viewpoint predicts that concepts should 
delineate various objects by distinct classes and, therefore, the boundaries 
between the different categories must be distinct and well defined.  
 
Although some concepts may fit the classical view of definition, such 
as a triangle (whose characteristics include a closed geometric form with three 
sides and interior angles of 180 degrees),
64
 most concepts do not, such as ‘fruit’ 
or ‘furniture’ which would be considered common categories;65 I would argue 
that it is difficult to specifically name one defining feature that is a prerequisite 
for category membership to the classical view of concepts. Similarly, Murphy
66
 
gives a very good example of the concept of dog when trying to explain its 
defining features. He states that if our concept of dog is a definition, why then 
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are we so bad at saying what it is even when we know the concept? Why is it 
that we can use this definition for identifying dogs and for thinking about them, 
but the properties we give for dogs are not definitional? He maintains that the 
classical view has considerable trouble explaining this.
67
 Furthermore, as 
Slaney and Racine argue: 
 
The concept dog may be defined in terms of other concepts such as 
wagging tail, barks, fetches stick, has four legs, and so forth. However, 
these features will not be equally weighted by virtue of the fact that 
some are more prototypical of dogs than others, for example, we are 
more likely to recognise an object as a dog by virtue of observing that 
the object has a wagging tail and barks than that it as four legs, is furry, 
and so on.
68
  
 
Murphy also argues that there are empirical problems with the classical 
view which are even greater than its theoretical ones.
69
 He states that ‘the 
neatness envisioned by the classical view does not seem to be characteristic of 
human concepts.’70 He continues to explain that in real life (and I would also 
argue in ‘real time’ as proposed by Wilson71 in her description of the embodied 
cognition thesis) that many objects do not obviously belong to a particular 
category.
72
 He suggests that there is doubt expressed by some people in 
relation to: 
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whether ‘a tomato is a vegetable or a fruit […] This uncertainty gets 
even worse when more contentious categories in domains such as 
personality or aesthetics are considered. Is Sergeant Pepper’s Lonely 
Hearts Club Band a work of art? Is your neighbour just shy or stuck 
up? These kinds of categorizations are often problematic.
73
  
 
Another limitation was identified by Mervis and Rosch (1975). Rosch
74
 
states that other research challenges directly the requirement of the classical 
view that categories have defining features. Mervis and Rosch (1975) found 
that when subjects are asked to list attributes for category members, many 
categories show up with few, or sometimes no attributes at all in common. 
Attributes appeared to have Wittgenstein’s family resemblance only rather than 
any necessary and sufficient conditions or structure.
75
 
 
The classical view also failed to provide any satisfactory explanation 
for three main issues: first, it has been difficult to find definitions for most 
natural categories, and even more challenging to find definitions that are 
‘plausible psychological representations’.76 Secondly, ‘the phenomena of 
typicality and unclear membership are both unpredicted by the classical 
view.’77 Thirdly, the existence of intransitive category decisions, such as, for 
instance, ‘car seats are chairs; chairs are furniture; but car seats are not 
furniture’,78  is very difficult to explain and, therefore, understand within the 
classical approach. Furthermore, other problems of the classical view were 
raised by Medin and Smith (1981) in Categories and Concepts. They argued 
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that not only was there a failure to specify specific defining features for most 
lexical concepts (i.e. those reflected in our language
79
) they also cite the 
‘goodness of example effects’ where some examples are better category 
members than others.
80
 However, Smith, Rips and Medin
81
 argue that there are 
no specific boundaries, or sharp boundaries, between the core properties of a 
concept and the properties used for purposes of identification.
82
 Finally, Medin 
argues that there are, what he refers to as, ‘unclear cases’ where it is difficult to 
know whether an example belongs to one category or another, for example, 
should a rug belong to the category of furniture?
83
 The defining view fails to 
select some defining feature sets as more appropriate than others.
84
  
 
Although the classical view is now considered redundant and 
inadequate in terms of explaining how concepts are formed, it did nonetheless 
at the time of its inception, and in the very early days of cognitive psychology, 
provide some answers to concept and category development.  For example, the 
work of Bruner et al. (1956) assumes this theory and its instantiation as a 
semantic network model. Similarly, Collins and Quillian (1969) used sentence-
verification tasks to find support for their model of the theory.
85
  Furthermore, 
there have been a number of variations of the defining attribute theory 
proposed: an example of this type of modification would be the feature 
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comparison theory which not only proposes (and presupposes) that there are 
defining attributes but also characteristic attributes.
86
 
 
5.6  THE PROTOTYPE VIEW 
 
 
The probabilistic view, also known as the prototype view, suggests that we 
assume the ‘average’ of an entity, that concepts have properties that are typical 
of category members but not necessarily true of all members, therefore the 
term ‘probabilistic view’: attributes may only be probable, typical or 
characteristic, and not necessary and sufficient as in the defining attribute 
theory.
87
  The prototype can be seen as the best description of a category: what 
we are looking for is a commonality across items and the ‘average’ to best 
represent that particular concept.  However, the probabilistic view, although 
widely accepted as one of the strongest ways of categorising concepts, has 
serious implications in terms of how information around categories is 
organised; first, some category members may exhibit more characteristic 
features than other category members and, therefore, may be understood as 
being more ‘typical’; secondly, there is the issue of category boundaries and 
the grey area that is considered by many as ‘fuzzy’: non-members of a category 
may exhibit some or as many characteristic properties of a particular category 
as do some members.   Thirdly, familiarity with a category cannot be aligned 
with determining what the defining features actually are because there may not 
be any.
88
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As stated previously, the prototype theory is attributed to the work of 
Rosch, while her use of the term family resemblance is accredited to 
Wittgenstein. (Rosch who was also influenced by Zadeh and Lakoff, whom she 
cites in several of her papers, established cognitive research programs to 
demonstrate pivotal issues on concepts and categories such as centrality, family 
resemblance and basic-level categorization.
89
) Similar to Wittgenstein taking a 
Socratic approach when challenging Augustine in his definition of terms, 
Aristotelian categories were also challenged by him in the Investigations when 
he refers to ‘family resemblance’; however, Rosch brought Wittgenstein’s 
ideas into cognitive psychology by ‘dramatically changing the view of 
concepts’.90 As we know, Wittgenstein’s term ‘family resemblance’ is used to 
describe how concepts share a commonality or share features and, therefore, 
there is no defining set of features to be found among category members. The 
prototype theory proposes that we look for commonality among objects, and 
where all the characteristic features of a category are represented, this is 
referred to as a prototype. However, Medin asks that if categories, of any kind, 
are not represented in terms of a definition, then ‘what form do our mental 
representations take?’91 It would appear that there is a very ‘natural 
interpretation’92 of organizing fuzzy categories; ‘probabilistic view categories 
are organized according to a family resemblance principle.’93 
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When classifying new objects, a prototype process is initiated: the new 
object is compared to the prototype.  If there are sufficient similarities to the 
prototype, then the object is classified as a member of that particular category. 
The prototype becomes the summary representation for a category
94
 and, 
therefore, no specific object need have all the defining properties that are 
represented by the prototype.  An object must have prototype properties and 
also core properties in order to become a member of the concept that is being 
categorised.  For example, a bachelor may present the prototype properties of 
being in his forties and unmarried, while the core properties presented for this 
example would include ‘male’ and ‘adult’.  This ‘bachelor’ prototype concept 
is also specifically defined and, therefore, easily interpreted, understood, used 
and referred to where appropriate.
95
 Other prototype concepts such as ‘fruit’ or 
‘fish’ are not considered as well defined concepts: the core genes or attributes 
of ‘fruit’ or ‘fish’ are not as easily identifiable as that of the example presented 
in the concept of ‘bachelor’ and, therefore, concepts such as ‘fish’ or 
‘mammal’ or ‘bird’ are referred to as ‘fuzzy’ concepts or concepts with ‘fuzzy’ 
boundaries. It is interesting to note that Belohlavek et al. suggest that 
conceptual categories, ‘which are mentally represented as concepts’96 seldom, 
if ever, have sharp boundaries and with no ‘borderline cases’.97 Furthermore, 
the task of deciding whether an object is an instance of a fuzzy concept with 
unclear boundaries often involves using inference and prediction, and assessing 
its similarity to the concept’s prototype. According to Pinker, categories of the 
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mind often have fuzzy boundaries, and almost all everyday categories that we 
encounter regularly illustrate the presence of Wittgenstein’s criss-crossing and 
over-lapping of features, a family resemblance.
98
 Pinker states that people are 
comfortable that everyday concepts that they encounter will have ‘better and 
worse members’.99  
 
Research in the area of prototype theory has shown that typicality of an 
object influences its categorisation.  For example, studies show that people rate 
‘robin’ as more typical of a bird than an ‘ostrich’ because it presents the 
prototype property of ‘flying’.100  Similarly, people rate ‘red’ as a more typical 
prototype property of the object apple as opposed to the property ‘green’, 
although I would argue that this is culture-dependent. However, Rosch argues 
that: 
 
Colour categories do not have any obviously analysable criterial 
attributes, formal structure, or definite boundaries and they have an 
internal structure graded in terms of how exemplary of its category 
people judge a colour to be.
101
   
 
 
The issue of typicality also affects how we think when we encounter a concept.  
For example, if someone makes the statement ‘an animal has been knocked 
down on the road’ we are generally more likely to think of a fox or badger 
rather than a pig or cow.   
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Similar to the defining attribute theory, there were a number of 
limitations and weaknesses exposed in prototype theory which clearly could 
not be overcome. Murphy makes the point that the prototype view has not been 
‘undergoing much theoretical development’ either.102 He claims that many 
comments and descriptions about prototypes are ‘somewhat vague, making it 
unclear exactly what the writer is referring to — a single best example? a 
feature list? if a feature list, determined how?’103 He states that this lack of 
specificity in much of the writings about prototype theory has encouraged its 
critics to develop their own prototype models.
104
 For Murphy, many theorists 
assume that the prototype is the single best example, rather than a list of 
features or attributes, even though these models may have different and varying 
properties, for real-life, in real-time, categories.
105
 Another problem was 
identified by the cognitive psychologist, Barsalou.
106
 He studied categories 
such as things to take on a camping trip, foods not to eat on a diet, clothes to 
wear in the snow, etc., and showed that such categories, among their other 
properties and attributes, in contrast to the prototype view, do not show family 
resemblances among their members.
107
 Barsalau found that goal-derived 
categories, or ‘categories to achieve goals’108, can show the same typicality 
effects as other categories but the basis for these typicality effects is not 
similarity to a prototype but rather to an ideal.
109
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Rosch states that ‘a very important finding about prototypes and graded 
structure is how sensitive they are to context’110 while Medin argues that 
‘prototype theories treat concepts as context-dependent.’111 This, as we know, 
is what Wittgenstein advocates for too: that concepts are part of the context and 
are participatory. Rosch gives the example of: 
 
while a dog or cat might be given as prototypical pet animals, lion or 
elephant are more likely to be given as prototypical circus animals. In a 
default context (no context specified), coffee or tea or cola might be 
listed as a typical beverage, but wine is more likely to be selected in the 
context of a dinner party.
112
  
 
 
While she is correct when citing examples of prototypical pet animals or circus 
animals, Wittgenstein would not agree with her when she refers to a default 
context. For Wittgenstein there must always be a context: the environment in 
which the concept and the individual engage are key to participating in any 
language-game. 
 
Rosch also outlines in Reclaiming Concepts the evidence for graded 
structure and prototypes violating the tenets of the classical view (and of strict 
working cognitivism, although that is not of importance for the discussion 
here). She states that:  
 
(1) Graded structure categories do not have clear-cut boundaries. This 
is not simply an issue of the probability that items will be classified as 
members of the category since for many categories, such as colour, 
subjects will assert that some items are genuinely between categories; 
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(2) Many categories have no, and no category need have any, necessary 
and sufficient attributes which make an item a member of the category 
[…]; 
(3) Items in a category are not equivalent with respect to membership 
but rather possess gradations of membership. Again this is not merely a 
matter of probability as people will assert directly that one member of a 
category is a better example of the category than another […]; 
(4) Graded structures are not formal systems nor are any items in a 
graded structure necessarily implicatory or productive of any other 
items in the structure, nor need anything in a graded structure fill the 
role of substitutable strings of symbols […]; 
(5) Graded structures and prototypes, although they have default 
contexts, are otherwise flexible with respect to the ever-varying 
contexts of life situations […].113 
 
 
5.7  THE EXEMPLAR VIEW  
 
 
The exemplar view agrees with the probabilistic view in holding that 
concepts need not have criterial properties and, further, claims that 
categories may be represented by their individual exemplars rather than 
by some unitary description of the class as a whole.
114
  
 
 
They suggest an alternative way of representing prototype categories and 
concepts.  Rather than a summary representation, they argue particular entities 
that best represent the concept.   
 
The exemplar view suggests that people store individual exemplars of 
categories and as a result can then classify new concepts accordingly to their 
stored schemata of exemplar types.  Some of the exemplar types and models 
that have received the most attention suggest that the examples that are most 
similar to the item to be classified have the greatest influence on 
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categorisation.
115
 However, Rosch proposes that only the most typical 
exemplars are activated as category representation in memory.
116
 Furthermore,  
Murphy asks how do we define the term exemplar, and what constitutes 
learning or storing an exemplar? Storing exemplars in memory is imperative; 
encoding the exemplar’s category is required for it to influence 
categorization.
117
 
 
Medin asks the question why should exemplar models be considered 
better or more efficient than prototype models?
118
 In general, it would appear, 
because it allows for prediction and inference, which are two of the principle 
functions of concepts, and this, in turn, enables classification. However, as 
Medin suggests, there is a central problem with this notion of similarity when 
using exemplar models: ‘Do things belong in the same category because they 
are similar, or do they seem similar because they are in the same category?’119  
 
While the probabilistic views of concepts (the prototype and exemplar 
view) were developed from the ashes of the defining attribute approach, the 
knowledge approach was developed more in response to these two probabilistic 
views of concept development, conceptual coherence and representation. 
 
 
                                                 
115
  Medin, ‘Concepts and Conceptual Structure’, p. 1473. 
116
 Timothy Verbeemen and others, ‘Beyond Exemplars and Prototypes as Memory 
Representations of Natural Concepts: A Clustering Approach’, Journal of Memory and 
Language, 56 (2007), 537-554 (p. 538). 
117
 Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts, p. 58. 
118
 Medin, ‘Concepts and Conceptual Structure’, p. 1473. 
119
 Ibid. 
 153 
5.8  THE KNOWLEDGE APPROACH OR THEORY VIEW OF CONCEPTS 
 
 
‘Something is needed to give concepts life, coherence, and meaning.’120 The 
knowledge approach suggests that we use all our prior knowledge to learn new 
concepts, but the role of the context is also dependent here. Here, once again, I 
draw the reader’s attention to the Wittgensteinian characteristic of the context 
and its importance. This would also suggest that rather than depending on the 
individual to make judgements on how best to categorise, inference-based 
processing could be more effective, where the individual is relying on an 
intuitive approach and their understanding of the world which they are 
experiencing.
121
 
  
Proponents of the knowledge view argue that: 
Similarity is not powerful enough to account for conceptual coherence. 
What guides our categorization is knowledge of theories about the 
world. Again, this view is compatible with ill-defined boundaries of 
concepts.
122
  
 
The basis from which the knowledge approach was developed takes the form 
that concepts are part of our general knowledge about the world, and as such, 
concepts are not learned as separate entities which are objective and isolated 
from the rest of the world but rather concepts are learned as an integrated part 
of our experience and understanding of the world.
123
 Again we see a very 
distinct Wittgensteinian trait here: the meaning of the word is its use and arises 
from the interaction between the individual, the environment and the concept. 
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The social, communal and contextual behaviour of language enables us to 
participate and actively engage in communication and, therefore, a language-
game where we can engage in using different concepts.  Wittgenstein claims 
that: 
 
it is difficult to see that what is at issue is the fixing of concepts.  A 
concept forces itself on one.  (This is what you must not forget.).
124
   
 
Similarly, Wargo argues that: 
 
The connection between something you put on your ‘head’, for 
example, (hat) and the word for it used in your community can only be 
a learned social convention.
125
  
 
 
Furthermore, I would argue that how we use a word, and in Wargo’s example 
here the word ‘hat’, is also culture-dependent. 
 
When concepts are learned, the knowledge approach suggests that we 
integrate this information into our existing knowledge of a particular domain 
and consequently there is a development for us of both knowledge and 
experience. However, although concepts are influenced by what we already 
know, new concepts can affect general knowledge and, therefore, how we 
experience the world.  The knowledge approach invites us to use inference and 
prediction, just like we do when using the exemplar model. This enables us to 
develop sensible and intelligent categories in order that we can make sense of 
our world.
126
 However, Medin suggests that we should address the question of 
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‘why we have the categories we have or why categories are sensible.’127 He 
gives the example of the category comprising ‘children, money, photo albums, 
and pets’.128 He suggests that out of any specific context this category seems 
strange.
129
 However, if we said that the category represented ‘things to take out 
of one’s house in case of a fire,’ the category becomes meaningful and 
sensible.
130
 
 
While there are limitations with the prototype view, exemplar view and 
the knowledge approach, none of them suffer from the problems of the 
classical view. All of them suggest that categories will have gradations of 
typicality and that there will always be borderline cases or fuzzy boundaries.
131
 
Unlike the later revisions of the classical view (which has not been discussed in 
this chapter), these theories and approaches claim category fuzziness as an 
integral part of conceptual processing, ‘rather than an unhappy influence of 
something that is not the ‘true’ concept. This is because similarity of items is 
inherently continuous’.132 
 
Murphy suggests that a theory of concepts should be proto-type based, 
that is, ‘it must be a description of an entire concept, with its typical 
features.’133 Furthermore, he argues that there is a place for an integrated 
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approach to viewing concepts, combining the prototype and the knowledge 
approach in the form that: 
 
Rather than considering the two parts as independent contributors, I 
suspect that we will have to consider prototypes as being integrated 
with and influenced by the knowledge.
134
  
 
 
This, we can see, is already occurring in any language-game regardless of the 
context. 
 
5.9  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: EXEMPLAR STRATEGY, HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
         STRATEGY, AND MEMORY 
 
 
5.9.1 Exemplar Strategy 
 
 
The exemplar strategy is one of the easiest ways a child can learn a concept 
(while adults use this strategy also to acquire more novel and abstract 
concepts). For example, with the concept ‘furniture’ children are better at 
recognising the typical examples of this particular concept such as ‘dining 
room table’, ‘coffee table’, ‘rocking chair’ and ‘settee’, and appear to have 
difficulty in recognising and categorising the more atypical exemplars of the 
concept ‘furniture’, such as a ‘bedside locker’, ‘dressing table’, ‘coat stand’ 
and ‘lamp’.   However, although there are some complexities for children when 
acquiring the more atypical exemplars, it still remains as one of the most 
widely used forms of concept formation. 
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5.9.2 Hypothesis Testing Strategy 
 
 
Another way of acquiring concepts is the Hypothesis Testing Strategy.  This 
occurs when a particular hypothesis is tested before determining whether an 
instance (or a characteristic or feature) belongs to a concept.  For example, 
looking at known properties of concepts, such as fruit being sweet, or lemons 
being sour, and then hypothesising that this known common attribute is what 
characterises the concept.  From here we can hypothesise about a new and 
different concept when it is encountered and, thus, experienced. This form of 
hypothesising about new concepts that we encounter either allows us to 
continue this testing method and, therefore, add new concepts to our existing 
knowledge or it shows us that we are incorrect with our hypothesis and, 
therefore, need more information on the characteristics and common features 
of the concept in question, in this case, the instance of ‘fruit’ or ‘lemons’. 
However, a hypothesis never provides any certainty but more of a probability 
based on generalisations,
135
 or as Popper claimed ‘the hallmark of science is 
not confirmation but falsification.’136 
 
Both these forms of acquiring new concepts, exemplar and hypothesis 
testing strategies, are based on a bottom-up form of processing which makes 
extensions of a person’s existing knowledge.  A third way in which we acquire 
concepts uses the top-down strategy.  This is where a subject uses both their 
prior knowledge (unlike the exemplar and hypothesis testing strategies) along 
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with the known instances, in order that they may decide what the common 
properties of a concept are. 
 
Pinker raises an interesting point when he questions whether children’s 
and adults’ concepts are different in any way, and if so, how?   
 
The mind of a child […] actively assembles words and concepts into 
new combinations guided by rules and regularities.
137
  
 
Research suggests that that the content of a child’s concepts and an adult’s 
concept is different due to an individual’s knowledge, past experience and 
understanding of the world: 
 
but whether children’s concepts have a different structure and 
processing system is something that needs to be determined.  These 
differences, however tentative and abstract, are considered as 
‘qualitative differences’.138  
 
5.9.3 Memory 
 
As with concepts, memory too can also be considered as the glue of the 
cognitive processing system. The function of memory is to store information 
that has been processed, and only information that has been stored can be 
retrieved.  Similarly, how such information is stored, for example, at a low 
level processing or at a deep level of processing, affects how it can be 
retrieved.
139
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The cognitive component of memory can be divided up into structures 
such as declarative memory (‘conscious memory, memory that one can 
communicate or ‘declare’ to others’140), episodic memory (‘a form of memory 
in which information is stored with ‘mental tags’ about where, when, and how 
the information was picked up; i.e. the material in memory concerns fairly 
sharply circumscribed episodes’141) and procedural memory (‘memory for 
procedures or complex activities that have become highly automatized and are 
acted out without conscious thought about the process, such as driving an auto 
or riding a bicycle’142). Some of these types of memories work from the store 
of short term memory (or working memory) or long term memory.  However, 
this dissertation is concerned with only two models of knowledge 
representation that enable us to understand concepts and categories, 
specifically that of semantic networks and propositional networks.  A third type 
of memory, that of connectionist models and frameworks, is referred to only in 
this chapter and is not discussed in detail. 
 
The Semantic Feature Comparison Model
143
 suggests that ‘words are 
represented as sets of semantic features. So each word has critical defining 
features, and characteristic features.
144
 The defining determine set membership, 
e.g. fish have fins, swim and live in water, and then characteristic features 
which describe the particular example, such as a monkfish has no bones and is 
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only white. This is similar to the core and typical prototype properties that 
children attribute to concepts until the age of ten.
145
 However, when an atypical 
member of the set is found, such as a whale, which is a mammal rather than a 
fish, then other properties need to be examined and, therefore, several levels of 
comparison can be sought.
146
  However, there are some objects that appear on 
the surface to belong to a particular set but on closer examination fail. Consider 
the concept ‘bird’: some of the prototype properties of this concept include 
‘flying’ and ‘chirping’ which describes most birds, such as a robin or a blue 
jay. However, it does not fit other examples such as ostrich or penguin. In this 
example of ‘bird’ the prototype properties are salient but not exact indicators of 
concept membership, whereas core properties, such as a bird ‘flies’ and has 
‘wings’, are more representative of concept membership. Concepts like ‘bird’ 
are referred to as fuzzy concepts and concepts with unclear boundaries: ‘they 
lack true definitions, and categorization relies heavily on prototypes.’147  
 
A criticism of the semantic feature comparison model is that there is no 
one defining attribute that constitutes a set, such as mammal or fish. Similarly, 
however, the opposite is true: there is no one defining attribute that does not 
constitute a mammal, or fish or bird. As Gavin states: ‘defining features cannot 
have absolute properties. No single feature makes a bird, or not a bird.’148 
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Semantic network models arose from the ashes of the main principles 
of association.
149
 Within the semantic network frame, concepts are represented 
by linked nodes that form a network and these links between the nodes can 
vary in strength and vary in relation, from the general to the more specific.  
The level of activation strength between the nodes determine whether a 
concept will be activated, while the activation spreading through the network 
can be determined by a number of factors, such as the number of links between 
the said node, or the length of time passed since activation.
150
 Furthermore, the 
structure of this model is hierarchical and, therefore, there is what is known as 
cognitive economy ‘as attributes that are more general do not need to be stored 
with every member of a category.’151 
 
According to Harley: 
The semantic network is particularly useful for representing 
information about natural kind terms, words that denote naturally 
occurring categories and their members, such as types of animal or 
metal or precious stone.  This system works in the semantic network 
hierarchical frame.  Within this hierarchical structure, information is 
stored at various levels (and is therefore not repeated which accounts 
for its economy).
152
 
 
However, there are several drawbacks with Collins and Quillian’s semantic 
network model.  First, it is doubtful that all types of information can be stored 
in this hierarchical fashion.  One type of such information that could be 
considered in this argument is an abstract concept, such as ‘validity’. Similarly, 
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not all words or concepts have clearly defined sets of attributes.
153
 Secondly, a 
problem that emerged with this model is ‘conjoint frequency’, a weakness 
concerning the sentence-verification task.  Thirdly, the hierarchical structure 
seems to make some incorrect predictions in the sentence verification task.  
Some sentences appear to be verified faster than others; according to the 
hierarchical structure this should not happen based on the position of the words 
within the system.  This weakness would suggest that memory structure is not 
fixed in the sense that it may have a tendency to reflect incorrect logical 
category structure.
154
  
 
In the Spreading Activation Network, ‘concepts are held in a 
conceptual space, linked by association to related concepts.’155 Furthermore, 
the spreading activation network: 
 
Represents concepts and properties as nodes and represents associations 
between concepts and properties as pathways that carry spreading 
activation.
156
  
 
 
This method of activating concepts means that as one object is triggered other 
objects close by are also triggered and thus the activation continues to spread 
through the network, hence the term spreading activation. For example, the 
node between a dog and a cat may be connected by a link with an activation of 
0.5, whereas the node between dog and pencil may be connected by a link with 
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an activation of only 0.1.
157
 However, the down side of this is that there may be 
limits to the amount of information that can be activated.  The strength of each 
activation depends on the strength of the links between the first activated word 
and then the others.  If the link is weak then activation will be slow and poor 
but if it is a strong link then the activation process will continue until all words 
or nodes have been activated.
158
 Spreading activation is another example of 
where a dominant philosophical theme is present. In this case we can see the 
Aristotelian concept of associationism. Semantic priming, which is also 
something that could be considered here, would account for how some words 
are more closely linked and, therefore, activated to others.
159
  When we hear 
the word ‘in’ the word ‘out’ is activated; for ‘up’ the word ‘down’ is accessed; 
and for ‘bread’ the word ‘butter’ is triggered.  In contexts such as the above 
examples, the priming word automatically activates the stored representations 
of all the words related to it. 
 
Showing the word ‘sky’ will trigger ‘blue’, ‘aeroplane’, ‘cloud’, etc. 
very quickly, and with a bit more time, ‘green’, ‘pilot’ and ‘rain’ will be 
found. As each word is activated, the activation spreads throughout the 
network.
160
 
 
 
Propositional Networks are similar to semantic networks but differ in 
that they represent the smallest unit of knowledge within a proposition and, 
therefore, sentences are first segmented into propositions. ‘Propositions are the 
smallest components of knowledge that can stand alone as meaningful units’161 
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and have a truth-value, that is, the proposition is either true or false, such as the 
sentence ‘the book is on the table’.162  
  
However, one of the major drawbacks of propositional networks is that 
they don’t explain how inferences are made even though they do show how 
knowledge might be represented.  According to Harley: 
 
Propositional networks on their own are inadequate as a model of 
comprehension but do nonetheless form the basis of more complex 
models, such as Kintsch’s construction-integration model.163  
 
 
5.10  THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION 
 
 
As previously stated in the introduction of this chapter, cognitive psychology 
had developed as a separate area within the psychology discipline in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 
 
Jerome Bruner, in Acts of Meaning,
 
describes the revolution as trying to 
‘establish meaning as the central concept of psychology’,164 rather than in 
terms of some of the principles that had been associated with behaviourism 
such as the analysis of overt behaviour and S-R responses. However, Bruner 
also acknowledges that the cognitive revolution was not a revolution against 
behaviourism but rather it was ‘more profound’165 and its aim was to discover 
and explain formally the meanings that individuals created from their 
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experience with the world. Its focus was on the ‘symbolic activities that human 
beings employed in constructing and in making sense not only of the world, but 
of themselves.’166 For Miller ‘psychology could not participate in the cognitive 
revolution until it had freed itself from behaviourism, thus restoring cognition 
to scientific respectability’167 and for Sperry ‘to overthrow behaviourism would 
require an overthrow also of the conceptual foundations of neuroscience and of 
science in general.’168 
 
The birth of cognitive psychology can be seen emerging in the late 
1950s, several years after Wittgenstein’s death. I suggest that inspired by 
developments in other disciplines, such as linguistics for example, 
psychologists began to focus on cognitive processes (cognition) and mental 
states, instead of focusing only on overt and external behavioural dispositions. 
George A. Miller’s paper ‘The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two’169, 
which was published in 1956, is seen as an early development and contribution 
to cognitive psychology, while Ulric Neisser was the first to coin the term 
Cognitive Psychology in 1967. ‘During the 1970s theorists such as Neisser 
(1976) argued that nearly all cognitive activity consists of interactive bottom-
up and top-down processes.’170 For Neisser cognitive psychology was where 
individuals possessed information processing systems whose cognitive 
functions should be considered in computational terms.  
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In spite of its diversity, cognitive psychology is unified by a common 
approach based on an analogy between the mind and the digital computer; this 
is the information-processing approach.
171
 This, for Bruner, is how the 
cognitive revolution became too ‘fractionated’ and ‘technicalized’172 and where 
there was a gradual ‘shift from “meaning” to “information”, from the 
construction of meaning to the processing of information’.173 This emerged 
with the introduction of using metaphors, such as the computer, to describe the 
mind and ‘by the early 1950s became the root metaphor for information 
processing.’174 
  
Sperry sees, ‘a possible ray of hope in psychology’s cognitive 
revolution and what it would mean in bringing new perspectives, beliefs, and 
values – in short, new mind-sets and a new way of thinking – much needed if 
humanity is to survive the next century.’175 He also contends that there have 
been two other ‘revolutions’, one that was associated with Skinner and the 
other that was associated with Freud, namely the schools of behaviourism and 
psychoanalysis. Of the three revolutions that he cites, he claims that the 
‘current so-called cognitive, mentalist, or consciousness revolution is the most 
radical turnaround — the most revisionary and transformative.’176 However, 
Hergenhahn argues that: 
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There is nothing new in psychology embracing cognitive psychology, 
and there is certainly nothing new in the contention that the mind 
(cognition) and the body (brain) interact. Therefore, nothing as 
dramatic as a paradigmatic shift or revolution has taken place in 
psychology. If anything, there has been a counterrevolution in which 
psychology’s interest in cognition has been reasserted.177 
  
In Sperry’s estimation, nonetheless, ‘the cognitive revolution represents a 
diametric turn around in the centuries-old treatment of mind and consciousness 
in science.’178 For Sperry this would mean that mental states become functional 
and interactive which would be essential in order that for conscious behaviour 
could be explained.
179
 However, this should not be confused with ‘mentalistic 
dualism’;180 rather, the new position integrates previous ‘opposed solutions into 
a novel unifying synthesis.’181 The new position is certainly mentalistic but 
‘holding that behaviour is mentally and subjectively driven.’182 Furthermore, 
Bruner states that the cognitive revolution required that psychology joined 
forces with other disciplines such as linguistics, history and philosophy in an 
attempt not to ‘reform behaviourism, but to replace it.’183 
 
For Sperry, in 1995, psychology was turning the tables on areas such as 
physics and science. The cognitive revolution was enabling psychology to lead 
the way in science to what he describes as a: 
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more adequate and more vivid paradigm for scientific and all causal 
explanation. The same paradigm change that served in psychology to 
shift emergent mental states into their new interactive causal role 
applies equally to emergent phenomena and properties at other levels in 
other sciences. Thus the cognitive revolution is a revolution for a 
science.
184
  
 
 
Sperry further claims that the move from ‘cognitivism-mentalism’185, 
following centuries of materialism, is certainly going to have innumerable 
consequences in psychology.
186
 
 
 In many respects, then, Miller is correct to conclude that, 
Cognitive Science is a child of the 1950s, the product of a time when 
psychology, anthropology and linguistics were redefining themselves 
and computer science and neuroscience as disciplines were coming into 
existence.
187
 
 
Indeed, the science of psychology has experienced many paradigms (and 
paradigm shifts) that have developed since its inception. While early prominent 
domains (such as structuralism, functionalism and behaviourism) have had a 
major influential and contributing force on current themes, other movements 
also, such as the cognitive revolution, have had, nonetheless, an equally 
significant impact on where cognitive psychology is currently at, namely how 
concepts are explained as exemplified in the embodied cognition thesis. 
However, I suggest that they all share a common feature, one that Wittgenstein 
would agree with, and that is namely they are all ‘abstract’ and not sufficiently 
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grounded in either real-time or in real-world surroundings, even in something 
as fundamental as the environment, or as Wittgenstein would say ‘a context’. 
 
As we can see from this chapter some approaches, such as the defining 
attribute view, are out-dated and no longer contribute anything significant to 
current cognitive psychology. However, other methods in understanding the 
purpose or origin of concepts, such as the prototype view and the knowledge 
approach, are still much used and discussed. While Murphy gives an extensive 
overview of the different approaches cognitive psychology takes to concepts, 
along with the many problems that each one presents and the empirical 
evidence required in each of the views, he states in his conclusion that ‘if 
you’ve been keeping score, there is no clear dominant winner.’188 For Murphy 
and Medin, current theories of conceptual structure ‘represent concepts in ways 
that fail to bring out this relation between conceptual and theoretical 
knowledge.’189 A concept does not need to be embedded within a theory;190 a 
concept may be part of our knowledge, part of the environment and 
understood, therefore, within a context.  
  
More traditional and dominant views in the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science have considered the body as separate and distinct to 
understanding mind and cognition.
191
  Furthermore, ‘proponents of embodied 
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cognitive science view this as a serious mistake.’192 As we have seen in this 
chapter there has been a significant move in cognitive psychology as to how 
concepts are explained. We have seen a dominant view in behaviourism where 
external reactions of the individual were studied, and thus were thought to 
explain behaviour with no reference to an inner mental state, or to ‘a mind’ that 
was operating. During the cognitive revolution we saw how the terms ‘mind’ 
and ‘mental’ were replaced by terms such as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognitive 
processing’. Now contemporary themes in cognitive psychology are looking 
again at how the behaviour of the individual, combined with the environment, 
or a Wittgensteinian ‘context’, is how the concept is understood. The move 
from cognitivism to embodied cognition and embodied cognitive science has 
been a phenomenal move, almost returning full circle to behaviourism to 
explain how concepts are part of the environment, and as I will show, how 
concepts are also participatory.  
 
In the following chapter, I present an explanation of the embodied 
cognition thesis, and how concepts can be situated, both of which show strong 
traits of the Wittgensteinian theme of engaging the individual, the concept and 
the context. Following on from this chapter I present a series of arguments to 
show how Wittgenstein’s language-game is a place where concepts are 
participatory, thus we see the embodied cognition thesis in action. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
EMBODIED COGNITION AND SITUATED CONCEPTS: 
A WITTGENSTEINIAN THEME 
 
 
‘We can, however, establish differences of concept here.’1 
 
 
 
The focus of this chapter is to ‘show how the mind must be understood in the 
context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts with the world.’2 
This is not a new domain in the sense that aspects or traces of embodied and 
situated cognition have been emphasised before in the work of some theorists. 
For example, some of these traces are evident in Lakoff and Johnson’s work on 
concepts and metaphors, and how they [concepts] may be based on metaphors 
for physical concepts.
3
 We shall explore this further when we look at the 
historical anchors for embodied cognition in this chapter. 
 
 The label ‘Embodied Cognition’, otherwise known as EC, is typically 
used to refer to: 
 
A number of theories in a variety of domains within cognitive science 
(artificial intelligence, robotics, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, 
philosophy, linguistics, cognitive anthropology).
4
 
 
  
However, a distinction must be made on how embodied cognition is viewed by 
some authors; some consider that action is important for cognition and the role 
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that the body plays, while others consider the role that grounding plays in 
cognition and subsequently align embodied cognition with situated cognition.
5
 
Furthermore, there is what Boghi and Cimatti refer to as the ‘radical’6 version 
of embodied cognition where our cognition can be ‘constrained by the specific 
kind of body we possess, and the key notion of embodied cognition is action.’7 
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Wilson and Foglia define 
cognition as: 
 
embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical 
body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent’s body beyond the 
brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in 
cognitive processing.
8
 
 
In Anderson’s estimation, nonetheless, the nature of cognition is here being re-
considered because, 
 
instead of emphasising formal operations on abstract symbols, the new 
approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated 
activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered 
first and foremost as acting beings.
9
  
 
 
Anderson’s remarks here are suggestive of two of Wittgenstein’s key ideas, 
namely: that context is key to understanding how concepts are understood and 
subsequently used within a language-game, or in Anderson’s case ‘situated 
activity’; and how Wittgenstein has always considered that individuals are first 
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and foremost acting beings, hence his remarks on behaviour, forms of life, 
culture and social activities.  
  
Wittgenstein characterised cognition as an ‘umbrella concept’10 rather 
than a substantive that ‘makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.’11 His 
remarks on the philosophy of psychology can now be considered in terms of 
how he has contributed in shaping current trends in cognitive psychology, 
specifically situated cognition, which involves ‘interaction with the things that 
the cognitive activity is about’12, or embodied cognition. However, according 
to Anderson, while it is clear that embodied cognition is ‘not currently the 
dominant paradigm for understanding the mind, it is equally clear that it is 
ascendant, and it promises soon to be the predominant approach.’13 Since 
Anderson made this statement in 2007 there is a strong argument to be made 
for cognition, and the mind, to be seen more as contextual and situated in 
behavioural dispositions, cultural and social activities, rather than being 
considered in terms such as ‘mentalism’ or ‘in the head’ only. Susswein and 
Racine’s article14 suggests this kind of questioning and a new perspective on 
Wittgenstein’s contribution to how cognition should be considered. 
Furthermore, Susswein and Racine claim that Wittgenstein’s most fundamental 
insight into the philosophy of psychology is in fact the one that is most 
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profoundly unappreciated.
15
 To illustrate this point the following quote from 
Zettel is used: 
 
‘Thinking’ is a widely ramified concept. A concept that comprises 
many manifestations of life. The Phenomena of thinking are widely 
scattered.
16
 
 
 
Susswein and Racine argue that the term ‘thinking’ can be replaced with the 
term ‘cognition’ so that it may include a variety of relevant psychological 
terms such as knowledge and understanding, for example.
17
 Furthermore, they 
draw attention to Wittgenstein urging us to use the term ‘cognition’ cautiously 
and never to assume that when we use the word that there is a common process 
taking place.
18
 Here we can see that this is a further objection to mentalism
19
 
by Wittgenstein, and the idea that situations and language-games enable us to 
use and extend concepts depending on the context. 
 
To understand concepts the emphasis needs to be taken away from ‘the 
mind’ and ‘the mental’ and ‘out of the head’, and rather consider an emphasis 
on the interaction between mind and body. However, an awareness is needed of 
the difference between the embodiment and cognitivist perspectives which is 
mainly ‘in the role ascribed to the body, its characteristics, and its interactions 
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with the environment.’20 From the cognitivist perspective the activities of the 
body are irrelevant; rather the focus is specifically on the body which is 
considered as an output device that ‘executes commands generated by symbol 
manipulation in the mind.’21 From the embodiment perspective ‘cognition is a 
product of the body and the ways in which it moves through and interacts with 
the world.’22 Wittgenstein advocates for this perspective; for him the 
individual, who is made up of mind and body, engages with the environment 
through its behaviour and actions. The crucial distinction between the two 
perspectives lies primarily in the role that the body plays while interacting with 
the environment, and how cognition is ‘produced’ rather than being considered 
as a series of ‘symbolic manipulations’. Similarly, Wilson supports the 
embodied cognition perspective when she states that: 
 
There is a movement afoot in cognitive science to grant the body a 
central role in shaping the mind.
23
  
 
 
There is also a place for where the mind and body interact with the 
environment and where the: 
 
emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive 
processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world.24  
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However, while Wilson clearly shows support for the embodied cognition 
thesis she was also aware of some of its limitations, such as problems with 
fuzzy definitions.
25
  
 
6.1  THE HISTORICAL ANCHORS FOR EMBODIED COGNITION 
 
 
I present four examples of work in embodied cognition that are important to 
understand in order that the history of this new approach is understood. These 
are: metaphor and cognition; enactive cognition; rethinking robotics; and 
phenomenology.
26
 
  
In George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, they 
argue that language, and metaphor specifically, is not something that should be 
studied in the domain of cognition but  ‘actively structures much of cognition 
traditionally thought to be isolated from metaphor.’27 They consider that 
human experience and metaphor are intrinsically linked, hence the title 
‘Metaphors We Live By’. Furthermore, they contend that if experience and 
metaphor are shaped by the type of bodies that we have, and that these bodies 
‘mediate’ between mind and world, then for Lakoff and Johnson cognition is 
embodied yet not in a way that traditional cognitive science could explain.
28
 To 
explain their thesis on human experience and metaphor they use the example of 
love as a kind of journey. Metaphors that are often used to describe such an 
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experience would include phrases such as: “we’re together”, “we’re on a 
journey”, “this is our path”, “we’ve hit a bad spot”. These types of metaphors 
are used at a conceptual level by individuals for expression purposes and are 
used conventionally throughout cultures (and so arguably some are probably 
more culture-dependent than others). 
 
The enactive perspective on cognition was developed by Francisco 
Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind.
29
 This 
approach was an attempt to: 
 
redirect the cognitive sciences by infusing them with the 
phenomenological perspective developed in the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.
30
  
 
 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch introduced the concept of ‘enaction’, hence the 
term enactive cognition, and used this concept to develop a framework that 
would show that the: 
 
Experienced world is portrayed and determined by mutual interactions 
between the physiology of the organism, its sensorimotor circuit and 
the environment.
31
  
 
 
By focusing on the interaction between the individual’s mind, body and its 
engagement with the world, it highlighted the very bedrock of the embodied 
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cognition thesis, that ‘cognitive agents bring forth a world by means of the 
activity of their situated living bodies.’32 
 
By the early 1990s work in areas such as computational intelligence 
had started research in to how to generate ‘intelligence’ in robots. This was 
referred to as the embodied approach to robotics. Andy Clark’s Being There: 
Putting Mind, World, and Body Back Together Again
33
 heralded a sweep of 
work in reactive and or behaviour-based robotics, and its identification as 
marking a part of the embodied cognitive science.
34
 Clark assessed and 
critiqued research on robotics and computationally intelligent action. For 
Clark, minds were not for thinking but rather for doing, ‘for getting things done 
in the world in real time.’35 In Being There, Clark wanted to show affinities 
between what was considered intelligent action that was computationally 
driven and the idea that cognition was now being considered as ‘scaffolded, 
embedded, and extended’.36 
 
The idea that an understanding of the body and its physicality underlies 
the very possibility of experience
37
 can be traced to the historical roots of the 
phenomenological work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938),38 Maurice Merleau-
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Ponty (1908–1961)39 and John-Paul Sartre (1905–1980).40 We saw evidence of 
some of these philosophical roots and insights in the work of Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch in The Embodied Mind.
41
 The embodied cognition thesis 
seems to push phenomenological insights in new directions while 
acknowledging that rather than understanding how physicality opens up the 
experience of the individual and the world, they want to know the mechanism 
that explain how ‘cognition is grounded in, and deeply constrained by, the 
bodily nature of cognitive agency.’42 
 
As we can see the embodied cognition approach is drawing insights 
from many disciplines including: psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive 
science, artificial intelligence and robotics. 
 
6.2  EMBODIED COGNITION 
 
 
Anderson claims that: 
 
Structure and function, action and interaction, matter from top to 
bottom, affecting the nature and content of mental activities and 
events.
43
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He also suggests that to study the mind, we should be familiar with some of the 
basic principles of the embodied cognition approach. Some of these principles 
would include collating evolutionary accounts of observed cognitive 
phenomena that would be needed as support evidence for the account of these 
observations; to always look for the adaptivity of cognitive attributes and to 
establish whether these attributes increase the effectiveness of behaviour; to 
observe the many and varied ways in which the environment can serve as a 
resource for any said cognitive activity; to be aware of the role that physiology 
plays in cognitive functioning; to look for instances where there is evidence of 
pre-existing behavioural traits and tendencies and where these in turn have 
been attuned to serve cognitive needs; and finally, he states that we should 
never expect one type of solution to solve all cognitive problems or 
challenges.
44
 
 
Embodied cognition proposes that cognition has an ‘evolutionary 
history’ that needs to be considered in order that we may understand its 
function.
45
 I consider this to be one of Anderson’s most insightful remarks. He 
continues to explain that cognition evolved because it was adaptive and that it 
developed the ability to cope with the environment. He also states that 
cognition ‘evolved in organisms with specific physical attributes’46 and in 
organisms with ‘pre-existing sets of behavioural possibilities, instincts, habits, 
                                                 
44
 Ibid. pp. 14-15. 
45
 Ibid., p. 2. 
46
 Ibid. 
 181 
needs, purposes and the like.’47 Similarly, Glenberg claims that psychological 
processes evolved and that furthermore evolution is driven by two distinct 
imperatives: namely, survival and reproduction. These imperatives ‘require 
direct interaction with the physical and social world, and that interaction is 
only through the body.’48 
 
There is no doubt that these contributions from Anderson and Glenberg, 
which focus particularly on cognition being adaptive and interactive with the 
environment, can help in the study of the mind, and in understanding cognition 
from a new perspective. Furthermore, representation is central to theories of 
cognition, and according to Robbins and Aydede: 
 
the explanatory value of those representations depends on their 
meaningfulness, in real-world terms, for the agents that deploy them.
49
 
 
  
One of the tenets of embodied cognition is that ‘biological bodies move and act 
in rich real-world surroundings.’50 Proponents of the embodied cognition 
perspective, such as Wilson and Anderson, take as their ‘theoretical starting 
point not a mind working on abstract problems, but a body that requires a mind 
to make it function.’51 While there are many researchers of the embodiment 
thesis such as Glenberg, Clark, Rosch and Thompson, I have chosen to focus 
on Wilson’s description and the six views of embodied cognition that she 
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proposes. These six views are discussed here in order that I may show the 
importance of Wittgenstein’s key term ‘context’ and his views on how 
concepts, as situated within a language-game, can be identified. While some 
literature on this approach presents these claims together as if they were one 
view point, here they are discussed as separate points so I may do, as Wilson 
suggests, and take a more careful look at each of these claims on its own 
merits.
52
  
 
6.2.1 Cognition is Situated  
 
Now what takes place when, say, he reads a newspaper?—His eye 
passes—as we say—along the printed words, he says them out loud—
or only to himself; in particular he reads certain words by taking in their 
printed shapes as wholes; others when his eye has taken in the first 
syllables; others again he reads syllable by syllable, and an occasional  
one perhaps letter by letter.
53
 
 
Situated cognition is cognition that occurs in the context or environment of 
what Rosch refers to as ‘task-relevant inputs and outputs’54 thus, while 
cognitive processing is taking place other information, such as perceptual 
information, continues to come in that ‘affects processing, and motor activity is 
executed that affects the environment in task-relevant ways.’55 This situated 
cognition can be seen in the above remarks from Wittgenstein. Other examples 
of situated cognition would include writing and typing, and other functional 
tasks such as mowing the grass and cooking. However, by using the term 
‘situated cognition’ there is an implication that cognition is not situated on 
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occasions. This is referred to as ‘offline’ and simply means that when there is 
no input and output of any task-relevant activity cognition is not situated. 
Examples of non situated cognition, or cognition that is not situated, would 
include ‘planning, remembering, and day-dreaming, in contexts not directly 
relevant to the content of plans, memories, or day-dreams.’56 Consider the 
following remark from Wittgenstein: 
 
Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But ‘There has just 
taken place in me the mental process of remembering….’ means 
nothing more than: ‘I have just remembered….’. To deny the mental 
process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone  
ever remembers anything.
57
 
 
Anderson considers that much of cognition is adapted to serve as a 
function for survival and that an amount of cognitive activity takes place in the 
context of repeated and, therefore, familiar interaction and engagement with 
the environment.
58
 This too is something with which Wittgenstein would agree, 
particularly the aspect of repeated exposure and interaction with a specific 
environment or context. For him this is how we learn or grasp the meaning of 
the concept, and what it symbolises or represents. 
 
But it is just the queer thing about intention, about a mental process, 
that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it. 
That, for example, it is imaginable that two people should play chess in 
a world in which otherwise no games existed; and even that they should 
begin a game of chess—and then be interrupted.59 
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6.2.2 Cognition is Time Pressured 
 
 
According to Wilson: 
The observation that situated cognition takes place “in real time” is, at 
bottom, an observation that situated cognition must cope with time 
pressure.
60
  
 
Let us consider the following remark from Wittgenstein to see how cognition is 
time-pressured: 
 
Suppose we think while we talk or write—I mean, as we normally do— 
we shall not in general say that we think quicker than we talk; the 
thought seems not to be separate from the expression. On the other 
hand, however, one does speak of the speed of thought; of how a 
thought goes through one’s head like lightening; how problems become 
clear to us in a flash, and so on. So it is natural to ask if the same thing 
happens in lightning-like thought—only extremely accelerated—as 
when we talk and ‘think while we talk’. So that in the first case the 
clockwork runs down all at once, but in the second bit by bit, braked  
by the words.
61
 
 
When referring to situated cognition we need to be aware of the 
constraints of real-time: there must be an awareness of a real time environment 
in which the individual is present. Clark describes it as ‘mind on the hoof’62 
where the mind is interacting with the environment in what is considered as 
real-time situation. Anderson suggests that Wilson’s argument that cognition is 
time-pressured can be accredited to cognition being recognised as a coping 
mechanism in what could be considered or perceived as a possible 
unpredictable and changing environment:
63
 cognition can be considered under 
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these challenging circumstances as ‘highly reactive and environmentally 
driven.’64 Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
I can see or understand a whole thought in a flash in exactly the sense 
in which I can make a note of it in a few words or a few parallel dashes. 
What makes this note into an epitome of this thought?
65
 
 
6.2.3 We Off-Load Cognitive Work onto the Environment 
 
 
In order for us to understand cognition as an interaction between an individual 
organism and the social and cultural environment, and how cognitive works 
gets done, then the ‘complex transactions between embodied minds and the 
embedding world’ must be considered.66 
 
Wilson’s third claim that we off-load cognitive work onto the 
environment makes sense when we consider how over-loaded cognitive 
systems can become, a type of ‘representational bottleneck’.67 However, this 
off-loading activity onto the environment can also be considered as a type of 
cognitive strategy. The strategy seems to be necessary, or possibly is a natural 
development, due to cognitive limitations, such as attention and working 
memory. However, Wilson suggests that when off-loading onto the 
environment frequently it can involve spatial tasks, which would mean that this 
also becomes a limitation of the cognitive strategy. Anderson claims that 
epistemic actions are illustrative of only one of two categories of methods by 
which organisms can use the environment to simplify and aid tasks: 
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subsequently therefore organisms exploit what might be considered stable 
environmental features to simplify and aid cognitive tasks, and organisms 
change the environment to simplify and aid cognitive tasks:
68
 
 
We off-load cognitive work onto the environment because of limits on 
our information processing abilities […] we exploit the environment to 
reduce the cognitive workload.
69
  
 
This enables individuals to off-load information onto the environment and then 
later use that same information but only when it is specifically required. 
To illustrate this point we see where Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
Someone tells me: ‘I looked at the flower, but was thinking of 
something else and was not conscious of its colour.’ Do I understand 
this?—I can imagine a significant context, say his going on: ‘Then I 
suddenly saw it, and realized it was the one which…’. 
Or again: ‘If I had turned away then, I could not have said what colour 
it was.’ 
‘He looked at it without seeing it.’—There is such a thing. But what is 
the criterion for it?—Well, there is a variety of cases here.70 
 
6.2.4 The Environment is Part of the Cognitive System 
 
 
Wilson’s fourth claim suggests that cognition should not just be considered as 
an ‘in the head’ activity but as an activity that involves the interaction across 
and between  specific situations or a context that involves the mind, body and 
environment. 
  
Wilson states that ‘to understand cognition we must study the situation 
and the situated cognizer together as a single unified system.’71 Out of 
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Wilson’s six claims this one seems to be the most contentious. Anderson uses 
Merleau-Ponty’s description to defend Wilson’s claim.72 Merleau-Ponty 
describes a blind man that can be said to feel, not with his hand holding the 
cane, but rather with the cane.
73
 Merleau-Ponty wants us to understand that the 
cane becomes a part of the body, or an extension of the body, as opposed to 
only an object which the blind man uses as an accessory or tool. This claim, 
however, is rather contentious: it suggests that the experience of the blind man 
is: 
not one of feeling bumps in the hand and inferring from these the 
presence of certain textures or obstacles at the tip of the cane; rather the 
cane as artefact recedes into the phenomenological background and the 
signals transmitted by the motions of the cane are immediately 
interpreted in terms of — are felt as — the textures and obstacles in the 
world as presence at the tip of the cane.
74
  
 
Whatever agent drives cognition in an individual it does not reside only in the 
mind: it is an interaction, or as Wilson describes ‘distributed’ across the 
individual and the specific context the individual is interacting with.
75
 
However, as stated above, from Wilson’s six claims this is the most 
contentious and the one that draws the most attention. Anderson states that 
there are metaphysical and ontological issues that need to be considered when 
studying the mind. He argues that embodied cognition has been recognised on 
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pragmatic grounds, specifically where Wilson defines the cognitive system. 
She states that: 
 
For a set of things to be considered a system in the formal sense, these 
things must be not merely an aggregate, a collection of elements that 
stand in some relation to one another (spatial, temporal, or any other 
relation). The elements must in addition have properties that are 
affected by their participation in the system.
76
  
 
Anderson does not accept Wilson’s argument that ‘the mind is always and 
everywhere, in its essence, distributed.’77 He argues that Wilson’s 
metaphysical definition is the problem, and that relying on metaphysical 
elements is in contradiction to embodied cognition’s central thesis which is 
empirical, and which also comprises of an evolutionary element. 
  
We can see where the environment is part of the cognitive system, or as 
Wilson claims a ‘single unified system’,78 where Wittgenstein remarks: 
Am I to say that any one who has an intention has an experience of 
tending towards something? That there are particular experiences of 
‘tending’?—Remember this case: if one urgently wants to make some 
remark, some objection, in a discussion, it often happens that one opens 
one’s mouth, draws breath and holds it; if one then decides to let the 
objection go, one lets the breath out. The experience of this process is 
evidently the experience of tending towards something. Anyone who 
observes me will know that I wanted to say something and then thought 
better of it. In this situation, that is […].79 
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6.2.5 Cognition is For Action 
 
 
 ‘It is a good bet that many psychological processes have their roots (if not 
their trunk, limbs, and leaves) in the need for action.’80 Furthermore, there is 
little doubt that cognition is for action.
81
  
  
The claim that Cognition is for action can be seen in the following 
remarks: 
 
No one will say that every time I enter my room, my long-familiar 
surroundings, there is enacted a recognition of all that I see and have 
seen hundreds of times before.
82
 
 
And again where Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
A doctor asks: “How is he feeling?” The nurse says: “He is groaning”. 
A report on his behaviour. But need there be any question for them 
whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression of 
anything? Might they not, for example, draw the conclusion “If he 
groans, we must give him more analgesic”—without suppressing a 
middle term? Isn’t the point the service to which they put the 
description of behaviour?
83
 
 
Anderson is correct when he states that the cognitive system is also a 
behavioural control system, ‘albeit one that often utilises representations, 
concepts and other very complex and flexible machinery.’84 Perception and 
memory are central to the claim that cognition is for action, and how these two 
cognitive processes contribute to situation-appropriate behaviour. Glenberg 
argues that memory evolved ‘in service of perception and action in a three-
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dimensional environment.’85 The purpose of vision or perception is to develop 
an internal representation for an individual of what they have perceived, and 
then using memory as a cognitive process, to store this information either in 
short term (working) memory or semantic or episodic memory.  
 
However, Glenberg raises an interesting argument when he suggests 
that the traditional view to memory needs to be re-considered; rather than 
considering memory ‘for memorising’ perhaps it needs to be replaced by a 
view of memory as ‘the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction 
with a three dimensional world.’86 He argues that working memory should not 
be considered a ‘system’ but the deployment of particular, or depending on the 
context specific, action skills such as those used in verbal rehearsal.
87
 
Similarly, he argues that semantic memory and the formation of concepts can 
be understood in terms of embodied memory patterns. He also states that there 
must be a differentiation between semantic and episodic memory and that this 
can be seen in the frequency of the pattern’s use across many situations.88  
 
When the cognitive process of memory is considered, whether it is 
working memory, semantic or episodic, it should be understood in terms of an 
activity that allows us to encounter and conceptualise objects, contexts and 
situations in terms of their functionality rather than encoding them as objects 
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which are neutral. However, what is certain is that that mental concepts contain 
invaluable information for the perceiver, and information that can be relied on 
and used in many and varied contexts. Furthermore, these concepts can be used 
in and by situations and contexts that they may not have been originally 
encoded for. This again illustrates the functionality and versatility of both 
perception and memory, and also illustrates these two processes as distributed. 
This is what Anderson refers to as breaking out of functional fixed-ness.
89
 To 
illustrate this point Wilson gives the example of a piano in a room where a 
non-musician could use it as a bench to sit on or a flat surface to place their 
drink on. However, prior knowledge and experience can also allow someone to 
see the piano in a range of unforeseen contexts, such as using it as an 
instrument to gain the attention of a roomful of people, to barricade the door 
against an intruder or to break the instrument up for firewood. All these uses 
are derived from stored knowledge or representation of the piano.
90
 This area 
of prior knowledge and mental representation was discussed in the previous 
chapter when we considered the different approaches used by cognitive 
psychology to explain concepts. 
 
An individual’s mental representations are often incomplete, nebulous, 
unreliable and woolly, particularly when we consider concepts and situations 
that we may have encountered only occasionally and briefly. However, over 
time through repeated exposure and familiarisation, individuals are capable of 
developing detailed representations. Wilson claims that: 
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Our mental representations, whether novel and sketchy or familiar and 
detailed, appear to be to a large extent purpose-neutral, or at least to 
contain information beyond that needed for the originally conceived 
purpose.
91
 
 
 
6.2.6 Off-Line Cognition is Body Based 
 
 
Mental structures that originally evolved for perception or action appear 
to be co-opted and run “off-line”, decoupled from the physical inputs 
and outputs that were their original purpose, to assist in thinking and 
knowing.
92
  
 
The general purpose of these sensorimotor resources is to enable an individual 
to run ‘simulation’93 of some aspect of the physical world. The purpose of this 
is to enable the agent, or individual, to make inferences or to represent 
information and knowledge. 
  
While Wilson’s sixth claim is not as contentious as, for example, the 
claim that the environment is part of the cognitive system, it nonetheless has 
implications for human cognition, such as mentally simulated external events, 
e.g. mental imagery, working memory, episodic memory, implicit memory and 
reasoning and problem solving. All of the above would appear to make use of 
sensorimotor simulation. The domains of cognition mentioned here are ‘well 
established and non-controversial examples of off-line embodiment.’94 
Furthermore, there are current areas of research investigating studies in which 
off-line cognition may be embodied. Some of these include: the field of 
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cognitive linguistics which is currently re-examining linguistic processing in 
terms of broader principles of cognitive and sensorimotor processing.
95
 There 
is also the area of study which is examining an embodied approach to explain 
mental concepts.
96
 Finally, a third area of current research is motoric 
simulation and the role it may play in representing and understanding the 
behaviour of organisms belonging to the same species as another 
(conspecifics).
97
  
  
What is clear from Wilson’s sixth claim, and the examples of where 
off-line cognition may be embodied, is that in so far as: 
 
A concept has its roots in the structure of the body […] then cognition 
will still owe a great deal to the body, however distant one’s current 
thinking may be from the immediate demands of one’s body and its 
environment.
98
 
  
Anderson states that one of the advantages of viewing embodied 
cognition and its claims individually and on their respective merits, rather than 
examining the claims as a whole, is that it allows for the differentiation 
between the on-line and off-line aspects.
99
 The distinction of these two aspects 
separate clearly the on-line aspects such as the claims, as discussed above, that 
cognition is situated, time-pressured and that cognitive work is off-loaded on to 
the environment. When we consider these claims we can see the mind is 
‘operating to serve the needs of a body interacting with a real-world 
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situation.’100 The off-line aspects of embodied cognition would include any 
cognitive activities where sensory and motor resources are necessary for 
mental tasks whose referents may be imaginary, or at best distant in temporal 
and special aspects. These would include: symbolic off-loading where external 
resources would be used to assist in the mental representation of things that 
were not present, as well as internal uses of sensorimotor representations in the 
form of mental simulations. An example of this would be counting with your 
fingers whilst remembering something specific where a mental calculation was 
necessary. In situations such as these Wilson argues that the body is serving the 
mind, rather than the mind operating to serve the body.
101
 
  
We can see Wittgenstein’s traits of off-line cognition is body based in 
the following passages: 
 
When I say: ‘He was here half an hour ago’—that is, remembering it— 
this is not the description of a present experience. Memory-experiences 
are accompaniments of remembering.
102
 
 
And again where he remarks: 
 
Someone does a sum in his head. He uses the results, let’s say, for 
building a bridge or a machine.—Are you trying to say that he has not 
really arrived at this number by calculation? That it has, say, just 
‘come’ to him in the manner of a kind of dream? There surely must 
have been a calculation going on, and there was. For he knows that, and 
how, he calculated; and the correct result he got would be inexplicable 
without calculation.
103
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And where he states that: 
 
 
The mental picture is the picture which is described when someone  
describes what he imagines.
104
 
 
 
6.3  SITUATED COGNITION 
 
 
Situated cognition is a form of cognitive extension
105
 and is also: 
 
A many-splendored enterprise, spanning a wide range of projects in 
philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, robotics and other 
fields.
106
  
 
 
Indeed this could be applied to many of the words associated with situated 
cognition, such as embodied cognition, embodiment, distributed cognition and 
the extended mind, all new trends in cognitive science, albeit some central 
ideas expressed using these terms are divergent.
107
  By contrast, it is interesting 
to examine what does not constitute situated cognition. Situated cognition has 
been described as opposed to: ‘Platonism, Cartesianism, individualism, 
representationalism, and even computationalism about the mind.’108 I suggest 
that Wittgenstein also would agree with Wilson and Clark here. 
  
Situated cognition concerns activity and engagement, context and 
culture. A contemporary example of where this occurs would be the area of 
learning. Smith and Convey claim that cognition occurs in the context of other 
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people, whether that is personal contact, face-to-face contact, or social 
gatherings.
109
 These encounters, in the context of other people, influence 
cognition and behaviour which include thoughts and feelings. It could be 
claimed that situated cognition is for ‘adaptive behaviour’110 and that ‘our 
minds evolved for the on-line control of behaviour under the demands of 
survival rather than for detached puzzle solving or abstract cognition.’111 This 
type of claim would suggest that there is a connection between cognition, 
motivation and action. Furthermore, Smith and Convey offer three examples of 
where this may be present: motivation shaping cognition; time-pressure 
shaping cognition; and mental representations being action orientated.
112
 
  
Cognition has been understood as: 
 
Implemented by abstract, amodal informational processes that proceed 
within an organism, isolated from the larger context except for a narrow 
sort of defined inputs and outputs.
113
  
 
 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, cognition can be considered as distributed 
‘not contained within minds, but implemented by systems that link minds with 
aspects of the physical and social environment.’114 Here cognition is supported 
by aspects of the physical environment. Distributed cognition can occur across 
and between other people where shared meaning is the goal. 
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 Situated cognition emphasises the social context of behaviour. Again 
we see a Wittgensteinian theme: 
 
the fact that human behaviour in general takes place in, and is adapted 
to, a rich and complex network of group memberships, personal 
relationships, social motives and the socially constituted self.
115
  
 
Research in situated cognition should be considered as an on-going exploration 
into cognitive extensions, and ‘extensions of the mind into the physical and 
social world.’116 This area of situated cognition within the cognitive sciences, 
and also in some areas of philosophy, is an approach in how better to 
understand the mind and cognition. While situated cognition has well 
established roots in both philosophical and psychological paradigms, it has 
nonetheless developed significantly since the late 1970s as an alternative 
approach to exploring the mind and cognitive abilities. Furthermore, this new 
view on the relationship between cognition, individuals and the environment, 
and how to study the mind and cognition, meant that the cognitive sciences 
were now: 
 
Embracing what Jerry Fodor (following Hilary Putnam) called 
‘methodological solipsism’ and were, in effect, to bracket off the world 
beyond the individual in characterizing and individuating cognitive 
states and structures.
117
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6.4  SITUATED CONCEPTS AND EMBODIED COGNITION: A WITTGENSTEINIAN  
        THEME 
 
 
In order to understand Wittgenstein’s continual reference to context and the 
practical skill of understanding concepts, Gallagher’s use of the term embodied 
cognition as part of the general concept of situated cognition
118
 is being used 
here.  
  
Rosch states that because mind and world only occur as part of complex 
situations, these are the situations that our ‘interpretations, emotions, and 
motivations hold sway’ and where ‘situations are also the domain of 
actions.’119 Similarly for Barsalou, relations that occur between concepts and 
situations regularly ‘come into play during conceptual processing, thereby 
producing ubiquitous situation effects.’120 
 
Similar to Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the central role that any 
particular ‘context’ plays in developing an understanding of what a concept is, 
or how a concept is used, Robbins and Aydede claim that ‘situated cognition is 
the genus, and embodied, enactive, embedded, and distributed cognition and 
their ilk are species.’121 Furthermore, they argue that the embodiment thesis, 
the embedding thesis and the extension thesis all contribute to a general claim 
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that mental activity is dependent on the context in which it occurs.
122
 Similarly, 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on concepts, and particularly the attention he gives to 
the role that the ‘context’ plays, also show key aspects of the embodied and 
situated cognition approach:  
 
If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should 
we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which 
is the basis of grammar?—Our interest certainly includes the 
correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature.
123
 
 
Barsalau states that it is important to distinguish between concepts that 
are acquired from experience and concepts that have been established by 
means of productivity and reasoning.
124
 However, he also argues that it is 
possible for individuals to combine concepts that have been acquired from 
experience to ‘represent’125 concepts that have never been experienced, for 
example: striped water-falls; concepts that do not exist, for example: unicorns; 
and concepts that are impossible, for example: square circles.
126
 Similarly, 
Wittgenstein remarks on concepts and how we cannot, in some contexts, deal 
with the same experience, while acknowledging that the concepts are also 
related: 
 
But how queer for this to be the logical condition of someone’s having 
such-and-such an experience! After all, you don’t say that one only ‘has 
toothache’ if one is capable of doing such-and-such.—From this it 
follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of experience 
here. It is different though related concept.
127
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While Wittgenstein remarks on concepts and the practical skill used in 
understanding and situating them, he never refers either to concepts that have 
been acquired from experience, or combining concepts from experience to 
represent concepts that had not been experienced. However, evidence would 
suggest that he would support Barsalou’s thesis. For Wittgenstein, the central 
concern is the individual interacting with the concept and as part of the 
environment or context: 
 
Though—one would like to say—every word has a different character 
on different contexts, at the same time there is one character it always 
has: a single physiognomy. It looks at us.—But a face in a painting 
looks at us too.
128
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, if any context is repeated and 
becomes more frequent and, therefore, more familiar, an individual’s 
understanding increases with the ability to combine varying concepts, 
depending on the context or situation that has been presented. Arguably, there 
is an element of predictability and inference occurring here also. Furthermore, 
the sensory, action and emotion systems of an individual’s body provides, what 
Glenberg refers to as the ‘grounding’, for words and phrases, for example, to 
become meaningful and representative through our perception and interaction 
with objects, situations and contexts which symbols denote.
129
 
 
Consider the following remarks from Wittgenstein: 
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Think of this too: I can only see, not hear, red and green,—but sadness I 
can hear as much as I can see it.
130
 
 
Here Wittgenstein is making a clear distinction between concepts that are 
recognised by the different sensory systems. (However, this needs to be 
distinguished from synaesthesia where a ‘sensory experience normally 
associated with one modality occurs when another modality is stimulated.’)131 
He states that we can see colours but that the concept of an emotion, in this 
case sadness, both can be seen and heard. In this example the emotion of 
sadness would be situated in a particular context. Similarly in the following 
remark Wittgenstein again refers to a sensation:  
 
What is the natural expression of an intention?—Look at a cat when it 
stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape. 
((Connexion with propositions about sensations.))
132
 
  
Here he is drawing attention towards the connection between a 
proposition, a statement of fact, which is about a sensation. The intention of the 
individual, or in this example a cat or beast, is evident by their expression. This 
is a form of cognition as action, Wilson’s first claim in the embodied cognition 
thesis. 
  
Again the recurring theme of context and situated concepts is present 
when Wittgenstein remarks: 
I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I do if I take 
the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? Don’t I often imagine it 
with a spatial and temporal context which is one either of kindness or 
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malice? […]. This is no way altered by the fact that I can also take the 
at first sight gracious situation and interpret it differently by putting it 
into a wider context.
133
 
 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on experience and understanding are also 
presented frequently though the Investigations. In particular he draws attention 
to how we can make a transition from one language-game to another, to move 
from one context of understanding to another, where, through experience, 
familiar paths are presented to the speaker. The inference here is that these 
paths lead us to another language-game where further contexts and concepts 
are presented.  
  
Hearing a word in a particular sense. How queer that there should be  
such a thing!  
Phrased like this, emphasized like this, heard in this way, this sentence 
is the first of a series in which a transition is made to these sentences, 
pictures, actions. 
((A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every 
direction.))
134
 
 
And similarly in the following remark: 
 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be 
replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which 
it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme 
can be replaced by another.) 
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to 
different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by 
these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.)
135
 
 
Barsalou proposed that: 
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Concepts are not typically processed in isolation but are typically 
situated in background settings, events and introspections.
136
  
 
 
While Barsalou’s remarks presented here are clearly more empirical and 
resonate of contemporary cognitive psychology, such as the extended mind 
thesis, the embodiment thesis, situated cognition and embodied cognition, once 
again we can see similarities in Wittgenstein’s remarks: 
 
Then has “understanding” two different meanings here?—I would 
rather say that these kinds of use of “understanding” make up its 
meaning, make up my concept of understanding. 
For I want to apply the word “understanding” to all this.137 
 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein seldom focuses specifically on 
‘concepts of’ yet his remarks illustrate his interest in concepts in general: ‘We 
are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of 
thinking), and therefore the use of a word.’138 However, he consistently 
reminds us of how a concept, in general, is understood through its use in any 
language-game and the practical application of a concept in other situations: 
‘You learned the concept ‘pain’ when you learned language.’139 What we need 
to be clear on here, however, is that nowhere in the Investigations does 
Wittgenstein offer explanations or definitions on concepts; he is remarking on 
what he urges us to observe and then understand so that they [concepts] may be 
used. For Wittgenstein it is important for us to understand concepts and their 
place, the context in which they [concepts] arise: 
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It is almost as if ‘seeing the sign in this context’ were an echo of a 
thought. 
“The echo of a thought in sight”—one would like to say.140 
 
It is in this focusing of the context for Wittgenstein that we learn what 
the concept is, and furthermore how to use it; the practical skill of acquiring the 
concept and the many and varied contexts to which it can belong is understood. 
For example: 
 
Different concepts touch here and coincide over a stretch. But you need 
not think that all lines are circles.
141
 
 
Wittgenstein remarks: ‘But how we group words into kinds will depend 
on the aim of the classification,—and on our own inclination […]’142 while 
Barsalou claims that when objects and events are categorized ‘conceptual 
knowledge about the respective categories becomes active to predict what is 
likely to happen next.’143 (Classification and categorization were discussed in 
Chapter 4.) The following remark from Wittgenstein illustrates this point well: 
 
How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic) “Now take these things 
together!” or “Now these go together”? Clearly “taking together” and 
“going together” must originally have had another meaning for him 
than that of seeing in this way or that.—And this is a remark about 
concepts, not about teaching methods.
144
 
 
In this remark we can imagine the child interacting with the 
environment and using both mind, in terms of cognition, and body, in terms of 
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a social interaction, to learn arithmetic. Through language-games and repeated 
exposure to the concept, in this situation of arithmetic, the child has developed 
an ability to categorise the particular item. Furthermore, there is the probability 
that conceptual knowledge that has been associated with the particular category 
[of arithmetic] becomes active ‘to predict relevant actions’.145 It would appear 
that not only with situations, events or contexts that are repeated will the 
concept be learned, primarily through a practical application or skill as 
Wittgenstein advocates, but also inference (and inference that takes place in 
real time) and prediction are likely to take place too. Barsalou states that 
‘recognising the presence of certain objects is a powerful means of predicting 
the scene or situation likely to be present.’146  Furthermore, it is noted that 
Barsalou claims that prediction also lies at the heart of language 
comprehension: ‘a comprehender’s task is to predict what the language 
means.’147 Within the context of any given language-game, prediction and 
inference are likely to be apparent, although Wittgenstein advocates more for 
use and understanding. However, that is not to say that he overlooked 
prediction or inference: 
 
the prediction is a cause—and its fulfilment the effect. (Perhaps a 
physiological investigation could determine this.) So much, however, is 
true: we can often predict a man’s actions from his expression of a 
decision. An important language-game. 
148
 
 
  
 When this remark is examined, we can see that it refers to a 
physiological (bodily) state of an individual expression, in this instance, an 
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intention. Furthermore, reference to predicting an individual’s behaviour from 
the expression of his intention, or decision within a given context [language-
game], holds all the key aspects of situated or embodied cognition.  
 
He further remarks: 
But this ought not to surprise us. Think of the fact that one can predict 
one’s own future action by an expression of intention. 149 
 
 
And: 
This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind. It has duration; 
and that independently of the duration of its expression in a sentence, 
for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person. This 
is shewn me in the case of someone else by his behaviour; and by his 
words.
150
 
 
 Similarly, Wittgenstein also remarks on inference and links this term to 
behaviour and disposition: 
 
That is an inference; but not one belonging to logic. An inference is a 
transition to an assertion; and so also to the behaviour that corresponds 
to the assertion. ‘I draw the consequences’ not only in words, but also 
in action.
151
 
 
 
6.5  EMPIRICAL DOMAINS FOR THE EMBODIED COGNITION APPROACH 
 
 
There are several empirical domains in which embodied cognition has 
encouraged new insights and views about how the mind and cognition should 
be considered. I present just three of these claims here. They are not discussed 
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in detail in this dissertation for reasons of scope and limitations;
152
 however, 
the three domains are worth mentioning in the sense that they give a clearer 
idea as to why embodied cognition can be seen as empirical and ground-
breaking.  
 
‘Visual consciousness is typically viewed as a process within the 
brain.’153 However, the content of a visual experience can also be seen as 
experiential — ‘that is, represented from a point of view, active and 
attentional’154 — and it appears that none of these characteristics seem to be 
able to describe ‘the content of a neural representational system’.155 Noe also 
claims that an egocentric viewpoint of the world can be experienced by both 
animals and people, and to a point can phenomenologically can attend to parts 
of that experience that can then be explored through movements, albeit 
appropriate, of the head and the body while, simply put, neurons cannot.
156
 For 
O’Regan and Noe, conscious visual experience is a skilful action that occurs in 
real time and in a specific environment or context. It is simply something that 
we can do.
157
 
 
As this dissertation will show in the following chapter, Wittgenstein’s 
concepts are participatory and always context-dependent. As discussed in 
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chapter five it has been a traditional approach to see concepts as ‘context-
independent amodal symbols’.158 However, research strongly indicates that 
conceptual abilities include and are structured in terms of bodily activity. 
Evidence also suggests that people construct and use concepts differently 
depending on the context or situation which they are in, and conceptualization 
can be different across individuals and for the same individual in distinct 
environments.
159
 
 
Memory has also been cited as one of the empirical domains of the 
embodied cognition approach. (Memory was also discussed in Chapter 4.) 
‘Traditional accounts would claim that information storage and retrieval should 
be featured as essentially independent from sensorimotor mechanisms’;160 
however, empirical evidence could suggest that memory does not appeal to the 
‘semantic relatedness’ of something. A location, if appropriate, for example, 
would aid memory combined with the imagined embodied actions within the 
location or environment which would help the individual to retrieve the 
information required.
161
 Furthermore, it has also been shown that embodiment 
effects on memory have been found ‘in accomplishing particular tasks, 
including reasoning and language understanding.’162 
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6.6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In conclusion, we can see as Borghi and Cimatti state ‘that human body is a 
social entity’ and that ‘the body is always considered as an acting body.’163 It is 
also clear that distributed cognition, which is ‘consistent with Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy’,164 or situated cognition and extended minds incorporate two 
Wittgensteinian themes: first, ‘some degree of opposition to the identification 
of cognition with representation’;165 and secondly, ‘an apprehension of the 
metaphorical nature of conceiving of mind as inner.’166 
 
As we have seen, while Clark provides an analysis of embodied and 
situated cognition,
167
 Anderson suggests the following distinction: 
 
In my view, it is the centrality of the physical grounding project that 
differentiates research in embodied cognition from research in situated 
cognition, although it is obvious that these two research programs are 
complementary and closely related […]. Although related to and 
continuous with situated cognition, [embodied cognition] takes the 
physical grounding project as its central research focus.
168
  
 
Similar claims and arguments are echoed by other researchers. Clancey states 
that mental representations have been considered as the essential to cognitive 
science,
169
 while Clark draws attention back to the central thesis: 
                                                 
163
 Borghi and Cimatti, p. 763. 
164
 Susswein and Racine, p. 192. 
165
 Ibid., p. 185. 
166
 Ibid. 
167
 Gallagher, p. 1. 
168
 Anderson, ‘Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide’, p. 92. 
169
 William J. Clancey, ‘Scientific Antecedents of Situated Cognition’, in The Cambridge 
Handbook of Situated Cognition, ed. by Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 11-34 (p. 12). 
 210 
Of biological cognition as profoundly ‘action-oriented’ – geared not to 
the creation of rich, passive inner models of the world, but to the cheap 
and efficient production of real-world action in real-world context.
170
  
 
 
Clark’s description here is echoed throughout Wittgenstein’s descriptions of 
concepts and of forms of life, behaviour and cognition as action-oriented. 
  
As discussed, there are many terms that can be used to describe 
cognition: embodied cognition, situated cognition, distributed cognition, the 
extended mind. This would support the suggestion that there is a ‘growing 
interest in the idea that, to use a common vernacular, cognition is a not-just-in-
the-head phenomenon.’171 Furthermore, this is something that Wittgenstein had 
also suggested in The Blue Book: 
 
Perhaps the main reason we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head 
as the locality of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words ‘thinking’ and 
‘thought’ alongside of words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, 
speaking, etc., makes us look for an activity different from these but analogous 
to them, corresponding to the word ‘thinking’.172 
 
It is remarkable to see how insightful Wittgenstein was in 1933-1934 
when referring to thoughts and bodily activities, or social practices combined 
with thinking. Wittgenstein’s remarks as seen here are arguably the cornerstone 
of embodied cognition. In terms of contemporary psychology ‘Wittgenstein’s 
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insistence that conceptual questions of identity are distinct from empirical 
issues of causation’ has enabled a clear distinction in a very important issue: 
that the processes that generate cognition which are distributed, situated or 
extended is distinct from the suggestion that cognition itself can be considered 
as distributed, situated or extended.
173
 
  
As we have seen, what Wittgenstein commenced as a rejection of 
mentalism and to see ‘thinking’ and ‘thoughts’, or as it is now referred to as 
‘cognition’, in a new light, has developed into a discussion on how the mind 
should now be reconsidered, or as Nunez states: ‘the time to develop a richer 
and deeper science of the mind has come.’174 Testimony to the development 
and on-going research into the embodiment thesis is Glenberg’s claim that the 
principles of embodiment can be applied to specific areas within psychology 
such as development, language and memory, emotion and social psychology, 
theory of mind, psychological disorders, and educational psychology.
175
 While 
he agrees with Baumeister et al. that psychology has become ‘the science of 
self-reports and finger movements’176 he also cites that ‘work on embodiment 
has a long way to go to unify psychology’177 but is hopeful that embodiment 
will develop towards ‘regrounding psychology in behaviour’178 — a task that 
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Wittgenstein began in several of his works, but most notably, as we have seen, 
in the Investigations. 
 In the following chapter I show how Wittgenstein’s language-game is 
where concepts need to be seen as ‘participatory’, a phrase that Rosch179 uses 
consistently, in order to understand how we make sense of the world. Concepts 
should be considered as engaging with cognition, which is action-oriented, and 
with the environment, rather than being considered as objective and in isolated 
terms. I will show how the language-game can situate concepts within a 
context, and through social, cultural and rule-governed activities how concepts 
are always participatory and, therefore, meaningful and useful. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
THE LANGUAGE-GAME: CONCEPTS AS PARTICIPATORY 
 
 
‘Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments.’1 
 
 
 
The quote given above at the head of this chapter summarises, for me, what 
Wittgenstein means when he uses the term ‘concept’. For him, concepts are 
part of the environment and context in which individuals engage, through mind 
and bodily activity, and where the concept is participatory and a form of action:  
 
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the 
word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use 
in the language.
2
 
 
As I have stated previously, ‘participatory’ is Rosch’s term to describe 
how concepts should be considered as part of the environment and where 
situations are ‘the domain of actions’.3 In this chapter I look at some of 
Wittgenstein’s descriptions and remarks on and about concepts to show how 
they are not only situated within a context but also to illustrate how they 
[concepts] are participatory and a form of action. 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have used the term context repeatedly to 
emphasise the importance of Wittgenstein’s key element. As discussed in the 
previous chapter the term concept, or environment, is also key to understanding 
the embodied cognition thesis. It is clear at this point that it is the context that 
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gives the concept its meaning, and it is its use that identifies the term within a 
specific setting. Wittgenstein’s rule-governing elements and his communal and 
social features are also all reliant on the context for any given language-game 
to develop. 
 
As we know Wittgenstein is vague in his remarks and descriptions. As 
Monk states that ‘for without having the moral pointed out, so to speak, it is 
often difficult to see the point of his remarks.’4 Furthermore, his remarks are 
not explanations, and nor does Wittgenstein ever infer that they are, in fact 
quite the opposite; this, in some respects, makes the task of commenting on his 
investigations into language more difficult. The task, however, of showing how 
the language-game is the context for which we engage with concepts, that are 
also participatory, is not difficult, as we shall see. 
 
I propose that there seem to be no limits on the accessibility of meaning 
within a language-game. It is infinite yet always context-dependent. 
Wittgenstein argues that meaning can only be found when it can be shared, 
thus the description of language as a communal and social system (and his 
rejection of a private language, as outlined in Chapter 3). Wittgenstein, 
however, is his own worse critic. Despite the terseness throughout his writings, 
his remarks show language from a new viewpoint; from this position it is 
obvious that this is a viewpoint, that for many, is still held today: these remarks 
show language as a natural discourse that evolves depending on the theme and 
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context, as compared with other more theoretical accounts of language such as 
the developmental stages proposed in the Piagetian or Chomskyan viewpoint. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the term language-game is one that 
Wittgenstein introduces early in the Investigations and it is a term that is 
particularly prominent in his later work. Wittgenstein wants to teach us this 
term as we encounter his philosophy and his ideas on language and his 
immense interest in ‘the natural history of human beings’.5  He shows us how 
to use it [the language-game] as a tool to understand both his philosophical 
psychology, but more specifically, his views on language and psychology. For 
Wittgenstein there is always this connection between the two. He describes the 
language-game as an action; for him language is behaviour and its essence lies 
in the nature of its use (although this should never be confused with viewing 
Wittgenstein as a behaviourist, as I have argued in Chapter 3). He considers 
language always as a contextual and systematic process. 
 
In this chapter I present a series of arguments to show that 
Wittgenstein’s language-game is a theory of language. However, while I accept 
that Wittgenstein would reject the term ‘theory’ as a label I suggest that he 
would not reject my reasoning or my description of his language-game and 
how it can, in theoretical terms, explain the practice of language. I also show 
that his remarks on concepts and his investigations into the workings of 
language show that a language-game is the context, or environment, where 
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concepts become participatory and part of the social interaction between mind, 
body and world.  
 
Wittgenstein’s remarks are shown to be ‘about concepts’ rather than 
definitions ‘of’ concepts. They show concepts not as isolated and objective 
‘things’, ‘concept’ qua concept, but rather concepts as part of the environment. 
Wittgenstein neither regarded nor described concepts as an inner image or 
thought that was related to the external world. For him, this would separate the 
mind and body (a dualist position) which he was opposed to. This opposition is 
also seen in his rejection of mentalism and also in what he considered as the 
limitations of behaviourism. For him, meaning, that is, the use of the word, is 
an action, thus I use Rosch’s term ‘participatory’6 to describe Wittgenstein’s 
idea of language and, therefore, concepts and their use and meaning. For 
Rosch, as stated in Chapter 4, ‘concepts have a participatory, not an 
identifying, function in situations’7 (as opposed to the cognitivist’s view of the 
classical approach
8
 that ‘concepts are definitions, by which is meant equivalent 
and substitutable string of symbols’).9 
 
 
7.1  THE LANGUAGE-GAME AS THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
 
 
In order to determine if the language-game complies with the essential 
characteristics of a theory, we must first look at this concept ‘theory’ and agree 
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a satisfactory definition. However, it is also worth mentioning that Rosch 
criticises the term ‘theory’ and states that: 
 
the word theory manages to evoke and give the impression of satisfying 
two problematically contradictory understandings of the world.
10
  
 
 
She argues that life activities and experience do not occur as isolated units but 
rather within independent meaningful wholes which a laboratory experiment 
could never reflect.
11
 Rosch’s term ‘meaningful wholes’ refers to: 
 
world knowledge, beliefs (which are generally not organized into 
anything like coherent theories), expectations, desires, habits, skills, 
intuitions, the body, the functioning of the senses, tacit knowledge, 
everything that is un- or non-conscious, customs, values, the 
environment, and so on.
12
 
 
  
Wittgenstein, without doubt, would endorse this description of ‘meaningful 
wholes’ and would use it as a description of how concepts are understood 
within contextual settings. 
 
However, from a theoretical perspective, a theory is defined as: 
 
A set of propositions which provides principles of analysis or 
explanation of a subject-matter. Even a single proposition can be called 
a theory.
13
  
 
(It is also interesting to note that since the 1980s, a ‘theory’ is used in some 
academic contexts (chiefly in literary and cultural studies) not as a general 
concept but for a particular kind of theory, inspired by thinkers like Lacan, 
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Foucault and Derrida, usually with a tendency towards relativism in respect of 
knowledge and interpretation.)
14
 
 
Harley, however, suggests a more linear definition: for him the term 
theory means ‘to have a general explanation of how something works.’15 
Although simplistic in its explanation, in this case, it nonetheless describes 
effectively exactly what the reader is looking for in the term language-game. 
 
Now, let us examine two scenarios: if we take the sentence ‘even a 
single proposition can be called a theory’16 it is without doubt that this can be 
applied to the language-game. Wittgenstein’s description of the practice of 
language in use, and meaning as use, are logical unambiguous propositions. 
For him, the meaning of a word is always contextual, and this is why he 
describes the language-game process as one that is shared and social yet always 
rule-governed, as any ‘game’ is. Language for Wittgenstein is also about 
‘performance’; again I draw your attention to Wittgenstein’s interest in 
‘behaviour’ and ‘action’ where he sees language and its use as intrinsically 
linked to these concepts rather than him viewing language as a ‘competence’ 
for example, which is more akin to a Chomskyan view of language. 
   
When the theoretical term ‘theory’ is applied in relation to the subject 
of ‘language’ it suggests that a theory of language would include a description 
of the process or processes involved and not just a description of the action. 
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However, I suggest that, for Wittgenstein, the process is the action. This 
process allows for language and, therefore, concepts to emerge depending on 
the frame of reference and the conditions of the context. It is possible that 
Wittgenstein lacks clarity, even though as Magee states his prose is ‘distinctive 
and compelling’.17 The process, for Wittgenstein, is the behaviour rather than a 
description of the cognitive process (or mental process) involved in the 
acquisition of a concept. However, similarly, we could apply Rosch’s 
description of ‘life activities’ and ‘meaningful wholes’18 to Wittgenstein’s 
language-game. Her descriptions of:  
 
world knowledge, beliefs […] expectations, desires, habits, skills, 
intuitions, the body, the functioning of the senses, tacit knowledge, 
everything that is un- or non-conscious, customs, values, the 
environment, and so on.
19
  
 
 
is exactly how Wittgenstein would describe concepts; they are the action and 
they are participatory. 
 
Wittgenstein does not deny that there is a mental process – ‘To deny the 
mental process would mean to deny the remembering’20 – rather, he remains 
limited in his remarks. We must remember that Wittgenstein is rejecting 
mentalism (now referred to as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognitive processing’ since the 
cognitive revolution). This can be seen clearly when he consistently refers to 
‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’. An example of where we see this reference to 
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some types of mental acts, processes and states can be seen in the following 
passages:  
 
Negation: a ‘mental activity’. Negate something and observe what you 
are doing.—Do you perhaps inwardly shake your head? And if you 
do—is this process more deserving of our interest than, say, that of 
writing a sign of negation in a sentence? Do you now know the essence 
of negation?
21
 
 
But when you say ‘I intend to go away’, you surely mean it! Here again 
it just is the mental act of meaning that gives the sentence life. If you 
merely repeat the sentence after someone else, say in order to mock his 
way of speaking, then you say it without the act of meaning.
22
  
 
 
Both of these quotations refer to Wittgenstein’s descriptions of the mental act 
itself. While Wittgenstein does not elaborate or offer any theoretical 
explanations of this specific practice he is nonetheless acknowledging not just 
their [‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’] existence but also that they have a specific 
function even if he does not comment on this function in-depth. When 
Wittgenstein refers to the mental process he states that: 
 
Is a sum in the head less real than a sum on paper?—Perhaps one is 
inclined to say some such thing; but one can get oneself to think the 
opposite as well by telling oneself: paper, ink, etc. are logical 
constructions out of our sense-data.
23
 
 
 
Similarly he states that: 
 
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states 
and about behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
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undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we 
think.
24
  
 
 
Here Wittgenstein, for the first time, makes a connection between mental 
processes and states, and their possible relation to an individual’s behaviour. 
While he is cautious, as always, to describe something he cannot fully support, 
he nonetheless infers that we ignore or overlook their nature, and rely on 
knowing more about them in the future. However, I suggest that Wittgenstein 
could already see that there was connection between the two, that both mind 
(for him ‘mental process and states’) and the body (again for him 
‘behaviourism’) interact with one another. They are not separate and should 
therefore not be considered as such. Again, we see his rejection of dualism 
coming to the surface. He continues to state that: 
 
But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the 
matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to 
know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick 
has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite 
innocent.)—And now the analogy which was to make us understand 
our thoughts falls to pieces.
25
 
 
 
Here again Wittgenstein makes reference to an ‘unexplored medium’ even 
though he wants us to know that he is not denying ‘mental processes’. Perhaps, 
for Wittgenstein, this is all that he can say but I would argue that this is not 
because he has not formed any ideas on what function mental processes serve, 
or what an unexplored medium may refer to, but because his interest, at that 
time, lay in human nature and the use of language. Furthermore, as we saw in 
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Chapter 3 Wittgenstein could see the limitations of behaviourism; perhaps now 
also he is seeing how, when only we emphasise mental processes or cognitive 
processing, we fail to understand the individual and, thus, their interaction with 
the environment. 
 
While exploring Wittgenstein’s remarks about concepts in Part II of the 
Investigations, it is imperative to determine not only clarity around what he 
meant precisely but also to determine, in as far as possible, what exactly he did 
not say or pursue. It is only in light of this type of information that the real 
intent of his investigations into language will become apparent and 
understandable, particularly in relation to his descriptions on concepts and their 
role in the environment: 
 
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into 
such a whole, I realized that I should never success. The best that I 
could write would never be more that philosophical remarks; my 
thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single 
direction against their natural inclination.—And this was, of course, 
connected with the very nature of the investigation.  For this compels us 
to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.—
The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of 
sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and 
involved journeyings.
26
 
 
 
The following are some further examples of the type of psychological 
concepts that Wittgenstein remarks on in part II of the Investigations: 
 
Can one keep hold of an understanding of meaning as one can keep 
hold of a mental image? That is, if one meaning of a word suddenly 
strikes me,—can it also stay there in my mind?27 
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What makes my image of him into an image of him? […] 
(But it is also possible for a face to come before my mind, and even for 
me to be able draw it, without my knowing whose it is or where I have 
seen it).
28
 
 
Then psychology treats of behaviour, not of the mind? 
What do psychologists record?—What do they observe? Isn’t it the 
behaviour of human beings, in particular their utterances? But these are 
not about behaviour.
29
 
 
 
This last quotation in particular shows how Wittgenstein observed how 
psychologist separated mind and behaviour and their [psychologists] 
interpretation of language (utterances) as distinct from behaviour. He 
reinforces this line of thinking when he further questions whether a man ‘out of 
humour’ is a ‘report about his behaviour or his state of mind?’30 Again, this 
statement also clearly reinforces the arguments presented in Chapter 3 that 
Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist but is interested in human behaviour and 
action to explain how concepts are understood and subsequently used. 
 
Wittgenstein gives an excellent analogy when he explains how our 
language-game always rests on an implied presupposition: 
 
I describe a psychological experiment: the apparatus, the questions of 
the experimenter, the actions and replies of the subject—and then I say 
that it is a scene in a play.—Now everything is different. So it will be 
said: If this experiment were described in the same way in a book of 
psychology, then the behaviour described would be understood as the 
expression of something mental just because it is presupposed that the 
subject is not taking us in, hasn’t learnt the replies by heart, and other 
things of the kind.—So we are making a presupposition?31 
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Again, in this statement Wittgenstein shows what he considers to be an 
association between ‘the mental’ and its relation to behaviourism in the sense 
that the subject ‘hasn’t learnt the replies by heart’. 
 
How should we counter someone who told us that with him 
understanding was an inner process? […] then we shall have to draw 
his attention to the criteria which would demonstrate his capacity, and 
on the other hand to the criteria for the ‘inner states’.32 
 
 
Similarly, Wittgenstein states: 
 
Are the words “I am afraid” a description of a state of mind? 
 
I say ‘I am afraid’; someone else asks me: ‘What was that? A cry of 
fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your 
present state?’—Could I always give him a clear answer? Could I never 
give him one?
33
 
 
Here Wittgenstein is showing how a description of a state of mind cannot be 
separate or talked about independently from the behaviour, or action, of the 
individual: ‘This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind.’34 And again 
we see that ‘believing’ for Wittgenstein is an action. 
 
(The temptation to say ‘I see it like this’, pointing to the same thing for 
‘it’ and ’this’.) Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this 
way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the 
change because your memory constantly deceives you.
35
 
 
The interest of the experiences one has while speaking and of the 
intention is not the same. (The experiences might perhaps inform a 
psychologist about the ‘unconscious’ intention.).36 
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Wittgenstein’s uses of terms in the above two quotations such as ‘seeing’, ‘get 
rid’, ‘assume’, ‘change’, ‘deceives’, ‘experiences’, ‘speaking’, and ‘intention’ 
are all action words. These are movements and activities that involve both the 
mind and body. Furthermore, for Wittgenstein, these types of actions are 
always context-dependent. This is how we engage and learn about the concept. 
The context, or the surrounding is not provided by particular ‘mental 
accompaniments’,37 but, as Glock states: 
 
(a) the subject’s abilities; (b) the ‘whole history of the incident’, by 
what went on before and after; (c) the social surroundings, that is, the 
existence of certain language-games in the subject’s linguistic 
community.
38
 
 
Wittgenstein’s description of the use of language is the bedrock of any 
context; from here meaning and understanding can naturally take their place. 
Dummett, however, states that our problem is:  
 
What is it that a speaker knows when he knows a language, and what, 
in particular, does he thereby know about any given sentence of the 
language. Of course, what he has when he knows the language is 
practical knowledge, knowledge how to speak the language: but this is 
no objection to its representation as propositional knowledge; mastery 
of a procedure, of a conventional practice, can always be so represented 
[…]. Thus what we seek is a theoretical representation of a practical 
ability. Such a theoretical representation of the mastery of an entire 
language is what is called by Davidson, and will be called here, ‘a 
theory of meaning’ for the language.39 
 
Can Dummett’s explanation here refer also to Wittgenstein’s description of the 
practice of language? Of course not, for it is this calling for a theory of 
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meaning that he so vehemently rejects. Simply, for Wittgenstein, language and 
its use and, therefore, meaning, is an activity: we do not speak of words but 
rather of what the word means or words mean. Dummett continues to state, in 
Travis’ Thought’s Footing (2009), that: 
 
A conception of meaning — that is, a choice of a central notion for the 
theory of meaning — is adequate only if there exists a general method 
of deriving, from the meaning of sentence as so given, every feature of 
its use, that is, everything that must be known by a speaker if he is to be 
able to use that sentence correctly.
40
  
 
However, for Wittgenstein if a word is to be used significantly and with 
understanding, then it must adhere to certain rule-governing in terms of it 
meaning something rather than nothing, thus meaning and use are 
interdependent and integral to one another. The later Wittgenstein shifts the 
emphasis from ‘naming’ to ‘how one uses language’ which can be seen in the 
following remark: ‘And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by 
pointing to its bearer.’41  
 
7.2  CONCEPTS AS PARTICIPATORY 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 some of the approaches to concepts in cognitive 
psychology show traits of philosophical influences and possible philosophical 
presuppositions, such as Eleanor Rosch’s prototype view and her use of 
Wittgenstein’s term ‘family resemblance’. Furthermore, Rosch refers to how a 
philosopher’s view of categories entered psychology explicitly in the form of 
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concept learning research in the 1950s. Led by the work of Jerome Bruner and 
his associates
42
 
 
subjects were asked to learn categories which were logical sets defined 
by explicit attributes, such as red and square, combined by logical 
rules, such as and. Theoretical interest was focused on how subjects 
learned which attributes were relevant and which rules combined 
them.
43
  
 
 
For psychology, the task to determine whether a set of propositions constitutes 
a theory is easier because these logical propositions must be supported by 
empirical evidence. For example, in the case of the exemplar view research 
was carried out by Medin and Schaffer (1978) while Keil (1989) and Murphy 
and Medin (1985) carried out research on the knowledge approach. 
 
 ‘The study of concepts is only a part of the study of meaning’44 which 
brings us back to Wittgenstein’s distinction between ‘concepts of’ and 
‘concept’ qua concept. Concepts can also be considered as ‘the building blocks 
of thought’45 and should always ‘be studied in the context of a system of 
interrelated functions.’46 The functions of classifying, understanding, 
explaining, predicting, reasoning and communicating are integral to ‘being’ in 
the world, to human nature and human behaviour. ‘Concepts are influenced by 
what we already know, but a new concept can also effect a change in our 
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general knowledge.’47 As we have seen Rosch claims that concepts occur only 
in actual situations, that is real situations: 
 
in which they function as participating parts of the situation rather than 
as either representations or mechanism for identifying objects; concepts 
are open systems by which creatures can learn new things and can 
invent; and concepts exist in a larger context – they are not the only 
form in which living creatures know and act.
48
  
 
 
Rosch explains how concepts ‘participate in situations in innumerable flexible 
ways’.49 
 
Furthermore, she states that: 
 
Concepts and categories do not represent the world in the mind; they 
are a participating part of the mind-world whole of which the sense of 
mind (of having a mind that is seeing or thinking) is one pole, and the 
objects of mind (such as visible objects, sounds, thoughts, emotions, 
and so on) are the other pole. Concepts — red, chair, afraid, yummy, 
armadillo, and all the rest — inextricably bind, in many different 
functioning ways, that sense of being or having a mind to the sense of 
the objects of mind.
50
 
 
According to Rosch, ‘(W)e think of mind and world as separate things. We 
also think of bodies (or organisms) and environments as separate things.’51 
However, looked at from a different perspective, this is obviously wrong:
52
 
 
No matter how abstract and universal a concept may appear to be 
(square root, for example), that concept actually occurs only in 
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specific, concrete situations. Real situations are information rich 
complete events.
53
  
 
 
This is also resonate of Wilson’s description of embodied cognition when she 
refers to ‘real-time’ and ‘real-world’. 
 
One does not stand in thin air gaping at a tree as one does in 
philosophical examples; there is always a rich context, so rich that it 
has been argued that it can never be fully specified (Searle, 1983). 
Situations/contexts are mind-world bonded parts of entire forms of life. 
Context effects tend to be studied in psychological research only as 
negative factors, artefacts that invalidate somebody’s experiment or 
theory. But it may be that contexts or situations are the unit that 
categorization research really needs to study.
54
 
 
When Rosch critiques the prototype view in her article Reclaiming 
Concepts she asks the reader to consider the colour red: is red hair as good an 
example of your idea or image of red as a red fire engine? Is a dentist’s chair as 
good an example of chair as a dining-room chair? Such questions are nonsense 
within the classical view of categories where something either is a category 
member or it isn’t, and all members are equivalent.55 Similarly, Wittgenstein 
makes reference to memory and trying to recall the exact colour ‘red’: 
 
Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that 
is why the meaning of the word ‘red’ is independent of the existence of 
a red thing.—Certainly it makes no sense to say that the colour red is 
torn up or pounded to bits. But don’t we say ‘The red is vanishing’? 
And don’t clutch at the idea of our always being able to bring red 
before our mind’s eye even when there is nothing red anymore.56 
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For Wittgenstein, ‘a concept forces itself on one’57, thus it is part of the 
situation an individual is engaged with. However, while mind and body are part 
of the interaction, Wittgenstein wants us to see simply that language is a tool. 
Wittgenstein refers to ‘the mental’ and ‘the mind’ as an object or something 
that exists rather than a process, unlike psychoanalysis which had by this time 
systematically declined as a prominent discipline, as behaviourism was soon to 
do. Also for Wittgenstein it is always the person that he is most interested in, 
and their humanity, rather than proposing explanations or theoretical accounts. 
Finally it is the late 1940s and behaviourism is still the more prominent 
tradition in psychology; the emphasis is still on overt and external reactions 
rather than any form of mental process or explanation of mental states. 
However, as we have seen in Chapter 4 the ‘cognitive revolution’ is imminent. 
 
7.3  THE LANGUAGE-GAME WHERE CONCEPTS ARE PARTICIPATORY 
 
 
Textbooks in psychology frequently refer to the language-game as a theory of 
language. This is because they consider a theory to be a set of principles that 
deduce a logical and sound conclusion or, as Harley claims, ‘to present a 
general explanation of how something works.’58 While Wittgenstein would 
vehemently reject the notion of his language-game as a theoretical tool, it is 
still nonetheless a ‘tool’ where we use the environment to engage with the 
concept that is participatory. His description of language as use, and language 
as a form of life, are the fundamental principles that lead to the theory. 
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In the Investigations, Wittgenstein’s remarks and investigations into 
concepts exemplifies his real interest in ‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’, despite his 
rejection of reservations about psychology as a science: ‘For in psychology 
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion.’59 When he 
describes these concepts he exposes his understanding of what it is to have a 
concept and what it is to use a concept. 
 
For any theory to work, to be used as a tool, it must earn its keep. It 
must be seen and used as a framework for statements or propositions to 
logically fit together. The question now becomes does the language-game, as 
the context where concepts are participatory, fulfil that representation?  
 
Wittgenstein first introduces the term language-game at #7 in the 
Investigations after he has introduced us to what he refers to as ‘primitive 
language’ in #2 he comments that: 
 
A child uses such primitive language forms of language when it learns 
to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.
60
  
. 
Wittgenstein shows us the term primitive language in order to introduce 
us to the ideas that this is not how people construct or use language. Words and 
concepts do not have definite meanings and use, but multiple purposes where 
the context enables the interpretation of the word. There is also a notion of the 
mastery of language, a phrase that Travis uses frequently, to show the ease and 
proficiency of language use but without the regularities of each word having to 
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conform to a specific definition. It is this lack of structure, or this fuzziness, 
that allows the term context to be of essential value here. 
 
Wittgenstein presents us with an interesting analogy where language 
can be seen as a tool, an instrument.  In the Tractatus, he considered language 
as a picture theory of meaning, while in the Investigations he replaces the 
picture theory with a ‘toolbox’ theory of language: ‘Language is an instrument.  
Its concepts are instruments.’61 Instruments and tools, like any other concepts, 
can be categorised in accordance with their relevant characteristics and features 
and the various procedures and functions that can be performed with them.  
Similarly, in the toolbox analogy, the notion of the meaning of a linguistic 
expression is replaced by its utterance, the expression, and ultimately, by its 
use: 
 
Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a 
screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws.—The functions of 
words are as diverse as the function of these objects.  (And in both 
cases there are similarities.)
62
 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, ‘naming’ can also be considered a linguistic activity, 
even a language-game, and similar to speaking a language and using concepts, 
the emphasis is always on ‘performance’ rather than ‘competence’. However, 
a significant aspect to consider in naming is the notion of a link between the 
speaker and the world: establishing this link is the very meaning of the word.
63
  
It is an act of recognition on the part of the speaker. What is in question here is 
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how these words are connected to the world and how we understand the rules 
attached to understanding this said connection? This also highlights the notion 
of a theory of meaning. 
 
The process of knowing as part of using language is based on the notion 
that we must know which object the name refers to, therefore we must be able 
to identify the object: 
 
We can therefore say that if naming something is to be more than just 
uttering a sound while pointing to something, there must also be, in 
some form or other, the knowledge of how in the particular case the 
sound is to be used.
64
   
 
 
However, I argue that it may be possible that we may not have any particular 
thoughts about the object, specific beliefs or knowledge, at that stage. This of 
course does not mean that a concept cannot be understood and used. Indeed the 
exemplar view of concept development proposed by cognitive theorists could 
be used in this instance, as could the prototype and knowledge approach.  
The Investigations opens with an Augustinian explanation of language. 
Here it is Wittgenstein’s intention to draw attention to how Augustine portrays 
language as essentially a correlation between words (noun-naming objects) and 
meanings and how Wittgenstein can explicate, and perhaps in some ways as 
shown in the Investigations, deconstruct this picture.
65
 It is his intention to 
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highlight the flaws of viewing language as thus presented through a 
Wittgensteinian explanation.  
 
For Augustine, ‘Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated 
with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.’66 However, 
Wittgenstein later states that: 
 
Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; 
only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to 
say this in many cases where the question arises ‘Is this an appropriate 
description or not?’ The answer is: ‘Yes, it is appropriate, but only for 
this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were 
claiming to describe.’67  
 
Here Wittgenstein has successfully challenged Augustine’s account of 
language and has subsequently proposed, by way of an argument, that not all 
uses of language can and do fit this Augustinian description. 
 
I suggest that there is a significant difference in Wittgenstein and 
Augustine’s conception of language. For Wittgenstein it is not sufficient to say 
that we understand language or can use language just because we can say 
words, either from ostensive learning or by repetition; for him the importance 
of understanding the use of word and its contextual meaning is immense. He 
illustrates the nonsense of language and its ineffective use when he again refers 
to the Augustinian picture and states: 
 
Imagine a script in which the letters were used to stand for sounds, and 
also as signs of emphasis and punctuation. (A script can be conceived 
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as a language for describing sound-patterns.) Now imagine someone 
interpreting that script as if there were simple a correspondence of 
letters to sounds and as if the letters had not also completely different 
functions. Augustine’s conception of language is like such an over-
simple conception of script.
68
 
 
 
For Wittgenstein the context and the speaker’s use is of paramount 
importance if the essence of language and the meaning of the concept are to be 
fully understood:  
‘I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever.’—Yes, given the 
whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a 
brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a lever; it may 
be anything, or nothing.
69
 
 
There is a line of argument that would suggest that ostensive definition 
plays a central role in how we understand language. Ostension connects 
language and world. It provides a reference and in doing so eliminates any risk 
of misunderstanding or ambiguity. Essentially, it is the vehicle which allows us 
to learn and understand simple terms such as ‘wet’, ‘car’, ‘yellow’, ‘bucket’ 
and so on. However, although naming, ostension/ostensive definition, is like 
attaching a label to something such as an object, the process can also lead to 
variously interpretations and, therefore, misunderstanding in any situation or 
circumstance that is presented to the speaker. 
 
The opening passage of the Investigations emphasises the notion of 
ostensive learning and the central role it plays in our acquisition of language. It 
does not, however, differentiate or distinguish between the different parts of 
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speech, although Wittgenstein does emphasise that he does not want to use the 
term ‘ostensive definition’: 
 
because the child cannot as yet ask what the name is: I will call it 
‘ostensive teaching of words’.—I say that it will form an important part 
of the training because it is so with human beings; not because it could 
not be imagined otherwise.  This ostensive teaching of words can be 
said to establish an association between the word and the thing.
70
 
 
 
 
However, Wittgenstein clearly rejects the role ostension plays in 
language learning. He states that ostension is fundamentally flawed and, 
therefore, fallible. For example, we can point towards the object ‘bucket’ but 
this can be misinterpreted as pointing to the object ‘spade’ which is lying 
alongside the bucket. Similarly, by pointing at the colour yellow and exhibiting 
a lemon, we might understand and interpret that the lemon is the yellow being 
referred to and not the colour. To avoid this ambiguity we could point to 
several items that are yellow, such as banana, a yellow marker or a yellow shirt 
but there is still the possibility that confusion can arise in terms of the actual 
referent.  
 
Secondly, ostension is not viable when objects are not present. We use 
terms such as colours, e.g. purple, and adjectives, e.g. beauty, in situations such 
as these. Therefore, ostension is not central but limited to learning language 
and, therefore, use.  
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Thirdly, ostension cannot tell us how we use words contextually which 
is key for Wittgenstein:  
 
how one may use words which spoke (in a given structured way) of 
given concepts and objects must genuinely depend on the 
circumstances in which they were spoken.
71
  
 
 
For example, if someone were to say: ‘I will tell you the truth’, how do you 
point to ‘I’ or ‘truth’. Words such as these are learned through contextual use, 
where the concept and the environment engage with the mind and the body. 
This is the embodied cognition thesis. 
 
Wittgenstein argues against the role ostension plays by suggesting that: 
 
There is a variety of distinct things to be said (or thought) in saying 
(thinking) a word to name blue. For such a thought to confer mastery of 
a word on a child, the child must grasp the proper understanding of that 
thought; he must be prepared to react appropriately to the fact it 
represents as so.
72
  
 
What cannot be in doubt is that ostension is concerned with providing meaning 
to a word or concept and, therefore, is integral to meaning and the use of 
language. It does, however, play a limited role in the use of words and concepts 
in natural language and is therefore by no means central, explanatory or key in 
the meaning of a word or concept, and also therefore to our naming, use, 
meaning and understanding of it. Wittgenstein’s intention is not to actively 
separate naming and meaning, rather he wants to emphasize that: 
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Neither what a word names nor what it means is sufficient by itself to 
determine by what standards of correctness it is governed on a use of 
it.
73
  
 
If a term can be used in several contexts, for example the adjective 
‘cold’ and the colour ‘green’, then the meaning of the word has been grasped. 
The learning of these words has taken place in not one, but I would argue, 
several situations where the context has been similar. It is this reinforcement 
that has invited the meaning and, therefore, the use of the word. These words 
and concepts now have a meaning for the speaker. Similarly, an argument in 
relation to the meaning of psychological terms should be highlighted. Terms 
such as ‘I am in pain’ do not describe a private inner state. However, the notion 
of psychological terms is more closely linked to Wittgenstein’s arguments on 
private language which has been discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
In primitive language, the use of the word is specific to a particular 
action as seen in #2 in the Investigations: “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”74 
and here we see the worker may be unaware of the many other uses of the term 
‘slab’, or even what the purpose of the slab is. There is no doubt that children 
learn language at an early age in a primitive way as seen in #2. They learn to 
‘say’ a word and ‘use’ a word in a particular context without necessarily 
knowing what the concept represents in other contexts. For example, a child 
will say: ‘There are nine holes on the grass over there’ or  ‘try and catch the 
bus’. This form of primitive language is also a language-game: ‘I shall also call 
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the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a 
“language-game”.’75 We now know that within the first 7 short paragraphs, or 
aphorisms as some refer to them, in the Investigations that Wittgenstein 
proposes that there are numerous related meanings to the term language-game.  
 
Wittgenstein never explicitly defines, or says with exactness, anywhere 
in the Investigations what he means by his term language-game but uses 
descriptions and remarks. I suggest he is arguing for a more fluid and flexible 
activity involving human language, which will ultimately provide a more 
realistic and communal and shared experience of language itself.  Kenny 
argues that: 
 
If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the 
agreement and disagreement of propositions and reality, of the nature of 
assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look 
at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear 
without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of 
thought.
76
 
   
 
What he is arguing for here is the ability to simplify our communication 
process through the use of language-games, simple forms of language. When 
we accept this as the process, we can then perceive human activities as 
transparent, unambiguous and understandable. When we are involved in a 
language-game, we are involved in an activity; the speaking of a language 
which is, for Wittgenstein, a form of life emerging. 
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One of Wittgenstein’s most frequently cited examples of language-
games appears in the Investigations #2 where he presents a list of what he 
considers to be a language-game: 
 
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine 
is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a 
builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: these 
are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in 
the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language 
consisting of the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’. A calls them 
out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a 
call.—Conceive this as a complete primitive language.77 
 
 
Here Wittgenstein is showing that the Augustinian picture of language, which 
we must accept may very well be correct, is nonetheless limited. Although 
language-games are rule-governed, they still allow us to communicate more 
openly in the communal and shared experience of human activity. Language-
games also present us with more opportunities to explore the diversity and 
complexity of language through use and meaning. Similarly, Travis states that 
the problem with Augustine’s account of language learning is as follows:  
 
There is a variety of distinct things to be said (or thought) in saying 
(thinking) a word to name blue. For such a thought to confer mastery of 
a word on a child, the child must grasp the proper understanding of that 
thought; he must be prepared to react appropriately to the fact it 
represents as so. But which understanding of the thought would be 
depends (often enough) on the history of the word in the language the 
child is learning (or its career within the community in which the child 
is to speak).
78
 
 
 
In the Investigations #23 Wittgenstein presents the reader with a list of 
what he refers to as ‘regular’ language-games: 
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Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the 
fact that speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form. 
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, 
and in other: 
 
 Giving orders, and obey them— 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements— 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about the event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams— 
Making up a story; and reading it— 
Play-acting— 
Singing catches— 
Guessing riddles— 
Making a joke; telling it— 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic— 
Translating from one language into another— 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
79
 
 
We can see from this list of regular language-games that they are all ‘actions’ 
and ‘behaviour’. Again he is drawing our attention to language-games as a 
‘performance’ that occurs contextually, and with the interaction between mind, 
body and world. These language-games that Wittgenstein has presented us with 
all include concepts as participatory. Furthermore, from the examples 
presented here, we can see that there are two apparent properties to 
Wittgenstein’s language-games: first, they belong to a broader context referred 
to by Wittgenstein as a form of life; and secondly, the concept behind 
language-games would suggest that there is a rule-governed element of 
language. I suggest that language comprises a complex network of language-
games, each separate and distinct from one another and yet also undoubtedly 
all are inter-dependent and reliant on another. Furthermore, we can never 
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escape a language-game. Similarly, to try and explain what the language-game 
is we find ourselves in a language-game of explanation. Wittgenstein, without 
doubt, has created a unique and clever concept. Fundamentally, any language-
game invites us to use terms, words and sentences in different ways and 
contexts, thereby ultimately alternating meaning, and hence there are many 
different uses for the various terms, words and sentences, as he outlines in the 
Investigations #17:   
 
It will be possible to say: In language (8)) we have different kinds of 
word.  For the functions of the word “slab” and the word “block” are 
more alike than those of “slab” and “d”.  But how we group words into 
kinds will depend on the aim of the classification,—and on our own 
inclination. 
Think of the different points of view from which one can classify tools 
or chess-men.
80
 
 
 
‘Concepts only occur as part of a web of meaning provided both by 
other concepts and by interrelated life activities.’81 I suggest that when we refer 
to any object in the world we are participating within a language-game; 
therefore our concept of the world, which has gradually evolved, and how we 
categorise the world in order to make sense of it, is already determined by the 
structure of our language. This idea of us participating in a language-game, as 
the concept participates in a language-game, is where the structure of our 
language determines our view of the world. If we can accept that the use of a 
word in various contexts is central to meaning, then we can now move a step 
further to show that Wittgenstein’s language-games are the contexts in which 
concepts are participatory. Wilson states that: 
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There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as ‘the’ meaning of a word, so 
there is no such thing as ‘the’ concept of a thing. When we talk, in a 
kind of shorthand, about ‘the’ meaning of a word, we refer to those 
significant elements in all the many and various usages of the word 
which make the word comprehensible, to the area of agreement among 
users of the word.
82
  
 
 
For Wittgenstein, concepts are meaningless unless placed within a context. For 
example, if I speak of the measurements of lengths and widths of different 
timbers, materials and tools such as a bench saw and measuring tape, then I can 
participate in this specific language-game, and competently use the concepts 
relating to the subject of carpentry. Similarly, if I speak of recipes and 
blenders, weighing scales and ingredients, then I am competently using the 
concepts relating to the subject of cookery. Wittgenstein wants us to see that 
language-games allow us to distinguish between what makes sense and what 
does not, and to able to distinguish between what is logical and intelligible. 
However, it is important to understand that one language-game does not take 
precedence or importance over another; they are simply different. Similarly, no 
language-game is more basic than another.   
 
Wilson states that: 
 
It is quite possible to have a concept of something, but for there to exist 
no single word — not even a word invented by the person who has the 
concept — which describes the thing.83  
 
However, for Wittgenstein, concepts are the meaning, because the meaning 
arises from it use, and while there will always be multiple language-games 
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which are rule-governed, the different rules will determine how the concept is 
interpreted and to what language-game it belongs. For example, let us look at 
the following sentence: 
 
‘The vessel submerged within minutes, much faster than anyone could 
have anticipated.’ 
 
 
When we look at this proposition in isolation, rather than interpreting the 
sentence within the context of the preceding or even proceeding statements, 
can we identify to which language-game it belongs? Looking at Wittgenstein’s 
list of possible language-games at #23 in the Investigations, the language-game 
for this particular statement could belong to: ‘describing the appearance of an 
object’; ‘constructing an object from a description (a drawing)’; ‘reporting an 
event’; ‘making up a story’; ‘play-acting’; ‘singing catches’; ‘making a joke; 
telling it’.84 (Note that all these are ‘action’ ‘behaviour’ and 
‘participatory’.)The proposition could belong to all of the above; the point I am 
making is not which one it refers to but rather how the sentence must be 
interpreted based on the context and the event to which it belongs. However, I 
would also claim that some psychologists might argue that they are more 
interested in the contextualist approach than to the actual meaning. For 
example: 
 
While there is no fixed meaning associated with linguistic expression, 
and the best we can do is catalogue the contextual uses of expression, 
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the message conveyed by an expression is heavily influenced by one’s 
understanding of the context.
85
  
 
 
It is important to factor out the respective contributions to understanding made 
by linguistic expressions and by context; this cannot be done by focusing on 
context alone.
86
 The expression must convey something with which the context 
can interact. Furthermore, Wittgenstein would argue that it is the context that 
gives the meaning of the word to the speaker and, therefore, knowledge and 
understanding follow with continuous reinforcement. Wittgenstein, for 
example, is not saying that when a child hears a word for the first time that the 
child will remember the context and how to apply that particular concept into 
all other contexts but with similar situations reinforcement of the use of the 
concept will occur. Gradually the child will identify the attributes of the 
concept and be able to assimilate them to use if the concept occurs in other 
situations, which we know is highly probable.
87
  This is similar to the prototype 
view, knowledge and exemplar approach of concept development work. 
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7.4  CONCEPTS AS PARTICIPATORY AND FAMILY RESEMBLANCE 
 
 
Family resemblance is an idea meant to have application to all our 
concepts, so that there is at least some important sense in which it is 
wrong to speak of ‘family resemblance concepts’, as if those were 
concepts of some semantically special kind. (Note that Wittgenstein 
introduces family resemblance in #65, in response to a question about 
the essence of language. His conclusion about the ‘essence of language’ 
is stated in #92. All the sorts of concepts mentioned above are 
discussed in connection with this problem in the space between those 
two paragraphs.)
88
  
 
 
Exploring a network of family resemblances can also be considered as 
exploring a ‘cluster’ of resemblances which is not about the meaning of a name 
in the way that, for example, the term family resemblance explains the meaning 
of the term ‘game’. Furthermore, while Wittgenstein is not a cluster concept 
theorist his view of names does suggest that the semantics of a name might be 
specified correctly by means of descriptions; this might be where the 
‘descriptions are properly understood as imposing a condition on being the 
referent of the name.’89 However, investigating a cluster of resemblances has 
become a theory about the shared nature of language, something common to a 
language/linguistic community, so the question becomes: how can we talk if 
we do not or cannot agree on everything about the words we use?  Wittgenstein 
would argue that: 
 
We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because 
we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real 
‘definition’ to them […]. Our ordinary use of language conforms to this 
standard of exactness only in rare cases.
90
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Again, we see here how it is the environment and the social interaction 
between the individual (mind and bodily activities) that determines the 
meaning of the concept. This notion of a shared nature of language is evident 
in the way that Wittgenstein describes language as a tool, and its use, and the 
cognitive approach that psychology takes to concepts. 
 
When concepts, categories and classifications are examined, it appears 
that many categories seem to be defined by a family resemblance 
between their members rather than the specification of defining features 
that all members must possess.
91
   
 
 
However, this brings with it another problem: the wooliness or fuzziness within 
the boundaries of concepts. As discussed in Chapter 4 the classical category 
has clear and well defined common properties and boundaries, and it is from 
this type of category that Wittgenstein derives his notion of ‘game’ and how 
‘game’ does not fit the classical view since there are no common properties 
shared by all games:  
 
The strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre 
runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
92
  
  
 
Wittgenstein argues that just because we cannot give a definition of words such 
as ‘game’ or ‘number’ or ‘family’ that we do not know what they are:  
 
But this is not ignorance.  We do not know the boundaries because none 
have been drawn.
93
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A fuzziness or lack of definitiveness around a concept does not mean 
that the expression itself is meaningless. This is where he argues for the use of 
a word and how it is learned rather than searching for a precise and definitive 
meaning. Furthermore a sharp boundary can be chosen, to suit whatever 
purpose we might have to hand. In such cases, it is the way in which the term is 
employed, and how it is learned, that are pivotal, rather than any precise 
meaning. The Investigations rejects the assumption that the meaning of a word 
is the thing that it stands for. That involves the misuse of the word ‘meaning’.  
Hacker argues that: 
 
There is no such thing as the name relation, and it is confused to 
suppose that words are connected with reality by semantic links.  That 
supposition rests on a misconstrual of ostensive definition.  Not all 
words are or need to be sharply defined, analysable by specification of 
necessary and sufficient conditions of application.  The demand for 
determinacy of sense is incoherent.
94
  
 
However, I argue that Wittgenstein is correct when he states that there 
are no real ‘definitions’ to the concepts that we use. However, by contrast 
cognitive theorists have shown that there are real definitions and that some are 
bound by specific rules, such as the defining attribute viewpoint would suggest, 
albeit that there are some limitations and weaknesses to this approach as I have 
outlined in Chapter 4. While Wittgenstein continually draws our attention to 
the connections between the words, both as they are used in specific examples 
that he draws out for us — such as ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’ —95and how 
we use them in our ordinary life, he is focusing on broader descriptions rather 
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than specific definitions. This is another sharp contrast in how philosophy and 
psychology explain certain phenomena. Wittgenstein is also highlighting the 
differences in our uses of language which is the fundamental basis of the 
language-game. However, as this dissertation shows, the meaning and use of a 
concept, both concrete and abstract, is found in the way that it participates in 
the environment. 
 
In this regards, then, while, for Travis, Wittgenstein placed 
epistemology squarely at the centre of philosophy of language,
96
 his purpose 
also was for us to grasp the notion that in order to understand the workings of 
language there was also a need to understand how this knowledge of language, 
and its many and varied uses, arose. He has done this by showing the 
distinction between the ‘concept of’ something and ‘concept as concept’. For 
Wittgenstein, his remarks are often ‘about’ concepts rather than specific 
explanations of ‘a concept’. The subtle distinction he makes between the 
conceptual and the meta-conceptual allows for us to see ‘concept of’ as action 
and participatory rather than static and objective. 
  
Despite Wittgenstein’s potential objections, I propose that the 
language-game can be seen as a theoretical tool, that is, it can also be 
considered as a theory of language (as many scholars and critics currently do). 
Similar to using Rosch’s definition of a concept as non-representational and the 
‘bridge between mind and world’,97 I have also used her term ‘participatory’ to 
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show how concepts in any language-game are an ‘action’ and where they 
actively engage, become part of the environment and interact with mind and 
body. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
‘The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden  
because of their simplicity and familiarity.’1 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion to this dissertation I would like to look at how Wittgenstein is 
considered a key figure in the history of psychology and how his contributions, 
whether as a critic of behaviourism, or whether as a philosopher who foresaw 
how ‘context, or the ‘environment’, would play a pivotal role in understanding 
concepts, have been immensely influential. 
 
One of Wittgenstein’s most famous remarks can be found on the last 
page of the Investigations where he writes: 
 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by 
calling it a ‘young science’; its state is not comparable with that of 
physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain 
branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are 
experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case 
conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and 
method pass one another by.
2
  
 
 
I thought it appropriate that the conclusion of this dissertation should 
acknowledge Wittgenstein’s immense contribution to cognitive psychology 
and how he should be considered a key figure, alongside other influential 
theorists such as B.F. Skinner and Sigmund Freud. 
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This dissertation has examined Wittgenstein’s move from a quasi-
realist position in the Tractatus to an anti-realist position in the Investigations. 
As we have seen, the Investigations, in many ways, can be considered as a 
critique of his earlier work. His reflections on logical positivism invite him to 
question his propositions as explicated in the Tractatus. One of the reasons 
why Wittgenstein moves from this idea of a conception of language as a 
calculus to a language-game is because he could identify the dissimilarities 
between language and calculus, even though rules and their application would 
always have to apply.
3
 Without doubt, he is a philosopher who understood the 
significance of language and its use. 
 
Wittgenstein, by the early 1940s, had radically changed not only the 
way he had viewed language from 1926 as exposited in the Tractatus, but he 
had also changed the way language as a ‘system’ was being discussed by 
philosophers, psychologists and in the area of linguistics. Wittgenstein had 
posited a language system, through his central concepts of a language-game 
and family resemblance, where the meaning of words and concepts were solely 
derived from the practice of language itself; in other words, language was the 
use of the word as held in a particular context. 
 
While Wittgenstein was working on the Investigations he witnessed the 
pendulum swing from the prominent paradigm of psychoanalysis to the now 
more important domain of behaviourism. His interest in behaviour, as a 
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description of the practice of language, frequently and incorrectly labels him as 
a behaviourist; rather his descriptions and remarks in the Investigations show 
what he considers to be the limitations of behaviourism. While ‘The emerging 
viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply 
rooted in the body’s interactions with the world,’4 Wittgenstein’s interest in 
behaviourism was embedded in his view that concepts should always be seen 
as participatory within a context: ‘Language is an instrument. Its concepts are 
instruments.’5 Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s rejection of mentalism is often 
considered an attack on psychology, particularly when he makes remarks such 
as ‘The occult character of the mental processes.’6 Wittgenstein wants us to see 
that mental processes and states (‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’), are much more 
significant than something that is considered separate from the body: this can 
also be interpreted as Wittgenstein’s rejection of cognitivism and dualism. 
However, as we have seen in his remarks, Wittgenstein is not denying that 
mental states exist: he is stating that these mental processes and states should 
never be described in abstract terms or as isolated objects. Wittgenstein wants 
us to see the connection between concepts participating as part of the context, 
with mind and body, thus the individual can make sense of their world.  
 
The cognitive revolution brought mentalism to a new standing point. 
Terms such as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognitivism’ were introduced and the mind was 
now considered in terms of a computer and computational symbols. We also 
saw how the cognitive approach to concepts emerged. There was now an 
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emphasis on how concepts were developed and used from a cognitive 
perspective, such as the definitional view, and prototype, exemplar and 
knowledge approaches. However, contemporary cognitive psychology 
acknowledges and, thus emphasises, the role that the environment plays, hence 
the embodied cognition thesis, where, also notably, the notion of the ‘abstract’, 
which for Wittgenstein was a problem, is no longer a challenge. The embodied 
cognition thesis is Wittgenstein’s legacy to cognitive psychology.  
 
This study also examined the role that concepts play and how they are 
the bridge between mind and world,
7
 the glue of our cognitive system,
8
 and 
should always be considered as participatory within a context. What this study 
has established is that concepts are not isolated objects of reference,  rather 
they are part of the context and a social construct, such as a language-game, 
where they are situated and where there is an engagement between the 
individual (mind and body) and the environment. Furthermore, concepts 
contain information that allow us to classify items according to the category to 
which they belong and, thus, enable us to make sense of our world. Concepts 
also allow us to make predictions and inferences about situations, reason out 
new and unfamiliar experiences, and facilitate communication so that we can 
share information.
9
 For Wittgenstein, outside an environment there cannot be a 
precise meaning that any concept ascribes to: 
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But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the 
words by means of examples and by practice.—And when I do this I do 
not communicate less to him than I know myself.
10
   
 
Rosch’s views on concepts were also examined and, hence, it is her 
term ‘participatory’ that I use to describe Wittgenstein’s concepts within a 
language-game. Rosch states that ‘because concepts are situation based and 
participatory rather than identification functions, definitions can be viewed in a 
new light.’11 She explains that concepts are usually defined against a 
‘background of practices, understandings and explicit teachings’ and that the 
explanation we give usually is the definitional view of a concept which we now 
know is incorrect. As Wittgenstein urges us to see, the explanation of the 
concept always lies in its use within a context. Rosch suggests that there is an 
alternative approach: a definition by means of prototypes: 
 
Prototypes with their rich non-criterial information and imagery can 
indicate, on many levels, possible ways of situating oneself and 
navigating in complex situations.
12
 
 
  
Once again, the reader can identify a Wittgensteinian theme in Rosch’s 
remarks. 
 
This dissertation has also shown that Wittgenstein’s central concept of a 
‘language-game’ is more than a tool for establishing the meaning of words; it is 
indeed a theory of language. This would suggest that as a theory it presents 
language from a theoretical framework and, as such, adheres to the demands of 
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its propositions. However, while Wittgenstein’s language-game emerged as 
part of his critique of his earlier work, the Tractatus, it still nonetheless, 
conforms to a ‘theory’. As I discussed in Chapter 6, Wittgenstein would 
undoubtedly reject the label ‘theory’, as he tends to rejects all labels, 
definitions and exactness, but would understand that what he describes in the 
context of a language-game can also be used to describe the practice of 
language and, therefore, language use from a theoretical viewpoint.  
 
However, I contend, that there remain many unanswered questions for 
psychology and philosophy. I present these as follows: 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 cognitive psychology approaches concepts in 
various ways. While it is not the task of this study to evaluate whether these 
views are correct or how they need to be modified, if at all, there are, without 
doubt, significant philosophical influences which are apparent. However, when 
does an influence become a direct challenge in empirical research? 
Furthermore, did Wittgenstein’s remarks, specifically in the Investigations, 
spur empirical research in psychology, particularly in the domains of cognitive 
and social psychology? 
 
Similarly, I also ask are there any issues that the language-game does 
not address? If so, what are they? Are there any limitations to a language-
game? If so, what are these limitations? Often cited as the most influential 
philosopher of the twentieth-century, is it possible that he also shaped the 
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development of cognitive psychology from its inception?  For example, Rosch 
adapted the term family resemblance when developing the prototype view as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Did this, in turn, influence the development of the other 
approaches taken, such as the exemplar view and the knowledge approach, and 
perhaps even create biases in these viewpoints? Indeed the term family 
resemblance is also used in current theories of memory, such as propositional 
networks and connectionist frameworks, including parallel distributive 
processing, and given its significance within the domain of memory 
specifically, is it likely that Wittgenstein’s family resemblance will also 
feature, at some point, in a semantic network model?  If so, what does this 
mean for cognitive psychology?   
  
One of the most contentious and yet interesting debates within the 
domain of cognitive psychology is whether our knowledge and, therefore, our 
concepts, are best supported by empiricism, where concepts are more data 
driven, or whether they are best supported by innate knowledge, where 
concepts are considered more conceptually mediated, thus a priori arguments 
arise. How can we prove that some concepts, such as maths for example, are 
not a priori and other concepts, such as dancing, are not formed culturally and, 
therefore, considered a posteriori?; why is it easier to learn concrete concepts 
such as ‘chair’ and ‘apple’, but more difficult to acquire abstract concepts such 
as ‘university’ and ‘truth’? Was Wittgenstein’s interest in concepts as part of 
the environment, and part of the interaction with the individual, fuelled by the 
dogmatism of psychoanalysis and behaviourism?; if we accept that meaning is 
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not a designated word, then is it the context that makes a difference to what 
happens cognitively? If so, how do we identify the cognitive processes 
involved?  
 
Another issue to consider is whether cognitive theorists would accept 
that the language-game is a theory of language, from a psychological 
perspective as opposed to a philosophical explanation only, or could it be 
accepted as both? While there is no empirical evidence to support this theory 
would a theorist, such as Rosch, examine it and perhaps advocate for its 
efficacy considering that she had previously shown that ‘what philosophers 
took as a matter for a priori speculation could be demonstrated empirically.’13  
 
When a closer examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks is undertaken, it 
is clear that some fundamental questions are not answered despite his 
comments (and in some cases presuppositions) on some of these areas. For 
example, why does he never develop an explanation on the meaning and the 
function of what it is to ‘understand’? Is this because, for Wittgenstein, to 
address these issues would have meant entering into the domain of cognitivism, 
a paradigm that was yet to emerge? Furthermore, is it possible Wittgenstein 
withheld his extended comments and descriptions on the role of ‘the mind’ and 
‘the mental’ and ‘cognition’ because he felt restrained by other less dominant 
themes, such as structuralism and functionalism, even though he could see the 
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limitations of behaviourism and the role that ‘the mind’ and ‘the mental’ could 
potentially play? 
 
Finally, why is it that psychology books, with particular reference to the 
domains of cognitive and social paradigms, still find Wittgenstein so 
interesting? Did Wittgenstein change how language is viewed and utilised in a 
social and shared context? Is there a significant Wittgensteinian influence, in, 
for example, social constructionism?
14
 Is there a place for social 
constructionists and their critics in psychology to engage with Wittgenstein’s 
work, in particular again his later philosophy, and to examine the relationship 
between language, mind and world?
15
  
 
I suggest that these are only some of a myriad of questions that can be 
raised in relation to Wittgenstein’s contribution to contemporary psychology. 
As we have seen in this study, for Wittgenstein ‘the most interesting 
psychological questions are conceptual.’16 I propose that the present resurgence 
of interest in Wittgenstein is related to: 
 
growing concern in the philosophy and methodology of the behavioural 
sciences with the role played by conceptual frameworks, models and 
metaphors in the mediation of our experience of the world.
17
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I suggest that this mediation is also embedded in the interaction between the 
environment, concept, mind and body, that is, the embodied cognition thesis. 
Furthermore, the framework emerging from experiments by Ambrosini et al. 
would support this claim and suggest that: 
 
Knowledge of the world is built online, via current information, 
implicitly through behaviour, and is not necessarily reflected in explicit 
estimates or conscious representations.
18
 
 
Once again, we see a Wittgensteinian theme. 
 
In conclusion, it would appear from this study that concepts are neither 
right nor wrong: they are simply the bridge we use between mind, body and 
world (environment or context) in order that we can make sense of our 
experiences. The purpose of this dissertation was to examine concepts as 
participatory, as exemplified through Wittgenstein’s language-game, and as the 
embodied cognition thesis purports. However, similar to Rosch, I believe that 
the study of concepts must be an open discussion rather than a study that is 
based on logic or theoretical data only. If we can do this, then there will be a 
genuine rethinking of the interaction and reciprocity between mind, world and 
concepts, and where the rational method of philosophy can reveal more about 
the structure of language and its use.
19
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This dissertation on Wittgenstein’s legacy to cognitive psychology has 
established three arguments: first, that the language-game can also be 
considered a theory of language; secondly, that the language-game is the 
context within which concepts are participatory and engage with the mind and 
body; this is the embodied cognition thesis. Thirdly, Wittgenstein’s 
contribution to cognitive psychology has influenced current psychology 
paradigms in how psychology approaches concepts, namely situated and 
embodied cognition. Without exception, Wittgenstein’s immense contribution 
makes him a key figure in the history of cognitive psychology, alongside other 
significant theorists such as B.F. Skinner and Sigmund Freud. 
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